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#### Cooperation with NATO is an extension of Western IRs colonial project of maintain European supremacy – it creates the conditions for violence and war against the periphery

CAMPBELL 19 – Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University [Horace, “[Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis](https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/),” 4/9/2019, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>, DKP]

In the celebratory events to memorialize the founding of NATO in 1949, it is usually forgotten that when the North American Treaty was signed in April 1949 most of the founding members were colonial overlords. Colonialism and imperialism took a new form under the leadership of US capitalists defending the dollar and Wall Street. At that historical moment in 1949, the justification for starting this organization was that it constituted a system of collective defense whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. The external party in question at that time was the USSR; insofar as NATO had been formed as an alliance ostensibly to defend Western Europe against ‘communist expansion’. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all.” The US military and industrial leaders studied the terror and propaganda tactics of the Nazis in order to learn the lessons of how to develop an efficient military machine. James Whitman in the book, Hitler’s American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law, outlined what the fascists had learnt from the eugenics movement in the United States.[10] Although many anti-fascist scientists from Germany had found a place in the US academy, the top planners of the Cold War linked the US primacy to the global history of racism to the efficient, bureaucratic and professionalism of conservative Germany. One of the unspoken aspects of the first years of NATO was the question of containing the possible revolutionary impulses of the German working peoples. To forestall such a possibility, the thinkers and planners of NATO collaborated with the former fascists to learn their skills. The details of this alliance have been spelt out in the book on the CIA by David Talbot in the book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government. The merging of fascist ideas with the ideas of Jim Crow in the United States were refined in the secret operation called, Operation Paperclip. Anne Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America, [11] elaborated in great detail the secret program of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) largely carried out by Special Agents of Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in which more than 1,600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken from Germany to America for U.S. government employment, primarily between 1945 and 1959. Many were former members, and some were former leaders, of the Nazi Party. These elements were the foundation of a military program that has brought us the weaponization of space. The creators of NATO simultaneously mobilized the colonial and fascist elements in Belgium, Spain, Italy and France. Of the twelve founding members, six were outright colonial powers and at that moment, countries such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain and Portugal looked to the USA to support their plunder of colonial societies. In the specific case of France, in order to assist French colonialism, Algeria was named as a territory of NATO. Sixty years later when the President of France, Macron, apologized for the crimes of killing more than one million Algerians, there is no reflection inside western academic institutions on this role of NATO in Africa. Currently, the French have been the most aggressive in promoting the fiction that the defense radius of Europe stretches 4000 kilometers out from Brussels, up to the arctic, well across the Russian frontier and down into central Africa. It is not widely known that, initially, the Portuguese fascists were some of the principal beneficiaries of the membership of NATO, with major deployment of nuclear weapons in the Azores as reward for the NATO support for colonialism in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea and other Portuguese outposts of colonial domination. Prior to the formation of NATO in 1949, the 1947 document of the State Department on Cooperative Development of Africa had stipulated that colonialism would assist the recovery of European capitalism. [12]The State Department had been explicit in outlining how cheap foodstuffs and raw materials from Africa would assist Europe’s recovery and create the basis for unity and economic regeneration. The USA set about creating a number of international institutions to guarantee the survival of Europe and of capitalism, the IMF, IBRD (World Bank), the NATO, GATT, to guarantee the strength of the USA in international trade and finance. By the time NATO was formed in 1949, the US planners had already made their plans with Britain and France to extend their military control over Africa. France was bequeathed the task of maintaining order in western Africa while the British sought to maintain naval power incorporating the British facilities from the Suez Canal down through Aden (Yemen), to Mombasa (Kenya), Simons town South Africa across to Malaysia. [13] The racist apartheid regime had persuaded NATO that it was necessary to integrate the South African military into the western defense planning in order to protect the ‘Cape route.’ After the Suez crises of 1956 and the 1967 war this alliance with the racist regime deepened. Throughout its existence NATO assisted in the refinement of the racial status hierarchy in which whites are dominant and people of color are subordinate. [14] This incorporation of racist ideas into western defense continued a long tradition that shaped the outlook of NATO and reinforced the outlook of Frantz Fanon: “Colonialism is violence in its natural state.” France and Britain excelled in this violence with the Belgians cementing their communications and logistics coordination to kill Patrice Lumumba and later support the killing of the Secretary General of the United Nation, Dag Hammarskjold. [15]

#### Their theory of IR is wrong and racist – it relies on Western conceptions of sovereignty, and assumes a White, rational neoliberal subject at the core of decision making – this propagates both instability and imperialism through the cloak of liberal restraint.

Hobson 22 – Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield, PhD from the LSE [John, “Unmasking the racism of orthodox international relations/international political economy theory,” Security Dialogue 2022, Vol. 53(1) 3 –20, Security Dialogue 2022, Vol. 53(1) 3 –20, DKP]

Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose1: Racism as shapeshifter – The polymorphous cycles of racism in everyday life and world politics

While liberal conceptions construct a progressive-evolutionary vision of world politics wherein racism gradually evaporates as the bright sunlight of modernity intensifies, nevertheless, numerous critical race scholars point to a recurring dark cycle of racial control that marks the long history of modernity (e.g. Alexander, 2012: 20–58; Bonilla-Silva, 2018: 17–52; Omi and Winant, 2014: 84–91; Perry, 2007). Focusing on the United States, Michelle Alexander (2012: 21) asserts that

racial history . . . is highly adaptable [or polymorphous]. The rules and reasons the political system employs to enforce status relations of any kind, including racial hierarchy, evolve and change as they are challenged. The valiant efforts to abolish slavery and Jim Crow and to achieve greater racial equality have brought about significant changes in the legal framework of American society – new ‘rules of the game,’ so to speak. These new rules have been justified by new rhetoric, new language, and a new social consensus, while producing many of the same results. This dynamic, which legal scholar Reva Siegel has dubbed ‘[racist] preservation through transformation,’ is the process through which white privilege is maintained, though the rules and rhetoric change.

This ‘Groundhog Day’ cycle entails pyrrhic moments of black victory being subsequently rolled back by a white backlash whereby white racial control is reasserted once more, albeit in a new guise, thereby rendering the liberal conception of a temporal movement of linear progress towards black liberation/justice as but a Whiggish construct. For racism is a polymorphous shapeshifter, crystallizing in different guises over time but retaining its oppressive properties. Accordingly, it is not that racism is progressively undermined over time but that its outward appearance becomes progressively more hidden, camouflaged or sublimated – at least in the eyes of white people.

In the United States, the era of Reconstruction entailed the end of slavery in 1865, together with the 14th Amendment (prohibition of states from denying due process and equal protection under the law), the 15th Amendment (the right to vote regardless of race) and the Ku Klux Klan Acts (which declared interference with voting regardless of race as a federal offence). But these progressive initiatives led on directly to a white backlash. In particular, the Southern states sought to circumvent these progressive initiatives while the emergence of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) backed up the states’ reactionary activities through the organization’s sustained campaign of racist terrorism. Woodrow Wilson (1901: 11) typified this racist episteme when he argued that ‘the first practical result of the Reconstruction under the Acts of 1867 was the disenfranchisement . . . of the better whites and the consequent giving over of the Southern governments into the hands of the negroes’. Moreover, he dog-whistled to the KKK when he asserted that ‘the white men of the South were aroused by the mere instinct of self-preservation to rid themselves, by fair means or foul, of the intolerable burdens of governments sustained by the votes of ignorant negroes and conducted in the interests of [Negro] adventurers’ (Wilson, 1902: 58).

It was not long before the North retreated from the South to leave black people at the mercy of the white backlash via the Jim Crow era of racial segregation. Nothing changed until after World War II, with the next transformational-moment-cum-pyrrhic-victory coming exactly 100 years after the 13th Amendment (the abolition of black slavery) through the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the death of Jim Crow was followed by a renewed white backlash that forged a New Jim Crow era that has remained up to the present (Alexander, 2012; Bonilla-Silva, 2018). And this ‘new’ era gained its legitimacy by dressing racism in more neutral cultural clothing while maintaining racial oppression. Thus, in this New Jim Crow era, the matrix of white power ensured that the black man would be held back not because of his inferior genes but by his inferior culture, though the ‘invisible empire’ of the KKK remained intact, albeit much diminished.

This American racial cycle comprises a microcosm of the wider cycle that has played out across the West. Thus, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the entwined discourses of scientific racism and manifest cultural racism underpinned the identity of the West, with both developing during and especially after the Atlantic slave trade. Liberal visions emphasize the ‘benign’ Western humanitarian drive, with the British termination of the slave trade in 1807 constituting the inception of a long, progressive process of black liberation from racial oppression. But this is problematic because Britain is celebrated for in effect putting out a fire that the British and other Europeans had started. Even so, the British did not put out the fire, because the ensuing white backlash saw racism and racist imperialism deepen after the end of the British slave trade, while the latter morphed into the highly oppressive indentured labour trade.

For many liberals at the time (e.g. Mitrany, 1933), the Paris Peace Conference and the creation of the League of Nations Mandate System was viewed as another turning point in the progressive liberation of black and brown people. However, in addition to Woodrow Wilson’s well-known rejection of the Japanese delegation’s proposal for a racial-equality clause, his prior enunciation of the principle of sovereignty in his (1918) Fourteen Points speech that triggered emancipatory hopes in the hearts of the colonized peoples turns out to have applied only to Eastern Europe and Wilson was categorically opposed to awarding sovereignty to non-Western polities. Surely, though, Wilson stood behind the ‘humanitarian’ Mandate system? Indeed he did, but only because the system was founded on the racist-imperial idea of ‘trusteeship’ that had first been explicitly conceived at the 1884 Berlin conference as the guiding principle of European imperialism in Africa. For this conception rested on the paternalist-racist assumption that the uncivilized races were not yet ready to rule themselves and therefore must be held under imperial trusteeship until they had ‘grown up’ (i.e. become Western). Once again, the Western mandate of racial-imperial oppression remained fully intact during the interwar period.

The next key ‘turning point’ occurs in the 1945–1960 period, when decolonization was allegedly bequeathed by the gracious hand of the benign West. Apart from the fact that decolonization was won by the nationalist movements against the resistance of the colonial powers, the subsequent postcolonial era has witnessed a continuation of racist practices, albeit in the camouflaged guise of subliminal cultural-racist concepts such as US hegemony and Western humanitarian intervention. But while one might anticipate that the task of (orthodox) international relations/international political economy scholars should be to deconstruct such subliminal cultural racism, it turns out that they have, albeit unwittingly, given it succour, as the next two sections explain.

Cycles of racism in orthodox international relations theory

The core point is that racism is a shapeshifter in that its outward expression or modality changes over time while its underlying structure remains the same. Before 1945 both scientific racism and ‘manifest’ cultural racism focused explicitly on race as a core category, while after 1945 race disappears from international relations theory’s gaze and its conceptual repertoire. In particular, 1945 is conventionally viewed as the watershed moment when international relations jettisoned scientific and manifest cultural racism. In this narrative, the West’s ensuing ‘colonial racist guilt syndrome’ prompted the social sciences to ‘make amends’ by replacing the dark old racist Weltanschauung with a bright new non-racist worldview in which the post-1945 international relations discipline came to embrace a value-free, positivistic posture through which the pernicious phenomena of racial hatred and imperialism are thought to have been finally and mercifully exorcized. But the reality saw the creation of a brave new worldview in which explicit racism (scientific and manifest cultural racism) indeed died out in the halls of the academy and were replaced not by ‘non-racist cultural pluralism’ but by subliminal cultural-racist monism that appears on first blush as socially acceptable given that it no longer talks about race and its associated tropes (Hobson, 2012: 185186, 319–322). Thus, in subliminal cultural racism, Western academics did indeed distance themselves from the old explicit racist tropes but reaffirmed them in whitewashed terms that dare not speak their name.

Thus, ‘white supremacism’ was replaced by the core modus operandi of Western universalism (a.k.a. ‘Western superiority’) and, albeit implicitly, white normality; racial hierarchy alongside the racial standard of civilization were replaced by the proxies of cultural-institutional hierarchy and the Western market standard of civilization; ‘civilization versus barbarism/savagery’ was replaced by ‘tradition versus modernity’ or ‘developed versus undeveloped economies’; ‘barbaric Oriental despotisms’ morphed into the tropes of ‘rogue states’ and the ‘axis of evil’ on the basis that such states would not reciprocate according to the ‘civilized norms’ of (Western) international law and (Western-based) ‘international society’, while ‘savage anarchies’ morphed into ‘failed states’ on the basis that they could not reciprocate. And last, but not least, the old colonial denial of non-Western state sovereignty was replaced by the construct of ‘conditional sovereignty’ in the postcolonial era, while imperial intervention was replaced by (the ‘civilizing mission’ of) US hegemony, intervention by international financial institutions and humanitarian intervention.

Accordingly, orthodox international relations scholars have mistaken the shift from explicit racism to subliminal cultural racism for one that marks the transition from racism to non-racist, value free ‘scientific positivism’. Critical race theorists view this transition as one in which cultural difference masquerades as tolerant cultural pluralism but that, in reality, is ‘racism in disguise’ (Balibar, 1991; Barker, 1981; Bonilla-Silva, 2018; Henderson, 2013; Hunt, 1987; McCarthy, 2009; Miles, 1993; Omi and Winant, 2014; Perry, 2007; Salter, 2002; Vitalis, 2000, 2015). Thus, speaking of the post-1945 substitution of cultural difference for racial difference, Richard Perry (2007: 216) concludes that ‘the terms may change, perhaps giving the impression that the old [racial] problems have disappeared, when in fact they have merely acquired protective coloration through semantic camouflage’. Or, again, ‘the demise of scientific racism in its evolutionary-biological form did not mean the end of racist thinking in scholarly discourse altogether. A new, post-biological modality of neo-racism is now widespread in social science’ (McCarthy, 2009: 91). This cultural modality has also been termed ‘racism lite’ or ‘colour-blind racism’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2018).

Thus, the evolution of international relations theory has mirrored the generic shifts in the practice of racism in everyday life and in world politics given that the discipline’s racism has been hidden behind a non-racist mask after 1945. Unmasking modern international relations theory reveals its emphasis on cultural difference as a proxy for non-white racial inferiority and white Western superiority. Thus, white international relations theorists often wear a ‘non-racist mask’ in order to make their cultural-racist theories appear socially palatable in the so-called cultural-pluralist postcolonial era. Accordingly, all that has really changed since 1945 is that the old racist Jim Crow laws that international theory originally conceptualized became sublimated or ‘hidden in plain sight’ (Henderson, 2013; Rutazibwa, 2020; Vitalis, 2000), having morphed into the ‘New (subliminal) Jim Crow laws’ of modern analyses of the global economy/interstate system. Uncovering this long temporal passage that links the past with the present means that the discipline has a fabricated detachment with the racist ghosts of its past (as Bryony Vince put it to me in private conversation). What, then, of the racist double move that modern orthodox international relations theories perform when analysing world politics/global political economy?

Revealing the racist double move of orthodox international relations theory

The giveaway concerning the racist foundations of modern international relations theory lies not simply in what it does say but as much in what it does not. Thus, to postcolonialism’s rhetorical question as to whether racism has played an important role in structuring world politics past and present, the orthodox reply is simply ‘nothing to see here’. This first racist move, which evacuates and whitewashes the presence of racism in world politics past and present, is complemented by the second, in which international relations theory advances a racist analysis of world politics/global political economy but in subliminal cultural language that appears as value-free and ‘racially neutral’. To illustrate this double move, I shall draw on examples from my current research (Hobson and Odijie, forthcoming) and from elsewhere.

The neorealist vision of the Cold War comprises a Western zone of relative peace and stability that ensues from bipolarity or US hegemony or the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). But such ‘peace and stability’ was only rendered possible because of the racist decision by the superpowers to outsource war to the ‘inferior’ and expendable ‘wastelands’ of the Global South, which constituted a safety valve that could prevent direct nuclear conflict from erupting between the USA and the USSR. Thus, ‘it appears that cold war history has a concentric conceptual organization, consisting of a “formal” history of relative peace in the center and “informal” violence in the periphery’ (Kwon, 2010: 155; see also Persaud, 2016). Moreover, ‘in a historical sense – and especially when seen from the South – the Cold War was a continuation of colonialism through slightly different means. . . For the Third World, the continuum of which the Cold War forms a part did not start in 1945, or even 1917, but in 1878 – with the [Congress] of Berlin that divided Africa between European imperialist powers’ (Westad, 2007: 396). This Western neo-imperialism also takes us back to the future of America’s racist-colonial drive in the 19th and early 20th centuries (see Go, 2011; Hunt, 1987). But all of this necessarily flies under neorealism’s ontological radar scanner given its evacuation of social process through its reification of the structural logic of anarchy that is coupled with the deployment of the Eurocentric/racist method of ‘analytical bifurcation’, wherein racist-imperial processes are bracketed out and silenced in favour of focusing solely on intra-Western white activities (Go, 2016: 89–92, 104–110).

This first move is complemented by neorealism’s second, wherein a subliminal cultural-racist theory is applied to analysing world politics. Notable here is that European empires constituted subsystems hierarchies in which the dominant hyper-sovereign colonial power stood atop of the colonies that were denied sovereignty. But Waltz’s reification of international anarchy is triply problematic, first because this conception replicates the old scientific-racist conception of ‘tropical anarchy’ (Henderson, 2013; Sampson, 2002; compare Lynch, 2019: 277); second, because Waltz sanitizes or evacuates hierarchy from world politics, thereby conjuring Western colonialism and its practices of genocide, the Atlantic slave trade, land appropriation and labour exploitation together with its neo-imperialist successor into thin air (Hobson, 2012: 203–208; Sabaratnam, 2020); and, third, Waltz’s claim that sovereign states are the dominant form of polity under modern anarchy is undermined by the presence of colonial hierarchy before the very recent era of decolonization wherein the only sovereign states that existed were Western. Accordingly, Waltz’s move serves to let Western imperialism off the moral hook, thereby reflecting an ‘epistemology of ignorance’ (Sabaratnam, 2020: 20–21; see also Mills, 2007). Interestingly, we find an evacuation and naturalization of Western empire in the classical realist work of Hans Morgenthau (Hobson, 2012: 188–190; Salter, 2002: 117) and other realists, which leads Nicolas Guilhot (2014) to talk of ‘imperial realism’.

By contrast, Robert Gilpin’s neorealist hegemonic stability theory embraces a normative (direct) imperialism that is dressed up in terms that dare not speak its name (Hobson, 2012: 193–203). Gilpin (1987) differentiates hegemons from empires, where the latter exploit non-Western states while the former help them through the hegemon’s self-sacrificial provision of global public goods. But the paternalist sign of US hierarchical hegemony is that it supposedly uplifts states around the world, with East Asian states singled out as the most egregious and ungrateful free riders that benefit most from hegemonic largesse. Thus, what Gilpin misses is that the conception of uplift reconvenes Britain’s paternalist-imperial civilizing mission of the 19th century, though this elision is inevitable given that he re-visions the British Empire as a benign liberal hegemon. Significantly, Niall Ferguson (2004) effectively reconvenes Gilpin’s argument, though he talks explicitly about the benign liberal imperialism of Britain and America. Moreover, this benign conception that reflects an epistemology of ignorance effectively boils off the coercive side of empire in the subliminal cultural-racist distillation process, thereby providing an apologia for Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

Similar cultural racist logics play out in liberalism (see Hobson, 2012: 216–222, 285–310). While the normative (direct) imperialist posture that is found in John Rawls’s (1999) The Law of Peoples is a very obvious example (Hobson, 2012: 292–295), nevertheless the hard test-case here is that of neoliberal institutionalism. The received wisdom is that neoliberal institutionalism presents a genuinely ‘universal’ picture or flattened ontology of all states learning to cooperate in order to enhance their gains. But it turns out that, in After Hegemony, Keohane (1984) confines this process to Western states (as did Norman Angell before him). Moreover, absent here is a historical sociological analysis that would reveal the hierarchical-imperial contexts that have driven both Western unity (Sabaratnam, 2020: 25) and the global process by which unequal gains accrue to the West at the expense of the non-West. Paradoxically, constructivists critique neoliberal institutionalism for its rational actor model by asserting that interests are not a priori but are formed through socialization. However, a close reading of Keohane’s book reveals that it is Western norms and identity that socialize Western states into cooperating (Keohane, 1984: 5–7, 43, 182). Accordingly, Keohane not only looks specifically at Western states as the successful actors, but argues that they take specifically Western cultural values such as democracy and liberal capitalism to the table before they enter iterated prisoner’s dilemma games (Keohane, 1984: 182).

One of several (direct) neo-imperialist cues in Keohane’s work emerges from his approval of US hegemonic intervention and intervention by international financial institutions in the Global South as a means of extending complex interdependence across the world. But here the international financial institutions act as paternalist neo-imperial vehicles for the cultural conversion of non-Western states along Western neoliberal capitalist lines via the imposition of neoliberal conditionality and structural adjustment programmes. Moreover, the notorious resentment that these programmes have invoked in many non-Western states, all of which disappears in Keohane’s analysis, takes us back to the future of the ‘unequal treaties’ that emerged under Britain’s informal imperialism in the 19th century, much as the paternalist role of the international financial institutions finds its historical parallel with the League of Nations Mandate System (Anghie, 2005: 245272). And, finally, Keohane’s approval of Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the 19th and 20th centuries returns us to the problems that I discussed above vis-a-vis hegemonic stability theory (see also Sabaratnam, 2020: 18–19).

A notable example of an indirect imperialist approach is found in the neoliberal theory of globalization, which rehabilitates the classical liberalism of Adam Smith and his aversion to empire (e.g. Friedman, 2000). But there are three subliminal neo-imperialist cues here, the first comprising Friedman’s (2000: 101–111) argument that non-Western states have no choice but to ‘don the golden straitjacket’, which requires them to adopt Western neoliberal-capitalist architectures. Having to become Western means that the theory smuggles informal imperialism in through the backdoor of its Western universalism. Second, by subscribing to the ontological proposition that ‘the world is flat’ (Friedman, 2007), the neoliberal theory of globalization conjures Western imperial/neo-imperial hierarchy and racial capitalism into thin air, thereby naturalizing rather than problematizing these phenomena via the epistemology of white ignorance. And, third, because Friedman focuses on rational individuals whose interests are a priori and whose social identity is irrelevant to individual behaviour, racism and racialized capitalism are whitewashed from the global economy.

Surely constructivism fares much better given its ability to highlight international racial norms? Not only has much of it ignored racism in world politics but the few constructivists who have considered it argue that racism was left behind in world politics after 1945 (Finnemore, 2003; Klotz, 1995), much as imperialism was supposedly outlawed by the UN in 1960. This whitewashing of racism and imperialism from modern world politics not only reflects the illusion that subliminal cultural racism projects but is also a vital move because it allows liberal constructivists to portray Western humanitarian interventionism and liberal peacebuilding/state-building as a non-racist/ non-imperial project that saves oppressed non-Western peoples. It is here that we encounter a subliminal cultural-racist paternalism that presents the West as the white saviour of the inferior non-Western societies – thereby rehabilitating the 19th-century conception of the white man’s burden and the civilizing mission – and where the West is (re)presented as the altruistic paternalist father of the non-West (Hobson, 2012: 302–305). Moreover, in this liberal imaginary of ignorance, the notion that peacebuilding/state-building is initiated as a means of eradicating the threat of the deviant non-Western Other disappears from view, as does the legacy of Western empire that created some of the core problems in non-Western states that prompted intervention in the first place (for further postcolonial critiques of liberal constructivism, see Sabaratnam, 2020; Sampson, 2002; Vitalis, 2000).

Liberal constructivism buys into the cultural-racist idea that all progressive actions in the world are initiated by the universal West ‘on behalf of global humanity’. For example, it is the benign West that has single-handedly brought human rights to the world via the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Here international relations’ ‘non-racist mask’ slips conspicuously, given that the Western great powers did their utmost at the United Nations to keep human rights off the global agenda for fear of diluting white supremacy and white normality in world politics and within Western societies. For it was various non-Western delegates at the UN that pursued human rights most fervently while their Western counterparts mobilized the defensive prerogative of sovereign independence to insulate their states from future criticism given that human rights were denied to minorities within their constituent societies, particularly native Americans and black African Americans in the United States. Thus, Western racist motivations and the progressive role of nonWestern agency in advancing the cause of human rights in world politics have been airbrushed out of the liberal-constructivist picture. And, in turn, this serves to retain the chimera of the purely progressive non-racist West and the regressive non-West. Equally as egregious is that the role of the West in the denial of human rights to non-Western peoples in the first place is somehow written out of the narrative. Still, much of this is perhaps unavoidable given that liberal-constructivist international relations tends ontologically to divorce power from norms in world politics and epistemologically segregates power from knowledge.

Are orthodox scholars intentionally racist? Racist impact over intention

The case for intentionality is that it is no coincidence that the shift from scientific racism to subliminal cultural racism in orthodox international relations/international political economy theory mirrored the trajectory of racism in everyday life and world politics. My hunch, though, is that international relations theory’s racism is unintentional given that the overwhelming majority of orthodox international relations scholars are most probably non-racist (but not anti-racist) in their private lives. But orthodox international relations scholars have mistaken a critique of their implication in structural racism for an allegation of interpersonal racism. This epistemology of, or move to, innocence links directly to the self-deluded heart of the orthodoxy. For there are all manner of built-in cloaking devices that mask the racism and whiteness of orthodox international relations theories from the eyes of their advocates. International relations’ ‘non-racist mask’ has at least four mystificatory layers.

The first layer (or cloaking device) is that racism in orthodox international relations/international political economy theory is manifested in cultural rather than biological terms, thereby appearing as outwardly non-racist (given the mistaken popular belief that racism is inherently biological). The second layer of mystification is that cultural racism takes on a hidden or subliminal guise (which exorcizes race as an ontological category from world politics), thereby making such racism much harder to detect. Aggregating these two layers together leads white international relations/international political economy scholars to buy into the self-deluded rhetoric that their theories are racist-free. Pertinent here is Blaut’s (1992: 296) characterization of the social sciences since 1950 as ‘so much [subliminal cultural] racism yet so few racists’ (see also Memmi, [1982] 2000: 3).

This mystification is ultimately secured by the third layer of the mask that constitutes the problem of blindness to white privilege. For not being on the end of racism’s pernicious effects means that, unlike non-whites, many white academics tend quite naturally to downplay its existence (see Lake, 2016). An obvious example of this lies with the everyday performance of driving from A to B. For the vast majority of white drivers are able to travel safe in the knowledge that they will not be stopped by the police unless they have been unlucky enough to have been caught breaking the speed limit. By contrast, many black drivers consider themselves lucky if they are not stopped by the police when they have respected the speed limit. Such blindness to white privilege feeds directly into the unreflexive propensity to deny the presence of whiteness and racism in both the theory and practice of orthodox international relations/international political economy (Peterson, 2021; Sabaratnam, 2020: 5). For the ingeniousness of white privilege is that it renders such privilege invisible. Thus, white people are effectively taught not to notice racism and their role in reproducing it (McIntosh, 2020). Which, in turn, fuels the tendency of the privileged to reject, if not protest vehemently, the accusation of racism in the social sciences – as in the aforementioned spat between Pankaj Mishra and Niall Ferguson (see Mishra, 2011). All of which undermines the prospect of addressing, let alone redressing, the problem at stake.

Thus, while a fifth great debate concerning the Eurocentric racism of orthodox international relations/international political economy is long overdue, unfortunately the chances of it occurring are slim to zero. This is partly because intradisciplinary dialogue between international relations’ orthodox and critical wings has completely broken down (De Carvalho et al., 2011), and partly because a simmering ‘white silence’ of denial is the most likely ‘response’ (see, Ryde, 2019; Saad, 2020). Strikingly, it is now some two decades since Robert Vitalis (2000) wrote his seminal article, but still the tumbleweed of white silence blows deafeningly past my window. However, were an explicit response to be forthcoming, two entwined paradoxes might emerge here, the first being that it would most likely accuse my argument of being angry, hysterical and outlandish, wherein ‘Eurocentrism’ is deemed to be the calm/rational ‘standard of common sense’ – the paradox being that rather than engaging with the substance of my critique, such a response would likely comprise an angry ad hominem attack on the accuser and the journal for publishing such an article. And the second paradox is that while most orthodox scholars abhor ‘cancel culture’, it turns out that engaging in an ad hominem attack serves merely to shut down debate on this vital issue. That is, an ad hominem attack on the accuser is merely another form of cancel culture. Still, both such ‘responses’ would reinforce my argument given that ‘white silence’, ‘white rage’ and ‘white denial’ are manifestations of white privilege (see Ryde, 2019; Saad, 2020: 40–45; Sabaratnam, 2020; Peterson, 2021).

A fourth cloaking device is that pre-1945 orthodox international theory has been put through an ahistorical deracination laundering process to reappear in whitewashed form, fit for consumption in the ‘cultural pluralist’ post-1945 era. And because post-1945 international relations theory is (re)presented as non-racist so the laundering of its pre-1945 predecessor means that international theory in the last three centuries is (re)presented as universally racist-free. In this sleight-of-hand manoeuvre, the racist underpinnings of pre-1945 liberal and realist theories are filtered out or conjured away, leaving only their claims about states or geopolitics or interdependence that are transmogrified into ‘objective universalist’ propositions. In the liberal pantheon, two examples are pertinent. First is Norman Angell, who is (re)presented as a key theorist of liberal interdependence and the peaceful benefits it provides rather than as the paternalist-Eurocentric/cultural racist that he was, given his fundamental belief in international hierarchy and the positive need for the British Empire to promote harmonious global interdependence by acting as the civilizer of the barbaric and savage East (see Hobson, 2012: 40–45). Second is the reconstruction of Woodrow Wilson, who is recast as the founding father of 20th-century progressive liberal internationalism, based as ‘it is’ on anti-imperialism, sovereignty and self-determination for all states rather than on what ‘it was’ – a Lamarckian racist vision comprising a pro-Western imperialist stance and a denial of nonWestern state sovereignty that was coupled with strong racial immigration controls and anti-black initiatives at home (see Hobson, 2012: 167–175). Similarly, pre-1945 realists typically mentioned in international relations textbooks include Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder and occasionally Nicholas Spykman, all of whom are (re)presented as geopolitical-realist thinkers that analysed spatial conceptions of world power rather than as Lamarckian scientific racists who advocated Western imperialism to contain the marauding ‘barbaric’ non-Western peril and whose mentor was the scientific-racist thinker Friedrich Ratzel (see Hobson, 2012: 123–130, 156–158).

Critically, this laundering process extends across all aspects of pre-1945 international relations. Thus, it becomes (but should no longer be) a revelation to learn that early international relations was primarily concerned about inter-racial relations; that the claim that international relations emerged formally in 1919 with the noble desire to solve the problem of war elides its earlier origins, which revolved around maintaining white Western global supremacy and racist empire together with the normative study of ‘effective’ colonial administration; that the journal Foreign Affairs was originally called the Journal of Race Development; and that the International Studies Conference at the League of Nations, which set up the subject matter of international relations in the 1930s under the leadership of Alfred Zimmern, grounded its syllabi in normative Western imperialism and racism (see Acharya and Buzan, 2019; Ashworth, 2014; Bell, 2016; De Carvalho et al., 2011; Henderson, 2013; Hobson, 2012; Kristensen, 2021; Long and Schmidt, 2005; Lynch, 2019; Schmidt, 1998; Schmidt and Guilhot, 2019; Thakur and Vale, 2019; Vitalis, 2000, 2005, 2015). That orthodox international relations scholars persist in ignoring these arguments in the face of a now substantial body of literature that has emerged over the last two decades means that this pervading silence can no longer be excused as the product of an innocent ‘historical amnesia’. Rather, this silence points clearly to the white denial of international relations’ racist origins wherein the non-racist mask slips most conspicuously, thereby constituting an actual example of orthodox international relations’ version of cancel culture.

However, except for in the above context, ‘intentionality’ is not the issue that the racist charge hinges upon given that most international relations/international political economy theorists are unintentionally racist. What matters, therefore, is racist impact regardless of intention. And to conclude this article more generally, it would be folly to presume that if only the Eurocentric rather than the racist charge were levied against the orthodox mainstream then ‘all would not be lost’. For the E-word cannot be used as a ‘get out of racist jail free’ card.

#### “Treason to Whiteness is loyalty to humanity.” The alternative is to reject the 1AC by de-centering and de-mythologizing Whiteness in favor of centering Blackness – that’s key to any ethical research project – even if they win analyzing Great Powers is important, the alternative is a pre-requisite to the plan

Sabaratnam 20 – Senior Lecturer in International Relations at SOAS University of London, PhD and MSc from the London School of Economics in Senior Fellow of the Higher Education Academy [Meera, “Is IR Theory White? Racialised Subject-Positioning in Three Canonical Texts,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10/25/2020, Vol. 49(1) 3–31, DKP] blue highlighting in tag

Beyond White Subject-Positioning in IR

Given this, what would it mean to re-imagine the study of IR in a way that attempted to overcome epistemologies of immanence, ignorance, and innocence? While it is impossible to do justice here to the wide range of traditions that have alternative starting points, as scholars of IR our priorities should be to (1) ‘de-mythologise’121 and (2) ‘de-centre’ this racialised standpoint. Both require a more sophisticated awareness of epistemological situatedness, a better global-historical education and a wider ethical and political vocabulary and universe. It requires an alertness not just to the intellectual contours of Eurocentrism, but the interlocking moral and epistemological consequences of White subject-positioning. They may be animated by the abolitionist principle that ‘treason to Whiteness is loyalty to humanity’.122 This principle does not build the grounds for a ‘redeemed’ or ‘modified’ Whiteness but totally deconstructs it analytically and ethically.

A ‘de-mythologising’ strategy challenges epistemologies of immanence and ignorance – the specific racialised metahistorical narratives and myths about the exceptional, vanguardist, and progressive character of the ‘West’ and its peoples as a point of departure for building international theory. Alternative accounts are already available to us which emphasise the uneven but interconnected ways in which the modern international system came to be. These look at the contributions of the ‘non-West’ to the rise of the ‘West’,123 the role of transnational networks as drivers of development,124 the enduring role of hierarchies as an organising principle of global order,125 the colonial origins of sovereignty practices126 and the transnational character of political thought.127 There is considerable scope for more historically oriented work which excavates in particular the relation between the ‘colonial’ and the ‘modern’.

Another way of ‘de-mythologising’ Whiteness in IR is to re-think the discipline’s constitutive distinction between ‘war’ and ‘violence’, particularly where the coding of historical events into one or another category have been as a result of racialised categorisations and thinking about whose deaths count, thus enabling an epistemology of ‘innocence’.128 Withholding the assumption that ‘war’ (meaning wars as recognised by and between Western powers) rather than ‘violence’ should be studied in IR – as in peace studies, for example129 – offers considerable scope for contemplating the rich web of interconnections and entanglements that constitute the international system, and particularly its colonial, imperial and racialised inheritances. It is a particularly productive point of departure for conceiving of questions of consent and sovereignty under radical inequalities of power globally, and potential shared forms of theorising among feminist approaches,130 critical environmentalisms,131 Indigenous political thought,132 and so on.

‘De-centring’ Whiteness means not only a regional expansion of IR’s gaze but more profoundly a re-locating of its intellectual and ethical centre of gravity away from its stories of ‘immanence’ and ‘innocence’. One way of doing this might be, as Wynter does, to re-centre Blackness as the starting point for the embrace of the ‘human’ in all its multiple potentialities, given that Blackness has been historically overdetermined by experiences and epistemes which locate it at the underside of humanity.133 This radical shaking-up of IR’s epistemological orientations would be particularly productive in dismantling the limits identified here. This could connect them to forms of worldly politics rooted in experiences of diasporic connectivity and suffering, and creativity and solidarity.134 These signal different sites of sovereignty, rights, borders, and power,135 and open up questions of historical injustice, responsibility, and reparations. It could conceive of more ‘conventional’ IR theory that began with African presence rather than absence.136 Finally, working with and through Blackness would give an important corrective to debates on the ‘post-human’ which have not always contemplated the racialisation of humanity in depth.137 The point here is not simply to ‘replace’ White-centredness with Black-centredness as part of historical justice – but through re-positioning to reveal what has been obscured about the organisation of authority, relationality, rights, obligations, materiality, and knowledge.

Would the kind of IR theory examined here be possible with such starting points? Absolutely. A research programme focused on ‘Great Powers’ would still be possible but be explicitly a study of empires and other polities across time and space. It would have to embrace rather than ignore their internal diversities and forms of interconnectedness – overall, this might lead to an abandonment of the ‘anarchy’ problematique in favour of a more positive historical appreciation of diverse forms of authority and sociality. For a research programme interested in international co-operation, it would have to take a wider understanding of the kinds of co-operation which are possible, the kinds of political purposes that they underpin, and the forms of exclusion, collusion, and expropriation which are likely involved in setting them up. This would make it impossible to study ‘institutions’ or ‘organisations’ among powerful actors in a way which is disembedded from their political foundations. Similarly, for a research programme interested in the emergence of forces of socialisation and collective identification, much more attention would need to be paid to the political context and drivers of particular forms of sociality and the kinds of coercion enabled by productions of Otherness. All such projects would be informed by that spirit of hermeneutic suspicion with which writers not racialised as White have often greeted projections of Western civilisation.

However, it is up to the field as a whole to uphold standards of rigour which make the persistence of racialised ignorance, immanence, and innocence impossible. What has happened over the last several decades has been a continued asymmetry in the practice of our ‘science’, such that the profound epistemological challenges presented for the field in a range of critical writing have been sidelined through practices of training and citation which together reproduce a White subject-position in the discipline. The vast bulk of references to ToIP, AH, and SToIP continue to treat them as authoritative texts. This is an institutional problem more than an epistemological one in many respects and one that is unlikely to be solved in the near future, or at least by this generation. Identifying the logics constitutive of Whiteness in IR theory is a necessary step towards institutional change, but no more than that. In the absence of this change, IR theory will continue to be White.

## 2NC – ATs

### 2NC - Framework – Card

Info processing DA – the paradigm of maximizing clash for clash sakes turns to speed up research processing and reduce all knowledge into calculation and predictions turns the brain into a computer for coding algorithmic racism, where instrumentality is the modus operandi of all political calculation – this fractures communities along racialized lines via linguistic purity politics

Mbembe 22, interviewed by TORBJØRN- Achille is a member of the staff at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER) at the University of the Witwatersrand, visiting appointment at the Franklin Humanities Institute at Duke University PhD in History at the Sorbonne, DEA in Political Science at the Instituts d'études politiques [Achille, “Thoughts on the Planetary: An Interview with Achille Mbembe,” Decolonizing the Neoliberal University – Law, Psychoanalysis and the Politics of Student Protest, Interview first Conducted in 2018, Re-Published in this book and Edited by Jaco Barnard-Naudé, Professor of Jurisprudence in the Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town, DKP]

that there is then still a genocidal potential?

MBEMBE: Perhaps more than at any other moment in our recent past, we are increasingly faced with the question of what to do with those whose very existence does not seem to be necessary for our reproduction; those whose mere existence or proximity is deemed to represent a physical or biological threat to our own life.

Throughout history, and in response to this question, various paradigms of rules have been designed for human bodies deemed either in excess, unwanted, illegal, dispensable, or superfluous. One historical response has consisted in putting in place spatial exclusionary arrangements. Such was, for instance, the case during the early phases of modern settler or genocidal colonialism in relation to Native American reservations in the United States, island prisons, penal colonies such as Australia, camps and even Bantustans in South Africa.

Two late modern examples are Gaza and the encaging of migrant children in the context of the ongoing planetary war on mobility. Gaza and the encaging of migrant children might well prefigure what is yet to come.

In the case of Gaza, control of vulnerable, unwanted, surplus or racialized people is exercised through a combination of tactics, chief among which is modulated blockade or molecular strangulation. A blockade prohibits, obstructs, and limits who and what can enter and leave the Strip. The goal might not be to cut the Strip off entirely from supply lines, infrastructural grids or trade routes. The Strip is nevertheless relatively sealed off and strangulated in a way that effectively turns it into an imprisoned territory. Comprehensive or relative closure is accompanied by periodic military escalations and the generalized use of extra-judicial assassinations. Spatial violence, humanitarian strategies, and a peculiar biopolitics of punishment all combine to produce, in turn, a peculiar carceral space in which people deemed surplus, unwanted, or illegal are governed through abdication of any responsibility for their lives and their welfare.

But as I have intimated, there is another, early twenty-first century example, which consists in waging new forms of wars, which can be called wars on speed and mobility. Wars on mobility are wars whose aim is to turn discounted bodies into borders. They generally begin by turning into dust and piles of ruins the milieux as well as means of existence and survival of vulnerable people thus forced to flee in search of a refuge. These kinds of wars against milieux and ecosystems rendered toxic and uninhabitable are not accidental. They are methodically programmed and conducted. Such milieux and ecosystems are sites of experimentation of new weapons. The targets of this kind of warfare are not by any means singular bodies, but rather great swathes of humanity judged worthless and superfluous.

TORBJØRN: Can you elaborate a bit more on that?

MBEMBE: Let me put it differently. Nowadays the project is to render as many people as superfluous as possible. The novelty is the production at a massive scale of discounted bodies, a residual humanity that is akin to waste. With our entry into a new climatic regime, this process will only intensify. As the global conditions for the production and reproduction of life on Earth keep changing, population politics at a planetary level will increasingly become synonymous with excess and waste management. In terms of the future geopolitics of our world, populations will be more and more treated not only in the Darwinian terms of sexual selection, but also within a utilitarian and biophysiologico-organic framework.

Take a place such as South Africa where a very high percentage of the total population is unemployed. This is not because there is no “work as such”. This is not because people do not want to work.

In fact, here as elsewhere in Africa and other parts of the global South, almost everything remains to be done. The amount of work needed in order to create a better life for all is incalculable. But the structure of the economy doesn’t really need us all. Nor does it need our time. It doesn’t really need every single body, all of our muscles or energies or even the bulk of our social and collective intelligence. And this will be more and more the case in the future, as we move to a phase of human history in which only that which is computable counts. As we speak, many bodies already fall beyond the scope of calculation. Unless we reinvent the terms of what counts and, in the process, resignify what value stands for as well as the procedures of assigning value, of measuring value, of exchanging value, things won’t change. These are some of the key questions any decolonization project worthy of its name has to address if the injunction to decolonize is to be more than a mere ideological phantasm.

TORBJØRN: Back to the debate on decolonization: There was a heated debate in Norway, during the summer of 2018, about the decolonization of academia. How can #RhodesMustFall in South Africa be relevant for universities worldwide?

MBEMBE: The need for a critical re-appraisal of the relationship between knowledge, power and institutions is not an exclusively South African preoccupation. In South Africa, the term “decolonization” is one way in which concerns about “deracialization” are expressed. The imperative to “deracialize” is also valid for Europe, for the United States, for Brazil and for other parts of the world. The emergence of new varieties of racism in Europe and elsewhere, the reassertion of global white supremacy, of populism and retro-nationalism, the weaponization of difference and identity are not only symptoms of a deep distrust of the world. They are also fostered by transnational forces capable of making that same world inhospitable, uninhabitable and unbreathable for many of us.

All of this is of course important. But part of what truly frightens me is the recolonization of various fields of knowledge by all kinds of determinisms. What frightens me is the active confusion between knowledge and data, the reduction of knowledge to information. It’s the idea that the world is a matter of numbers and the task of knowledge is to handle quantities. Furthermore, it’s the belief that the best way to generate information is with computers and that which is not computable does not exist. It’s the creeping sense that the computer is our new brain.

In such a context, “to decolonize” must start from the assumption that knowledge cannot be reduced to computational information processing. There is therefore a massive need to recover the ability to think. And for me, knowledge is on the verge of being reduced to a reified metaphor. As a result, we are witnessing almost everywhere a tremendous impoverishment of thought.

TORBJØRN: In the Norwegian debate on decolonization, one of the demands from the young student activists was to have a more global curriculum. What’s your take on that?

MBEMBE: Right now we are literally assaulted by forces that want to retreat from the world and rebuild a certain idea of the nation, of the community, of identity and difference that is premised on the capacity to determine who belongs, who must be excluded and shouldn’t belong, who can settle where, why, how and for how long. Such forces are preoccupied with the erection of all kinds of borders and how they must be policed. They buy in the dream of a “pure” community, a community of people who look the same and act the same. They are sustained by the belief that we can go back to the past because the past is, in truth, our future. Let me just call it the dream of apartheid.

There is another dream, maybe not unrelated to the first. As I have just highlighted, it’s the dream of reducing knowledge to calculation by computers. In fact, it’s the dream of reducing everything to calculation and explaining everything from within biological and neurological strictures. A planetary library, archive or, for that matter, curriculum is one whose strategic project is to understand the incalculable and the incomputable. It can only be based on the will to go beyond cognitivism. I am not against calculation or mathematics. Nor am I against computation. I am simply saying that neither calculation, nor mathematics, nor computation are sufficient for explaining life. It can’t be enough to do correct mathematics. Once we have done correct mathematics, we still need to determine what this exercise implies for the life of beings. Pushed to a certain level, correct mathematics alone impoverish thought and destroy theory.

Otherwise, we only have one world. We might dream about colonizing Mars or Venus or other unknown planets in the future, but for the time being that is not part of our actuality. We only have one world, one solar system and for this world to last as long as possible and for this solar system to not calcinate life as such, we need to become a bit more intelligent and wiser. This Earth is our shared roof and our shared shelter. Sharing this roof and shelter is the great condition for the sustainability of life on Earth. We have to share it as equitably as possible. And in any case our lives, here and elsewhere, have become so entangled, that trying to separate them will require a tremendous amount of violence. It will require a lot of violence to disentangle humanity from itself and from the rest of the living species. And therefore, especially in the face of the kinds of ecological challenges we face, it is absolutely important to reinvent forms of life in common that go beyond the requisite of the nation state, ethnicity, race, religion, and so on. A curriculum that takes seriously

### 2NC – AT – Extinction First

#### The end of the world has already occurred – its try-or-die for an alternative form of being-in-the-world

Death 22 – Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy at the University of Manchester [Carl, “Africanfuturist Socio-Climatic Imaginaries and Nnedi Okorafor’s Wild Necropolitics,” Antipode, Volume 54, Issue1 January 2022 Pages 240-258, DKP]

Achille Mbembe’s (2019:7) diagnosis of the present is that “[n]early everywhere the political order is reconstituting itself as a form of organisation for death”. Even liberal democracies, he argues, are increasingly characterised by “separation, hate movements, hostility, and, above all, struggle against an enemy” (Mbembe 2019:42). War, racial hatred, the strengthening of borders and expulsion of enemies, the extreme inequality of contemporary capitalism, and the accelerating violence of runaway climate change produce what he terms an era of necropolitics, which the Covid-19 crisis has merely exacerbated and heightened. He uses the term necropolitics to account for the various ways in which diverse weapons are deployed in the interest of destroying life, and suggests that, “for a large share of humanity, the end of the world has already occurred” (Mbembe 2019:29). This trenchant picture resonates strongly, as we will see below, with the world Okorafor presents in the novel Who Fears Death. Like Okorafor, however, Mbembe does not flinch from this portrayal of a world characterised by violence and death, nor does he abandon all hope of a more convivial politics. Rather, he asks: What do human freedom and vulnerability mean in a necropolitical context? What alternative forms of being-in-the-world are possible? Refusing the binary choice between either violence or freedom, Mbembe (2019:92) suggests that “today’s form of necropower blurs the lines between resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom”.

Frantz Fanon (2001, 2008) wrote in the 1950s of the need for a “new humanism” that would set mankind free and restore human dignity, love, and understanding. This concern with the politics and possibilities of a new humanism is central to black feminist traditions of thought, which have done most to explore these questions precisely because the dominant genre of the human—Man—has always been irreducibly raced and gendered. As Sylvia Wynter (2003:313) puts it:

This issue is that of the genre of the human, the issue whose target of abolition is the ongoing collective production of our present ethnoclass mode of being human, Man: above all, its overrepresentation of its well-being as that of the human species as a whole, rather than as it is veridically: that of the Western and westernised (or conversely) global middle classes.

This predominance of a particular conception of human existence, and its constitutive role in carboniferous capitalism, racialised colonialism, patriarchy, and necropower, is why it is necessary to “go about thinking and living enfleshment otherwise so as to usher in different genres of the human” (Weheliye 2014:2; see also Jackson 2020; Mbembe 2019:2). Inspired by Fanon’s (2008:180) call to “introduce invention into existence”, Wynter asks: “How do we be, in Fanonian terms, hybridly human?” (in Wynter and McKittrick 2015:45).

For theorists like Mbembe, Wynter, Weheliye, Jackson, and others, art and the imagination have a crucial role to play. As Wynter argues, humans are a storytelling species: “the human is homo narrans”, at least since African ancestors scratched an intricate symbol on a piece of ochre in Blombos Cave (Wynter and McKittrick 2015:25, 66). Zakiyyah Iman Jackson (2020:1) shows that imaginative work can frequently alter “the meaning and significance of being (human)”. Exploring the work of authors like Toni Morrison, Nalo Hopkinson, Audre Lorde, Wangechi Mutu, and Octavia Butler, Jackson (2020:4) explains how such texts can provoke “unruly yet generative conceptions of being”. Reading and writing novels is itself a form of theorising about the world, and a way of practising new modes of being and freedom (Ashcroft et al. 2002; Gergan et al. 2020; Haraway 2016:12; Weheliye 2014:16).

### 2NC – AT – Util

#### Everyday violence is a massive impact – you should prioritize it or risk terrible policymaking

Olson 15 – prof of geography @ UNC Chapel Hill

(Elizabeth, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting and Urgency,’ *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the body is increasingly set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted suffering. Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can distort moral reasoning. Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to worry about:¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the urgency to secure the state, the citizenry, the economy, or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as impulsive and thus requiring management. McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently suffering cannot be urgent, because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be suffering everywhere in some future time. Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns are institutionalized, the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-scale emergency is a ‘built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies. The urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage (e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151) of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the urgencies of the body provide justifications for social exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of preparedness and risk avoidance. Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state. But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed priority of the large-scale future emergency, the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent.¶ If the important ethical work of urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes, ‘waiting … produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010: 186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting can therefore function as a potentially important spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing individuals, but also to retain claims over moral urgency. But there is growing resistance to the capture of claims of urgency by the elite, and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming urgency for the body. In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps, geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view, and also reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked – by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when the urgent body is rendered as only waiting, both materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006). Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait, has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional scope of large-scale futures. It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body. This bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others, the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g. Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes normative biases against subjugated people, and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires a debate about what really cannot wait. My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning.¶ I conclude, however, by pulling together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an acknowledgement that the temporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as fertile ground for radical critique, a truly fierce urgency for now.

### 2NC – AT – Perm

#### Gatekeeping DA – the perm is white respectability politics – they tokenize anti-racist critique while maintaining the form of disciplinary white IR while evading accountability but centering blackness thru refusing white epistemology solves

Abu-Bakare 22 – lecturer in the politics of race and decolonial studies at the University of Liverpool and a Visiting Fellow at the University of the University of South Wales’ International Centre for Policing and Security, PhD in International Politics at Aberystwyth University [Amal, “Your Work is Not International Relations,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, First Published 3/3/2022, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03043754221076965>, DKP]

The aim of this essay is to use my individual experience as an entry point for speaking to a structural pattern in IR scholarship. Here, I explore how observing the scholastic process of connecting disciplinary boundaries to real political lines demarcates an ongoing concern with how some academics pursue a monopoly on understandings of ‘the international’, treating its porous semi-arbitrary boundaries as though they define the political issues that traverse them (Conway, 2021). Some have described this monopoly as a form of methodological disciplinarity, a practice where research becomes restricted within disciplinary borders because of scholastic endeavours to keep the discipline pure. In this process, IR gatekeepers come to reject IR’s existence as a discipline that exists between fields, being focused on metaphorically manning the academic watchtower. By being busy policing what is and what is not a global issue, these same intellectuals miss key opportunities for innovative knowledge production concerning the international. As Annika Olsson (2015: 47) observes, ‘scholars of all kinds need to cross the borders of their disciplines more often’ if they are to bring new knowledge home. Vitalis concurs in his own exploration of the birth of American IR, where he writes that ‘the boundaries of international relations theory and in particular work in security […] remain open and ripe for infiltration’(2015:180). We indeed need to challenge ‘the bodies and borders of literature’ if we are ever to truly understand the structural nature of inequities in knowledge sharing in international studies (Olsson, 2015: 47).

On the question of whose bodies? Importantly, in the opening quote, it appears that the editors responding to my article felt that their contributing authors had to tick several boxes on their checklist. Not just to earn the right to exist within the purview of the journal but also to be considered international studies. My concern lies with how these editors seem disconcerted by how broadly their mandate may have been conceived instead of welcoming such breadth in conceptualisation. In the arena of IR, post-structural scholars have long since argued that the boundary between the international and domestic is insecure. Using the writings of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan and Žižek, Edkins (1999), for example, famously contested the technical arrangements that erroneously restricted the notion of the international subject when politics was presented as being a subsystem of social order instead of being seen as a mirror of a society’s own forgotten foundation – cutting off human beings from their sense of self. Others such as Charbonneau and Cox (2010: 14), in the context of foreign policy analysis, write how it is in locally situated security practices that scholars often find spaces where vital ‘elements of state power and global order are produced and reproduced’. So, why were the editors I quoted uncomfortable in the case of another break with the international–domestic divide prompted on the basis of a race-orientated tradition? A problem is that their anxiety and discomfort with a lack of perimeters being erected in this specific instance may possibly have been grounded in a particular epistemic genealogy where having a monopoly on how the international is conceived also constituted a form of racial domination. Allowing an analytical radicalism to be applied to IR problems only so far as they do not cross Eurocentric-white boundaries for what still constitutes intellectual respectability.

As a discipline, IR has historically provided numerous sources of intellectual rationale to justify only certain conceptions of the international which foreground norms of white subjectivity, and that in turn epistemically constrain the boundaries of political imagination within the discipline. This is largely as a result of IR’s origin, as a policy science devised to resolve dilemmas ‘facing the white Western powers’ because of colonial administration (Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam, 2015: 2). IR’s academic conventions more often than not still prompt recognition of how colonial histories matter yet are muted in the politics of the present. This is so in how these conventions still force the centre of non-Western and non-white people’s worlds to exist at the margins of the world(s) European imperialists endeavoured to create (Shilliam, 2021). In this regard, calling out racial attitudes to IR expertise necessitates drawing attention to how lines are drawn between intellectuals who are accused of dabbling in ‘selective colonial historiography for “political” purposes’, and those who are actually seen as ‘bona fide’ in international studies on the basis of the way they choose to assess what is global (Stoler, 2011:137). The public performance of solidarity by scholastic institutions appearing to support scholars that raise the issue of anti-imperial perspectives, all while still preventing the professional dispersal of their knowledge behind the scenes is indicative of the wage of white supremacy. This is so in how these IR gatekeepers enable perpetrators of intellectual tokenism to evade detection and accountability for their part in furthering imperialist ways of knowing the issues that plague the world populations. These same actors, counterintuitively, directly ensure that a limited understanding about how different populations experience world politics prevails.

#### Footnoting DA – it’s about starting points – you can’t add black scholarship and stir

Hawthorne and Heitz 18 – \*Chair of the [Black Geographies Specialty Group](https://blackgeographies.org/) of the American Association of Geographers, Assistant Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Cruz, PhD in Geography at UC Berkeley, MPA at Brown, BA in International Relations and Africana Studies at Brown, \*\* PhD Student in Human Geography, UC Berkeley [Camilla, Kaily, “A seat at the table? Reflections on Black geographies and the limits of dialogue,” 2018, DKP]

It is impossible to engage with the politics of dialogue without first situating ourselves—after all, these are fundamentally questions of power and access. I (Camilla) am a first-generation university student and the first in my immediate family to pursue a graduate degree. As a Black woman geographer, I must continuously reckon with the fact that the university—and the discipline of geography itself—was not made for me. Historically, the university has been a site wherein the subjugation of women and people of color has been articulated and legitimated. Still, I was drawn to human geography because it appeared to be a capacious, interdisciplinary field with productively porous boundaries. In other words, geography seemed to welcome, rather than strictly regulate, theoretical and methodological dialogue between disciplines. But when I began my PhD program, I experienced a distinct sense of alienation as I attempted to do research that seemed marginal to geography (specifically, understanding how Black youth in Italy craft a sense of place that challenges the symbolic and material boundaries of Europeanness and Italianness). I was alarmed that the vocabulary and rich canon shaped by my background in Africana studies (for instance, theories of diaspora, or the works of scholars such as Paul Gilroy and Sylvia Wynter) were not always recognized as ‘formally’ geographical, even though the issues they addressed were fundamentally about space, place, and power. I was similarly alarmed by the fact that, in a discipline whose history is so closely tied to the violent histories of colonialism and racism, race remained a relatively insignificant category in contemporary geography, a ‘superstructural’ embellishment atop the ‘material’, clanking gears of capitalism. The questions that animated my research and the intellectual genealogies I wanted to draw upon, were deeply spatial but seemedillegible to geography. They were, in other words, beyond dialogue.

As a Black woman, I (Kaily) can recall being taught from a very early age not to fight back. When I mouthed off, I was told to sit down and quite literally to shut up. ‘Black’ and ‘girl’ were thrown in my face as insults, justifications for my silence. Insecure in my body, I was also insecure in place, as I constantly moved around the country. Feeling powerless to do much to tangibly or markedly interface with the city streets or Midwestern fields in which I grew up, I found myself drawn to art and photography as some of the few ways I could dialogically assert the power of my body and represent it assuredly in place. Having utilized this embodied knowledge in my thesis research, my advisor proposed that I look into geography programs for my PhD. I found it to be a thrilling and expansive field that had the capacity to engage the language of visual representation and its materialization in structures of race, class, and environment. Like Camilla, my enthusiasm quickly hardened into exasperation when I found that theories of race and gender in geography were limited to one week each in most first-year curricula. I was, and still am, seeking to find the middle ground between the extensive attention Black studies scholars have paid to representations of race, and geographical scholarship on how place is epistemologically formed. It is time that geographers utilized the interdisciplinary nature of their field to widen dialogue formerly limited by structural inequalities.

As Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) rightly argue, certain voices have been systematically excluded from the physical and metaphorical spaces of dialogue within the field of human geography. The marginalization of Black geographic scholarship within the discipline cannot be understood separately from the marginalization of Black scholars at all levels within geography. This means that the academy can itself be a site of violence that regulates who can participate in scholarly dialogue. But, at the same time, we want to argue that the project of Black Geographies is more than simply a project of ‘add Black people and stir’. It is about moving beyond a liberal politics of superficial and provisional inclusion to think seriously about which voices, intellectual genealogies, and traditions of thought are deemed sufficiently canonical or scholarly—and why.

Claims to dialogue within human geography, and the academy writ large, are frequently invoked to obscure a lack of engagement with noncanonical scholarship. Yet we are still convinced that geography has important things to offer our understanding of blackness, and vice versa—that centering blackness can actually tell us important things about space and place, about power and the politics of resistance. The Black Geographies Symposium, for instance, was centered on a shared understanding of blackness as a fundamentally spatial relation, of space as profoundly racialized, and of the history of geography as entangled with racism, colonialism, and enslavement. What would it mean, for instance, if geographers were to read Marx on the factory alongside W.E.B. Du Bois and C.L.R. James on the plantation, or Jamaica Kincaid alongside Doreen Massey on relational understandings of place? A Black geographical scholarly praxis entails a willingness to subvert arborescent models of intellectual lineage in favor of queerings, rhizomes, undercommons (Harney and Moten, 2013), provincializations, or even the Sankofa (Benjamin, 2013). These are, in other words, nonhierarchical and nonlinear modes of study that can attend to the complex geographical itineraries and interconnected struggles that continue to shape our understandings of the relations of capitalism, racism, and sexism that structure the modern world.

Perhaps, then, we should be striving for something more radical than dialogue. Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) point toward the possibilities of dialogue as embodied action; but what if we instead take liberatory knowledges as the point of departure, rather than ‘democratic’ dialogue or abject embodiment? In her keynote presentation at the Black Geographies symposium, Katherine McKittrick suggested that scholarly dialogue necessarily invokes the materiality of humanness in both body and place:

‘The materiality of intellectual inquiry, the ideas we share, the counsel we give each other, is an ongoing referential conversation about Black humanity. [ ...] The materiality of intellectual inquiry, the ideas we share, is a referential conversation that begins from Black humanness’.

### AT – IR Reflexive

#### No methodological pluralism – “Self-reflexivity” is a myth – IR’s priors are foundationally racist which makes it unfixable absent radical re-thinking of the alt

Henderson 13 – Associate Professor of International Relations at Penn State University, PhD in Political Science at the University of Michigan, MA [Errol, “Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations Theory,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2013, Vol. 26, No. 1, 71–92, DKP]

The centrality of race and racism in the foundations of IR and their enduring impact on world affairs towards the end of the millennium contrasts with the relative dearth of mainstream scholarship on the subject in IR. For example, Doty’s (1998, 136) survey of mainstream journals in IR for the period of 1945 –1993 (World Politics, International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Review of International Studies) ‘revealed only one article with the word race in the title, four with the term minorities and 13 with the term ethnicity’. Given that at its inception IR focused heavily on issues of race and racism, the marginalization of race and racism in mainstream IR journals (and textbooks) begs the question of what accounts for the apparent disparity? Doty (1998, 145) argues that ‘the dominant understandings of theory and explanation in International Relations’ preclude conceptualizations of ‘complex issues/concepts such as race’ and result in their marginalization or force them ‘into constraining modes of conceptualization and explanation’. For Krishna (2001, 401), the complexity is related less to the issue of racism than to the methodological orientations that often privilege abstract theorizing over historical analyses, which allows IR theorists to whitewash the historical content of global affairs, especially ‘the violence, genocide, and theft that marked the encounter between the rest and the West in the post-Columbian era’. Ignoring the role of racism facilitates this whitewash. He adds that ‘abstraction, usually presented as the desire of the discipline to engage in theory-building rather than in descriptive or historical analysis, is a screen that simultaneously rationalizes and elides the details of these encounters. By encouraging students to display their virtuosity in abstraction the discipline brackets questions of theft of land, violence, and slavery—the three processes that have historically underlain the unequal global order we now find ourselves in’ (Krishna 2001, 401– 402). Further, ‘overattention’ on the part of scholars to issues related to racism in IR ‘is disciplined by professional practices that work as taboo’ and may label such orientations as ‘too historical or descriptive’ and label such students as ‘not adequately theoretical’ and ‘lacking in intellectual rigor’ (Krishna 2001, 402). Moreover, where the impact of race and racism is analysed, insufficient attention is paid to the relevance of struggles related to race and racism to basic conceptions of fundamental issues in world politics such as power, war, freedom or democracy. For example, Persaud (2001, 116) maintains that ‘what needs to be underlined is that the struggle for racial equality has been fundamental to the emergence of democracy as a whole, not just for the colored world’ (2001, 116).

Persaud and Walker (2001, 374) claim that race has not been ignored in IR as much as it ‘has been given the epistemological status of silence’. This silence is linked by Maclean (1981, 110) to ‘invisibility’, which ‘refers to the removal (not necessarily through conscious action) from a field of enquiry, either concrete aspects of social relations, or of certain forms of thought about them’. Vitalis (2000) also acknowledges a ‘norm against noticing’ white racism throughout mainstream IR discourse (also see Depelchin 2005). Each of these processes perpetuates the racist assumptions embedded in the foundations of IR theory where they serve as the ‘priors’ of the main propositions. These assumptions may be exposed by tracing the racist claims that inform IR theory. This approach is different from that undertaken in most studies of racism in IR, which usually focus on one of four approaches: (1) examinations of the impact of non-racial factors on racial outcomes, such as the geographical studies of Linneaus and the physical anthropological works of Blumenbach and Kant, which attempted to determine the extent to which environmental and climatic factors led to the creation of different races;3 (2) examinations of the impact of racial outcomes on non-racial factors, such as studies of the effects of racial stratification on domestic outcomes (for example, development or democracy), or the impact of racial differences on the likelihood of violence within or between states (for example, Deutsch 1970; Shepherd and LeMelle 1970); (3) examinations of the impact of racist practices on the IR of states and non-state actors, such as studies of diplomatic historians on racist practices such as international slavery, imperial conquest, colonialism, genocide, apartheid, occupation, or racial discrimination, among single states, several states, or international organizations (for example, Elkins 2004; Hochschild 1998; Tinker 1977; Vincent 1982; Winant 2001); and (4) examinations of the impact of racist ideology on the IR of states and nonstate actors, such as studies on the impact of racism on foreign policy (for example, Hunt 1987; Lauren 1988; Anderson 2003), imperialism (for example, Rodney 1974), state-making (for example, Cell 1982; Fredrickson 1982; Mamdani 1996; Marx 1998), diasporization (Harris 1982; Walters 1993) or international war (Dower 1986).

While studies utilizing each of these approaches have contributed to our understanding of the role of racism in world politics, they have largely ignored the issue of primary concern to us here: how racism informs the major paradigms of IR theory such as realism and liberalism.4 Racism informs IR theory mainly through its influence on the empirical, ethical and epistemological assumptions that undergird its paradigms. These assumptions operate individually and in combination. For example, racist empirical assumptions bifurcate humanity on the basis of race and determine our view of what/whom we study and how we study it/them—privileging the experiences of ‘superior’ peoples and their societies and institutions. These assumptions also lead us to privilege ethical orientations of the ‘superior’ peoples which justify their privileged status. In such a context, epistemological assumptions that reflect and reinforce the racist dualism are more likely to become ascendant, and ‘knowledge’ that supports the racist dichotomy—both the privileged position of the racial hegemon and the underprivileged position of the racial subaltern—is more likely to be viewed as valid. Such knowledge drawn from the empirical domain becomes legitimized through ethical justifications that ‘naturalize’ the racial hierarchy. In this way, the separate dimensions often reinforce each other.

Whether or not the empirical, ethical and epistemological assumptions operate singly or in combination, it is important to demonstrate the role of these assumptions in IR theory today, especially given that mainstream IR also provides prominent critiques of racism. Ignoring these critiques would misrepresent the degree of racism in the field and disregard the challenge to racist discourse within IR from IR theorists themselves. For example, few IR scholars openly embrace a racist ontology that assumes for whites a higher order of being than for nonwhites.5 Moreover, racist ethical assumptions usually receive the opprobrium they deserve in present IR discourse. Racist epistemological assumptions are largely challenged by the prevalence in IR theory of the view that our ‘knowledge’ of world politics usually requires us to have something approximating evidence to determine the accuracy of rival truth claims. Finally, racist empirical assumptions are checked by the dominant view in IR that our theses should be broadly applicable across states and societies and should be substantiated by crossnational and cross-temporal tests. But the sanguine view of the propensity of IR literature to check racist assumptions, or to generate non-racist theoretical discourse for the field, begs a fuller exploration of how ethical, epistemological and empirical assumptions underlie prominent theses in IR. The main sources of these racist assumptions that inform our present IR discourse are the primary theoretical constructs of most IR theory: the state of nature, the social contract and the conception of anarchy that derives from them.

## Links

### Link – AI

#### The integration of AI into Military logistics results unchecked racialized necropolitics as a value that informs politics and replaces human governance with AI that kill with impunity and result in endemic warfare

Grove 20 – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai’i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai’I at Mānoa, PhD in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University [Jairus, “From geopolitics to geotechnics: global futures in the shadow of automation, cunning machines, and human speciation,” International Relations 2020, Vol. 34(3) 432 –455, DKP]

The automation of war and the reduction of human troop sizes has a similar effect. Wars aided by drones and as a result significantly smaller numbers of soldier casualties continue on for decades in a kind of sustainable warfare.28 The political and material cost of casualties like the material cost of striking are being removed from the political equation making states less and less accountable in the case of social justice and the pursuit of violence outside their borders.

The feedback between these two trends is potentially catastrophic. At the same time that war becomes easier, governments become less accountable to their people, and people are deprived of the means to support themselves, it is also the case that people will matter less to their governments as they will not possess the labor power to cause pain to the economic productivity of the country by means of striking nor the capacity to refuse to fight. Zygmunt Bauman has spoken of disposable populations, a kind of human waste or surplus where the value of one’s existence is meaningless for the state.29 However, we ought to go further down this path by way of Achille Mbembe’s creeping necropolitics.30 It is not merely that chronically or even intergenerational unemployed people have no value; it is that the marginalization and even murder of people can now generate value. In what Mbembe refers to as the ‘enclave economies’ of war machines:

The concentration of activities connected with the extraction of valuable resource around these enclaves has, in return, turned the enclaves into privileged spaces of war and death. War itself is fed by the increased sales of the products extracted.31

In these enclave economies fueled by petroleum, diamonds, but increasingly things like lithium or even sand or water, the outright murder of people, clearing space, generates value even in the supposedly post-resource digital economy.32 However, beyond the instrumental value of security there is also the explosion of security services as its own economic sector rather than as a merely means to secure other economic sectors. International security corporations such as Wackenhut industries, once a private prison service provider in the U.S., now generate profits from refugee management in Australia and Europe.33 The nearly 200 billion dollar private security industry and $1917 billion dollar defense sector suggest that the economy of making death and deprivation is more than merely a means. What few normative and legal limitations exist on the lethality of these corporations and institutions could disappear. This is already taking place in the global South and amongst African-Americans and indigenous people around the planet.

However, one can foresee, with little imagination, the extreme injustices of the contemporary era as a general condition of global life. What requires imagination on our part is reaching a turning point where these crimes become themselves normative, that is, the ‘good’ the state pursues. Contrary to our sensibilities such ideologies already exist and are even gaining attention outside the obscure chat rooms where they began.

Under the heading of ‘negative messianism’, Mbembe reviews the growing movement of the ‘Dark Enlightenment’, ‘a political religion. . . [that] calls for the exit from democratic society and total corporate and absolute dictatorship’.34 The movement calls for a global, racial, culling of the population in the name of ‘human biodiversity’ and expounds the value of using racially inferior populations for radical experimentation to jumpstart technological breakthrough. If this sounds too implausible even for speculation it is worth considering the spate of recent terrorist attacks in the U.S. by the vanguard of the Dark Enlightenment. The mass shooter who killed 20 people in El Paso Texas in August of 2019 posted his Dark Enlightenment manifesto before beginning his rampage.35 In 2020, there have been multiple attacks by the so-called Boogaloos who have infiltrated the U.S. military and police forces and seek to spark the Dark Enlightenment by escalating the Black Lives Matter protests into a full scale civil war.36 And then there is the most famous and vocal theorist of the Dark Enlightenment, Steve Bannon, who in addition to being a key architect of the Donald Trump administration, works tirelessly to build the Dark Enlightenment movement amongst the burgeoning far right of Europe.37 Whether this world view succeeds or actually becomes normative globally is not really the point. Instead, as is the mode in the speculation here I propose that in the burgeoning Dark Enlightenment movement we can see a political community built around necropolitics as a value rather than a necessary evil.

It would be too much to draw a direct line from the Dark Enlightenment to all of the neo-nationalist, neo-authoritarian, and neo-fascist movements around the planet. However, the accelerating global right wing has been institutionalized at the highest levels of power in liberal democratic nation-states such as the United States, U.K. and India, suggesting that liberal institutions cannot subsist on autopilot. Neo-authoritarian politics have also moved from shaping domestic polities to the shaping of the international order.38

In such an order, what would liberal democratic states look like? The constraints on the genocidal dictatorships of the twentieth century was of course that they needed a substantial portion of their populations. Genocide could only be pursued against minority populations. State behavior even in the extremes of the Nazi state among others still required full mobilization and therefore at some level the necessity of willing obedience even if not quite legitimacy that could be supplemented through terror.39

What of the behavior of future states for whom their people are in some sense an afterthought? At a minimum the basic conceits of survival that underwrite practices like deterrence or coercion would change dramatically. The very logic and mechanics of biopolitics would have to change. Without a necessary or strict relationship to the nation, would states differ significantly from some kind of corporate entity? Would the state more closely resemble the ancien regime? What would become of territoriality? These are the grammatical questions raised by the dark imagination of an automated future sufficiently comprehensive to create the material condition whereby a state could survive without the majority of their population’s cooperation.


Can we not already see the outlines of such a future in the decisions of Bolsanaro, Trump, Xi, Modi, and Duterte, who blithely write off millions of their own citizens in the face of COVID-19 and the nearly 50 per cent unemployment rate it has created where the virus has been allowed total freedom of movement?40 One need not be conspiratorial to see how quick authoritarian leaders have been to give up on disease containment once the data came back regarding the overwhelming racial disparity in COVID fatalities.41

If we consider the ways in which the shift from coal to oil changed the character of economic and labor relations with states in the twentieth century, the nearly 50 per cent loss of jobs due to computerization in the twenty-first century,42 combined with a corresponding decline in the necessity of humans for military power, then these new conditions could change the very nature of what a state is. The biopolitical raison d’être of the nation-state which emerges in the nineteenth century and becomes truly geopolitical in the twentieth century is premised on the mobilization and securing of a national population.43 The revolutionary states emerge from and rationalize the hyphen of the nationstate as essential both in terms of democratic values and military-economic necessity. What will emerge in the aftermath of such necessities and values is the horizon of alternative futures we must consider.

Section 3: from Bergsonian machines to cunning machines

“Hello,” whispered Montag, fascinated as always with the dead beast, the living beast. . . Montag touched the muzzle. The Hound growled. . . “It doesn’t like me,” said Montag. “What the Hound?” The Captain studied his cards. “Come off it. It doesn’t like or dislike. It just ‘functions.’ It’s like a lesson in ballistics. It has a trajectory we decide on for it. It follows through. It targets itself, homes itself, and cuts off. It’s only copper wire, storage batteries, and electricity. . .

–Fahrenheit 451 A Wiener Filter or The Yellow Peril



The equation above is called a Wiener Filter. In mathematical terms, Norbert Wiener used it with a number of other steps to calculate the future. Despite the claims in the first section that the future does not exist, the territory or probable limits of the future do, at least most of the time. What Wiener was representing mathematically was that even with little data on which one would normally make a prediction you can define the space of possibility or in Wiener’s terms the distribution of probabilities even for non-linear or non-existent causal systems. In practical terms it meant that artillery could be automated to shoot where planes were going to be rather than where they were when the radar signal returned. The mathematicians did this by considering and then modeling the limits of the system being predicted.

It is impossible to predict what an individual pilot will choose to do but it is possible to describe in mathematical terms what a pilot is capable of doing and similarly what a plane with a particular maximum velocity was capable of doing. The predictions made by the Wiener Filter allowed the artillery guns to fire in a significantly more restricted area with minimal radar information rather than just blasting away at the sky in hopes of hitting something. According to Steve Heims, more predictable systems like the V2 rocket could be successfully targeted and shot down 99 out 100 times by the Wiener Filter.44 The seemingly ‘dumb’ artillery could adjust or read their environment and work in concert adjusting further as information from rudimentary radar systems or the assemblage of radar, operators, and canons. The artillery was in the most basic sense becoming aware.

Wiener’s ‘solution’ which made unpredictable systems targetable was another version of what Claude Shannon very soon after solved for communication with his theory of information. Shannon developed the techniques which allow the efficient transmission of information through imperfect media such as telephone lines by similarly modeling the range of noise and compensating or repeating signal to exceed it. Rather than predicting the noise which is impossible because of its chaotic nature Shannon was able to treat all noise as a system rather than individual events of noise such that the range of noise could stand in place of the individual incidents. In both cases, the breakthroughs of Wiener and Shannon created the world of computers, the internet, automation, and machine learning we now inhabit. All systems after Wiener and Shannon could be treated in some sense as information and communication problems to be solved.45

After his experience in the war and further experiments after, Wiener began to describe a more general principle of informatics and machine technology. What he would later call the last science or the science of everything saw every system, whether physical, chemical, mechanical, biological, as computable and alterable. Following this insight Wiener believed humanity was at the cusp of something unprecedented. In 1948, he declared that a new kind of machine had emerged in the history of human evolution. Although still rudimentary, cybernetic machines of the 1940s were capable for the first time of simple self-regulation based on interactions with their external environment. Unlike thermodynamic machines that sought equilibrium, cybernetic machines could pursue a goal or objective in the world. Wiener referred to these new machines as Bergsonian machines, after the French Philosopher Henri Bergson and his idea of elan vital.46 For Wiener, machines possessed for the first time the spark of a vital impulse. While these Bergsonian machines have so far disappointed the expectation of those hoping for and others fearing human-like artificial intelligence, machinic intelligence, whether learning algorithms or self-steering and targeting weapons systems, have exploded into a variable rainforest ecology of new species.

What is important for the purposes of this article is that Wiener was able to demonstrate that very simple feedback mechanisms could produce complex emergent results or what ‘appeared’ like intelligence even if the machines were not conscious of that intelligence. What I explore throughout the rest of the section is how even small advances in machine intelligence could produce dramatic changes in what we think of now as human dependent drones. Already AI platforms have the capacity to strategize and win complex games like Go, AI via drones have the capability to target or execute operations on their own, robots can 3D print and construct other robots, that is, a simple form of reproduction. The only thing missing is what in philosophical terms we call will or desire. However, the insight from Wiener is that the difference between rudimentary will and a command code is insignificant in effect if a feedback exists between the machine and the external environment which can shape or direct the now desiring machine. To put it somewhat simply, we do not need human general intelligence for robots to change the world and geopolitics; the world could change overnight if mechanical life emerged or was released into the wild and was as sophisticated, resilient and procreative as the cockroach.

We are already experiencing the burgeoning capability of cunning machine. If one considers to the underlying political and economic pressure to move away from human combatants not unlike the globalization of the labor market more broadly, the incentives for innovations continuing are difficult to deny.47 Even before 9/11 combat was becoming too costly in both economic and political terms and therefore required an alternative in order for empires and smaller states to stay afloat in lean times. The globally modeled War on Terrorism brought the crises of military expenditure still lingering after the Cold War to a head. However, the drive to cut costs and political liability has not stopped at the battlefield. Attempts to remove humans further and further from the battlefield follows this inhuman trajectory into the arena of decision-making and contestation.48 The reliance on algorithmic warfare creates the opportunity for increasingly unilateral warmaking. Cunning machines, not machines of reason but machines capable of hunting and trapping, represent the possibility of the command and control developed for nuclear arsenals with the micro-scale to pursue and kill of assassins or special forces.49

This process of automating politics as well as war creates further incentive for the development of increasingly autonomous machines and actually undermines security as it makes the capacity to wage war cheaper and more accessible around the planet. The drive for more autonomous machines is heading toward ‘sustainable warfare’, a kind of weird parallel to sustainable development. Like sustainable development, sustainable warfare really makes warfare endemic rather than providing a real alternative to war making. So war as we know it may be coming to an end but a permeating martial transformation is just getting started.

As the transformation in domestic policing, military planning, and combat takes place, the tactical landscape will also mutate, amplifying the corrosive effects on politics. A security complex indifferent to the differences between the war and policing, battlefield and lifeworld will increasingly target Internet exchanges, servers, monitoring, and listening stations, civilian communication and media infrastructure. As populations cease to matter to states, either those attacking or being attacked, infrastructure becomes the whole of the strategic landscape. Also, as the size of autonomous machines shrink, the incentive for hacking or indiscriminate attacks such as electromagnetic pulse attacks will become more desirable as drone to drone or human to drone combat will be prohibitively difficult.

After all, how reliably can one expect to track a drone the size of a dragonfly or as low to the ground as a snake? Thus, we face the possibility of a confluence of unaccountable decision-making, even the absence of human decisions at all with the saturation of living spaces with the dissonance of combat, killing and destruction. Rather than simply automating the ‘hunt’ for enemies chosen by political processes, already reliance on things like signature strikes signal a shift to the automation of the political decision of who is and is not an enemy in the first place. This shift from what Human Rights Watch has termed ‘human on the loop’ practices to ‘human out of the loop’ practices pushes the posthuman50 character of war further into the nightmare zone in which everything is an object to be targeted but never encountered or recognized. An algorithmic cunning replaces enmity and martial judgment in the recognizable terms.

Furthermore, in a future with a receding human public and that states are indifferent to moral catastrophe, these changes in machine capability and autonomy as well as the deployment of such machines would not be political events. Switches would be flipped by military planners or software developers along technical rather than ethical or political lines. Lewis Mumford referred to this as the advent of ‘post-historic’ humanity in which a process that ‘began innocently by eliminating fallible human impulses from science will end by eliminating human nature from the whole world of reality. In posthistoric culture life itself is reduced to predictable, mechanically conditioned and controlled motion, with ever incalculable – that is, every creative – element removed’.51 I would add that what emerges in its place is a mechanic creativity allowed to thrive within the constraints of a limited martial logic. If we continue on this trajectory practicality could replace both strategic and moral thinking.52 Further, the fora in which such decisions will be made (if at all) are likely to be constricted as secrecy predominates in an environment charged by a dangerous mix of paranoia and real danger.

#### Global solidarity that converges around AI and the Internet of Things is a symbiotic end of humanism that reifies neoliberal individualism and causes mass industrialized eugenics.

Armand 20 – Charles University, Prague, Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory, Director [Louis, “The posthuman: AI, dronology, and “becoming alien”,” AI & SOCIETY (2020) 35:257–262 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0872-2>, DKP]

Insofar as humanity dreams of life after death, the “drone” is the as-yet primitive technological image of that afterlife. Like the Panopticon, the drone is a metaphor (Bentham 1995). It is the prototype of an ideal proxy by which the “human condition” transcends its worldly embodiment into a cosmic internet-of-things: a distributed architecture of autopoietic, kinetic agency. Thought that moves itself. Yet, it is precisely for this reason that what calls itself posthuman masks the return of an ever-more-apocalyptic Humanism, wherein the prestige of what is conserved as species unique is equated with the prestige of species transcendence: the (supposed) “uniquely human” capacity to manufacture universalities—artificial intelligence, cybernetic machines, synthetic DNA, etc. The capacity, in other words, to project, by way of abstraction, an all-too Humanistic teleology upon the domain of evolution itself—and thus secure a future against human obsolescence.

This, at least, is the type of paradoxical science fiction narrative that has prepared the way, in the West, for the evocation of “species solidarity” in the face of catastrophic imminence: from Global Warming to Technological Singularity to Human Extinction Event. A pseudo-solidarity bound, on one hand, to the advance of neo-liberal individualism and, on the other, to a ceaseless erosion of the collective “social contract”. It does not matter that the logics of such catastrophes broadly contradict one another: what is essential is that the ultimate promise of business-as-usual both mitigates and masks a whole intervening process of un-becoming.

These symbiotic “ends” of Humanism are previewed in the historical convergence of two events:

1. the recognition (with the birth of cybernetics) that technology could no longer be viewed as a human prosthesis, but that the human was in fact a prosthesis of a general technicity;

2. the contemporary revelation of mass industrialised eugenics

In this simple convergence, the principle that “technological progress” was divisible from ideology—the separation of science from metaphysics, which was the very foundation of Humanist thought—was overthrown. Unable any longer to disguise itself as universal rationality, Humanism was exposed as what it had truly become: western political–economic mysticism. This did not cause Humanism to fail, but rather, under the liberal guise of techno-capitalism, to re-engineer itself into an escape plan for the end of history. It was able to do this because the idea of History itself, as maintained in the industrial imaginary, had never been anything more than a prosthesis of Humanism to begin with. In this way, posthumanism and posthistoricism likewise come to represent something like a closed feedback loop, whose epochal movement has been lugubriously and hubristically fashioned as the “Anthropocene”.

2 Posthuman, all‑too human In the 2002 postscript to his often-cited thesis on the “End of History”—Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnological Revolution—Francis Fukuyama advanced a line of argument around genetic engineering and recombinant DNA, under the rubric of an urgent need to address the “political control of biotechnology” (Fukuyama 1992, 2002). Failure to do so, he argued, would result in a “desperate rearguard action” for the future of humanity. A future, after all, guaranteed solely by the prospect that “there could be no end of history unless there was an end of science” (Fukuyama 2002: xii). Its contemporary iteration today is the mitigation industry of AI “existential risk”. What this argument conceals behind its tone of Humanistic panic, however, is that—according to its own logic—for science to secure the domain of the future, history must already have ended. If we equate, as Fukuyama does, history with ideological struggle, then the future as technocracy can only be consequent upon the end of politics as such. The real concern of Fukuyama’s “posthumanism” then, is not “political control of biotechnology”, but rather the contrary: biotechnology as political control—where “political control” means social cybernetics.

However, we must extend this line of thought further if we are to perceive its fully apocalyptic character, for concealed within the anxiety of an “uncontrolled” biotechnological assault upon the human, is the implicit understanding of the human itself as biological weapon. For Fukuyama, the true meaning of “posthuman” is thus the accomplishment of humanity’s historical mission. As the “End of History” designates an end of ideological struggle, so too the dénouement of the Anthropocene and the “ends of man” represent the accomplished purpose of species warfare: dominion, not simply over the world, but over all possible worlds. The question for whom is thereby diverted onto the abstraction of the question of control as such, as idealised (human) agency. It represents what Baudrillard called the “spiralling cadaver” (2006: 260) of Humanism: even in the (always hypothetical) aftermath of humanity, the future will be human.

Responding to this strand of Fukuyamesque “scientism” in certain strands of Accelerationist discourse, Germán Sierra has pointed to a recurrent tendency to “reload humanist discourses”, so as to “maintain the fiction of a ghost-of-the-human-re-presenting-itself as immutable and undisputed”:

All the current posthuman narratives, even those pointing to the evolution of a “radical otherness” as intended or unintended consequence of human action, are just modern versions of the extinction fables lying in the foundations of human rationality. Any “radical otherness” that may have a consequence for the human morphospace is just happening on “surface media” … is still “our radical otherness”. No future is still a future—very often a very specific one that is set in order to retro-determine present behaviour. (Sierra 2016)

In this retro-determined image of the future, “Extinction is unavoidable but impossible. Like time travel, if it ever happens, it always does” (Sierra 2016). In this way, “Being human” means the “acceptance of individual death in exchange for not conceiving the extinction of the species”. To which must be added, that any “acceptance” of individual death is premised not merely on the idea of species continuance, but upon the abstract vicariousness of a collective afterlife: a mode of hauntology, or telepathy, an exception from the domain of finite existence by way of an access to a future totality of human data aggregation. Such totalised futurity represents the dialectical counterpart of a radical individualism, in whom the idea of (human) agency corresponds to the very horizon of the impossible, beyond which there is nothing.

### Link – China

#### Their fear of China is a form of techno-orientalism that replicates the racialized tropes of Yellow Peril.

Siu and Chun 20 – \* Associate Professor Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies Chinese Diaspora, Cultural Citizenship, Cultural Politics of Food, Diaspora / Transnationalism; Asians in the Americas, Ethnography PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University, MA, Anthropology, Stanford University, BA, Anthropology, minor in Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley \*\*Ph.D. student at the University of California, Berkeley in the Department of Ethnic Studies, 19-2020 recipient of The Catherine and William L. Magistretti Graduate Fellowship, B.A. in Politics and Social and Cultural Analysis from New York University. [Lok, Claire, Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 23, Number 3, October 2020, pp. 421-440 (Article), DKP]

Yellow Peril and Techno-Orientalism

The term yellow peril emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to Japan’s arrival to the geopolitical stage as a formidable military and industrial contender to the Western powers of Europe and the United States.9 The concept was further elaborated and given a tangible racial form through Sax Rohmer’s series of novels and films that provided the early content for the social imaginary of “yellow peril” along with its personification in the character of Dr. Fu Manchu, the iconic supervillain archetype of the Asian “evil criminal genius,” and his cast of minions.10 Strikingly, Dr. Fu Manchu’s characterization as evil, criminal, and genius continues to inform the racial trope of the Asian scientist spy; and more recently, we may add to the list the bioengineer, the CFO, the international graduate student, to name just a few. Moreover, the notion of the non-differentiable “yellow” masses continues to function as a homogenizing and dehumanizing device of Asian racialization, which makes possible the transference of Sinophobia to Asian xenophobia.

In its inherent attempt to construct a racial other, “yellow peril” is more a projection of Western fear than a representation of an Asian object/subject, and in this sense, it may be better understood as a repository of racial affect that can animate a myriad of representational figures, images, and discourses, depending on context. Indeed, the images and discourses of yellow peril have surfaced multiple times throughout the twentieth century, capturing a multitude of ever-shifting perceived threats that range from the danger of military intrusion (i.e., Japanese Americans during WWII), economic competition (i.e., Chinese laborers in the late nineteenth century, Japan in the 1980s), Asian moral and cultural depravity (i.e., non-Christian heathens, Chinese prostitutes, opium smokers), to biological inferiority (i.e., effeminacy, disease carriers). As Colleen Lye observes, “the incipient ‘yellow peril’ refers to a particular combinatory kind of anticolonial [and anti-West] nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance and Chinese numerical mass confronts Western civilization with a potentially unbeatable force.”11 Arguably, the yellow peril of today represents heightened Western anxieties around China’s combined forces of population size, global economic growth, and rapid technological-scientific innovation—all of which emerge from a political system that is considered ideologically oppositional to ours. The current context, we suggest, is best understood through the lens of techno-Orientalism.

When the idea of techno-Orientalism first appeared in David Morley and Kevin Robins’s analysis of why Japan occupied such a threatening position in Western imagination in the late 1980s, techno-Orientalism offered a framework to make sense of the technologically imbued racist stereotypes of Japan/the Japanese that were emerging within the context of Western fears and anxieties around Japan’s ascendancy as a technological global power. They proposed that if technological advancement has been crucial to Western civilizational progress, then Japan’s technological superiority over the West also signals a critical challenge to Western hegemony, including its cultural authority to control representations of the West and its “others.” They claimed that the shifting balance in global power—the West’s loss of technological preeminence—has induced an identity crisis in the West. In response, techno-Orientalism, in which “[idioms of technology] become structured into the discourse of Orientalism,” is produced in large part to discipline Japan and its rise to techno-economic power.12 The United States, for instance, externalized its anxiety into xenophobic projections of Japan as a “culture that is cold, impersonal, and machine-like” in which its people are “sub-human” and “unfeeling aliens.”13 Techno-Orientalism, born from the “Japan Panic,” was effectively consolidated through and around political-economic concerns that frame Japanese and, by extension, Asian techno-capitalist progress as dangerous and dystopian.

Extending Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism,14 techno-Orientalism marks a geo-historical shift where the West no longer has control over the terms that define the East—the “Orient”—as weak, inferior, and subordinate to the West. It marks a shift not only in political-economic power but also in cultural authority. Techno-Orientalism, then, is the expressive vehicle (cultural productions and visual representations) by which Western and Eastern nations articulate their fears, desires, and anxieties that are produced in their competitive struggle to gain technological hegemony through economic trade and scientific innovation.15

Analogous to Japan’s position in the late 1980s, China currently figures into the techno-Orientalist imaginary as a powerful competitor in mass production, a global financial giant, and an aggressive investor in technological, infrastructural, and scientific developments. At the same time, the increasing purchasing power of China provokes American fear of a future global market that is economically driven by Chinese consumptive desires and practices. It is this duality—the domination of both production and consumption across different sectors of the techno-capitalist global economy—that undergirds American anxieties of a sinicized future.16

Further amplifying these anxieties around Chinese techno-economic domination is our imagination of China/the Chinese as the ultimate yellow peril, whose state ideology is oppositional to that of the United States and whose unmatched population size combined with its economic expansion and technological advancements may actually pose a real challenge to U.S. global hegemony. We turn now to examine how the ideology of yellow peril is manifesting in the current context of techno-Orientalism, beginning first with an analysis of the racial trope of “Chinese as contagion” and its connection to anti-Asian aggression.

#### Their attempt to model China’s desires is connected to a global process of control through modulating China’s tech development coalesces imperial violence

**Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 19**. Nick Dyer-Witheford is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at University of Western Ontario and Svitlana Matviyenko is an Assistant Professor of Critical Media Analysis in the School of Communication. “Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism.” March 2019.

This is not the place for a detailed examination of the political economy of "postsocialist" nations (Lane 2014). In the USSR, the orgy of privatization and the chaos of shocktherapy marketization after 1991 have been followed under Putin by a new period of nationalization, in which oligarchic capitalists operate under supervision of, and overlap with, state elites in a context of market exchange (Worth 2005; Pirani 2010; Dzarasov 2014; Sakwa 2014). In the more complex case of the People's Republic of China, the party apparatus has maintained control of some "commanding heights" of the economy, even as other domains are handed over to private ownership, including both foreign and domestic investors. Some commentators see China's arrangements as tantamount to full subsumption with the world market (Li 2009; HartLandsberg 2013); others consider that a "left turn" from within the party apparatus could reestablish a socialist project (Amin 2013). At the moment, the latter possibility seems remote. In Russia, China, and other postsocialist countries, the wage organizes production, the responsibilities of the state for provision of public services have typically been diminished, and there are vast income gulfs between workers in and owners of the means of production. Corruption is often rife. Political elites are either identical with, entangled in, or dependent on capital ownership, and although these elites must in various ways manage, mobilize, and hegemonize public opinion, their fractions define the agenda of policy decisions, and perhaps especially foreign policy decisions. Thus **discussions of international relations in terms of the intentions or desires of "China" or "Russia"** - **as**, of course, of **the "United States," "Canada," "Ukraine," "Saudi Arabia," or any other capitalist nation - must be understood as shorthand metonymic mystification of ruling-class power.**Cyberwar has therefore emerged as a topic of global concern at a moment when the teleological certainties of Marxism seem broken or reduced to cruel caricature. This is not a coincidence. As we will argue, **the emergence of cybernetics from the military-industrial complex of the United States** at the end of the Second Word War **was an important part of that nation's ascent as a new imperial leader for the** capitalist **system. Computers and networks**, both in their military and economic applications, **played an important role in eventual U.S. victory** over the USSR **in the Cold War. And their extension into electronic commodities, industrial automation, supply-chain logistics, and financial trading was a crucial part of** the **globalization** in which a reinvigorated capitalism from 1989 on disseminated itself around the planet, **under the shelter of** the global hegemon's **cruise missiles, smart weapons, and satellite intelligence. This armed pacification of a world market has**, however, **not had the finality many expected. Rather, it has generated new wars**, of two major types, both misnamed and ill defined but each a consequence of capital's global triumph over its socialist opponents.The "war on terror" is, of course, the conventional and ideologically laden name for the protracted sequence of conflicts set in motion when mujahideen, armed and financed by the United States and its Saudi Arabian ally to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, turned on its imperial patron with the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001. **These conflicts, centered on the Middle East but radiating across the planet, include the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; world-distributed terrorist attacks; and counterterrorist operations across Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Mali, Libya, and many other theaters**. If the "war on terror" is sometimes colloquially used to include the U.S. invasion of Iraq, this craven acceptance of the spurious rationalizations offered by the Bush administration could be only retroactively justified, as U.S. occupation generated first both Sunni and Shia insurgency and later, in its aftermath, the rise of ISIS. **This so-called war on terror interpenetrates other regional conflicts, such as** those in **Kashmir between India and Pakistan, Russian actions in Chechnya, and Saudi Arabia's intensifying clashes with Iran in Yemen and elsewhere, and also overlaps with Israel's constant operations against Palestinians, wars with neighbors, and determination to maintain** its regional **monopoly of nuclear weapons.** It is not our aim here to map the noxious vectors of the "war on terror," only to highlight how **its mutating fronts have been a bleeding edge for the development and use of cyberweaponry**, **in counterinsurgency operations, domestic surveillance, and digital strikes** and sabotage against nuclear weapons facilities.

### Link – Cybersecurity

#### Cyber warfare is a product of racial capitalisms unconscious – the root cause is violence shaped by inter-capitalist rivalries that make war inevitable – but it also is a source for revolutionary disruptions through a “cyber war on cyber war” that short-circuits capitals monopoly on violence

Dyer-Witherford and Mtviyenko 17 – Nick Dyer-Witheford is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at University of Western Ontario and Svitlana Matviyenko is an Assistant Professor of Critical Media Analysis in the School of Communication [Nick, Svitlana, “Cyber-War and Contemporary Marxism,” 2017, DKP]

Cyber-war could, in theory be part of a contemporary revolutionary war position which might include development militant hacking to sabotage and paralyse corporate operations, recovering the worker power lost by the (cybernetic) diminishment of the power of the mass strike, etc, or disrupting the financial sector. More loosely, as we have already mentioned the last decades of seen some successes in cyber-organizing of occupations, demonstrations and riots, and one could imagine this process intensifying in future crises. However, there are problems in particular to applying cyber-war to revolutionary ends. As Hassan (2013), Dyer-Witheford (2015) and others have argued, there is a misfit between the speed and secrecy of cyber-war practices and the slower and social logic that, in the long term, form radically emancipatory subjects and movements: reliance on cyber-organizing probably account for some of the "up like a rocket, down like a stick" aspect of the 2011 occupations. Moreover, despite hacker romanticism, there is a persisting imbalance of power between state and no-state forces even in the digital realm (Healey 2013), and the new vulnerability of social movements to surveillance cyber-crackdowns seriously jeopardises all sorts of cyber-organizing hacktivism. To assess the future possibilities of revolutionary cyber-war therefore requires an overall assessment of the diverse factors at play in the emergence of cyber-war as a feature of contemporary capitalism, a task to which we now turn.

3. Cyber-War and the capitalist unconscious

Cyber war emerges from and is shaped by the interaction of inter-capitalist rivalries, class war, technological revolutions and both progressive and reactionary social movements, producing an extremely complex diagram. What we might call the horizontal axis of inter-state conflicts, with which many cyber war accounts begin, has to be seen in relation to a vertical axis that pits these same rival states against a seething mass of (often contradictory) digitized resistance movements (many of which are supported or co-opted by inter-state rivalries in various proxy wars), with both horizontal and vertical dynamics arising from, and feeding into, a common origin-point in capitalism's most recent technological revolution. These different vectors interact to create a series of zigzagging, diagonal or swerving alignments whose chaotic tendencies are enhanced by the decentralization, opacity and velocity of networked interaction.

This complex pattern of conflicts can be seen as a manifestation of global capitalism's "unconscious" (Tom sic 2016; Jameson 1991). By this we mean that cyber-war is symptomatic of features of the world-market unacknowledged in the neoliberal discourse of "globalization", namely the profound aggression and destructiveness intrinsic to an order predicated on privatized competition. While neoliberalism of course not only recognises but enthusiastically celebrates competition and its associated "disruptions" and "creative destruction" as a spur to innovation and wealth creation, its official message is that ultimately the "invisible hand" of the market anneals this into the greater good of optimal resource allocation. What is denied is the possibility that this competitive agonistic system might explode into non-creative destruction, and that the ultimate "disruption" is to be found in the horror of war. Cyber-war is a secretive but increasingly present irruption of this possibility, a partially contained yet intensifying expression of the world market's disintegrative tendencies. As aspects of the opaque and undeclared but deeply penetrative refashioning of social subjects by cyber-war we include the following points:

\* Cyber-war is "crepuscular" (Virilio 2002). Cyber-war as neither simply a fabrication of cyber-security experts (Blunden & Cheung 2013; Rid 2013) nor the imminent equivalent of nuclear war, as some of those experts suggest (Clark 2011). It belongs rather neither war nor peace, as form of shadow hostility that is compatible with and cross cuts officially civil relations between states (e.g. US relations with Russia and China) and the outbreak of kinetic conflicts (Syria, Ukraine). It is neither identical to nor separate from either conventional war or peace time signals intelligence operations, but is rather the persistent background noise or "ceiling" (2013) of capital's new cold (and hot) wars, and its endemic class wars.

■ Cyber-war is mystifying. It is well recognized that cyber-war operations pose an "attribution problem" because of the tendency to "obliterate proof" (Filiol 2011) of its perpetrators. Although many of these attribution problems are convincingly solved, sometimes surprisingly quickly (Hansen 2013), they nevertheless invest questions of war and peace, security and risk with a deep murkiness and proliferating anxieties and paranoia.

Cyber-war as marketized (or privatized) war-in which the state's "monopoly of violence" is reinforced and undermined by private actors, hacker armies, corporate "hack-backs", for profit cyber-security firms and consultancies (Harris 2014), so that the "military industrial" complex's of national security states become more and more interfaced with criminal markets and "the dark web", and increasingly dependent by corporate collaborations, which can both enable and constrain state power (for example, the PRISM compliance between the NSA and giant info-corporations followed by "encryption" conflicts between FBI and Apple etc). Cyber-war thus becomes a domain beyond public oversight and democratic control.

Cyber-war is a new way of clandestine mobilization and disciplining of populations. The mass mobilizations of huge armies are thought of as past, but cyber-war offers both states and movements new forms of recruitment, beyond the professional armies, whether by induction into patriotic hacking, Anonymous-style scrip- hacking or jihadist virtual interpellation. By the same token it also sets in motion, through surveillance, a new militarized panopticism, capable of both highly personalized targeting of suspects (Duncan 2014) and the generalized repressive chilling of networks (Deibert 2013).

Cyber-war is increasingly automated, operating by malware implantation, bot -nets, chat bots, the tweaking of algorithmic filter- bubbles, big-data scanning surveillance and the "kill-chains" of drone-warfare (Deibert 2013; Cockburn 2015; Shaw 2016). It thus becomes a machinic capitalist unconscious, a subterranean process in which the participants are made unwittingly or at least unthinkingly complicit by their everyday involvement in a ubiquitously networked social context.

This subterranean militarized digital environment poses contemporary anti-capitalist movements with difficult dilemmas about how, when or if to practice networked organization, whose speed and secrecy offer some powerful advantages, but also confound the slower processes of mundane organization and are intensely vulnerable to surveillance and cyber-crackdowns. Future Marxist revolutionaries, operating under conditions of surveillance and sous veillance, viral information and disinformation, encryption and encryption-breaking, anonymization, verification, authentication, and algorithmic digital war, will have to make constant strategic and tactical decisions about whether to adopt cyber-war techniques. The resort to cyber-war by state actors, their proxies, and their terrorist opponents means that opposition to militarization of the digital is an important arena of organization, mobilizing popular sentiment against the enlarged scope of state and corporate mass surveillance, viral propaganda, covert malware operations, and, more broadly pressing against the aggressive disorders of the world market. Paradoxically, however, as Snowden, Wikileaks and Anonymous have shown, revealing the scope of the destruction, actual and potential, inflicted by global capitalism's new wave of wars and cyber-wars itself requires hacker ingenuity. Therefore the best current revolutionary strategy may be the paradoxical one of (to renew another phrase from the archive of the left) "Krieg dem Krieg", "war on war" (Nation 2009, or in this case, "cyber-war on cyber-war".

#### That has an external impact of cybereugenics and nanocellular racism as the perfection of previous techniques elaborated during counterinsurgency wars, increasingly armed with racial technologies of control

Mbembe 17. Joseph-Achille Mbembe, known as Achille Mbembe, is a Cameroonian philosopher, political theorist, and public intellectual. “Critique of Black Reason.” 3-10-2017. *Duke University Press*. cut by vikas bbyyy

The same is true of the different ways in which living things can be manipulated, including the hybridization of organic, animal, and artificial elements. In fact, **there is good reason to believe that** in a more or less distant future genetic techniques **will be used to** manage the characteristics of populations to eliminate races judged "undesirable" through the selection of trisomic embryos, or **through theriomorphism** (hybridization with animal elements) **or** "**cyborgization**" (hybridization with artificial elements). Nor is it impossible to believe that we will arrive at a point where the fundamental role of medicine will be not only to bring a sick organism back to health but to use medical techniques of molecular engineering to refashion life itself along lines defined by racial determinism. Race and racism, then, do not only have a past. They also have a future, particularly in a context where **the possibility of transforming life and creating mutant species no longer belongs to the realm of fiction**. Taken on their own, the transformations of the capitalist mode of production during the second half of the twentieth century cannot explain the reappearance and various metamorphoses of the Beast. But they- along with major discoveries in technology, biology, and genetics-do undeniably constitute its background. **42 A** new political economy of life **is emerging**, one **irrigated by international flows of knowledge about cells, tissues, organs, pathologies, and therapies as** well as about **intellectual property**.43 **The** reactivation of the logic of race also **goes hand in hand with the increasing power of** the ideology of security and the installation of mechanisms aimed at **calculating and minimizing risk** and turning protection into the currency of citizenship. This is notably the case in regard to the management of migration and mobility in a context in which terrorist threats are believed to increasingly emanate from individuals organized in cells and networks that span the surface of the planet. In such conditions the protection and policing of territory becomes a structural condition for securing the population. To be effective, such protection requires that everyone remain at home, that those living and moving within a given national territory be capable of proving their identities at any given moment, that the most exhaustive information possible be gathered on each individual, and that the control of foreigners' mobility be carried out not only along borders but also from a distance, preferably within their countries of departure. **The massive expansion of digitization under way nearly everywhere in the world partly adheres to this logic, with the idea that optimal forms of securitization**￼necessarily **require** the creation of **global systems of control over individuals conceived of as biological bodies that are both multiple and in motion.** Protection itself is no longer based solely on the legal order. It has become a question of biopolitics. **The new systems** of security **build on various elements of prior regimes** (the forms of punishment used within slavery, aspects of the colonial wars of conquest and occupation, legal- juridical techniques used in the creation of states of exception) **and incorporate them**, **on a nanocellular level**, into the techniques of the age of genomics and the war on terror. But **they** also **draw on** techniques elaborated during the counterinsurgency wars **of the period of decolonization and** the "dirty wars" of the Cold War (**in Algeria, Vietnam, Southern Africa, Burma, and Nicaragua**), **as well as** the experiences of predatory dictatorships put into power **throughout the world with the direct encouragement**, or at least complicity, **of the intelligence agencies of the West**. The **increasing power** of the security state in the contemporary context is, furthermore, **accompanied by a** remodeling of the world through technology **and an** exacerbation of **forms of** racial categorization. Facing the transformation of the economy of violence throughout the world, liberal democratic regimes now consider themselves to be in a nearly constant state of war against new enemies who are in flight, both mobile and reticular. **The theater of this new form of war** is both external and internal. It requires a "total" conception of defense, along with greater tolerance for legal exceptions and special dispensations. The conduct of this type of war **depends on the creation of** tight, **panoptic systems that enable increasing control of individuals**, preferably from a distance, via the traces they leave behind.46 **In place of the classic paradigm of war**, in which opposing sides meet on a well-defined battlefield and the risk of death is reciprocal, **the logic is now vertical**. **There are two protagonists: prey and predator.**47 The predator, with nearly complete control of the airspace, selects the targets, locations, times, and nature of the strikes.48 The increasingly vertical character of war and the more frequent use of unpiloted drones means that killing the enemy looks more and more like a video game, an experience of sadism, spectacle, and entertainment.49 And, even more important, these new forms of warfare carried out from a distance require an unprecedented merging of the civil, police, and military spheres with those of surveillance. The spheres of surveillance, meanwhile, are also being reconfigured. No longer mere state structures, and operating as chains linked in form￼only, they function by cultivating private-sector influence, by expanding into those corporate entities responsible for gathering the data necessary for mass surveillance. As a result, the objects of surveillance become daily life, the space of relationships, communication (notably through electronic technologies), and transactions. There is not, of course, a total concatenation of the mechanisms of the market and those of the state. But in our contemporary world the liberal state is transformed into a war power at a time when, we now realize, capital not only remains fixed in a phase of primitive accumulation but also still leverages racial subsidies in its pursuit of profit. In this context the citizen is redefined as both the subject and the beneficiary of surveillance, which now privileges the transcription of biological, genetic, and behavioral characteristics through digital imprints. In a new technetronic regime characterized by miniaturization, dematerialization, and the fluid administration of state violence, imprints (fingerprints, scans of the iris and retina, forms of vocal and facial recognition) make it possible to measure and archive the uniqueness of individuals. The distinguishing parts of the human body become the foundations for new systems of identification, surveillance, and repression. The security state conceives of identity and the movement of individuals (including its own citizens) as sources of danger and risk. But **the** generalized **use of** biometric data as a source of identification and for the automation **of facial recognition constitutes a new type of populace**, one predisposed toward distancing and imprisonment. 51 So it is that, in the context of the anti-immigration push in Europe, entire categories of the population are indexed and subjected to various forms of racial categorization that transform the immigrant (legal or illegal) into an essential category of difference.52 This difference can be perceived as cultural or religious or linguistic. It is seen as inscribed in the very body of the migrant subject, visible on somatic, physiognomic, and even genetic levels.53 War and race have **meanwhile** become resurgent problems at the heart of the international order. The same is true of torture and the phenomenon of mass incarceration. It is not only that the line between war and peace has been blurred. **War has become a "gigantic process of labor," while the military regime seeks to impose its own model on the "public order of the peace state."**54 While some citadels have collapsed, other **walls have been strengthened**.55 As has long been the case, **the contemporary world is** deeply **shaped and conditioned by** the **ancestral** forms of **religious, legal, and political life built around** fences, enclosures, walls, camps, circles,￼and, above all, **borders**. 56 Procedures of **differentiation, classification, and hierarchization aimed at exclusion, expulsion, and** even **eradication have been reinvigorated everywhere**. New voices have emerged proclaiming, on the one hand, that there is no such thing as a universal human being or, on the other, that the universal is common to some human beings but not to all. Others emphasize the necessity for all to guarantee the safety of their own lives and homes by devoting themselves-and their ancestors and their memories, in one way or another-to the divine, a process that only subtracts them from historical interrogation and secures them completely and permanently within the walls of theology. Like the beginning of the nineteenth century, the beginning of the twenty-first constitutes, from this perspective, a significant moment of division, universal differentiation, and identity seeking.

#### Cybernetic regimes of control which justifies global conflicts

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko 19. Nick Dyer-Witheford is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at University of Western Ontario and Svitlana Matviyenko is an Assistant Professor of Critical Media Analysis in the School of Communication. “Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism.” March 2019.

This is not the place for a detailed examination of the political economy of "postsocialist" nations (Lane 2014). In the USSR, the orgy of privatization and the chaos of shocktherapy marketization after 1991 have been followed under Putin by a new period of nationalization, in which oligarchic capitalists operate under supervision of, and overlap with, state elites in a context of market exchange (Worth 2005; Pirani 2010; Dzarasov 2014; Sakwa 2014). In the more complex case of the People's Republic of China, the party apparatus has maintained control of some "commanding heights" of the economy, even as other domains are handed over to private ownership, including both foreign and domestic investors. Some commentators see China's arrangements as tantamount to full subsumption with the world market (Li 2009; HartLandsberg 2013); others consider that a "left turn" from within the party apparatus could reestablish a socialist project (Amin 2013). At the moment, the latter possibility seems remote. In Russia, China, and other postsocialist countries, the wage organizes production, the responsibilities of the state for provision of public services have typically been diminished, and there are vast income gulfs between workers in and owners of the means of production. Corruption is often rife. Political elites are either identical with, entangled in, or dependent on capital ownership, and although these elites must in various ways manage, mobilize, and hegemonize public opinion, their fractions define the agenda of policy decisions, and perhaps especially foreign policy decisions. Thus **discussions of international relations in terms of the** intentions or desires of "China" or "Russia" - **as**, of course, of **the "United States," "Canada," "Ukraine," "Saudi Arabia," or any other capitalist nation - must be understood as** shorthand metonymic mystification of ruling-class power. Cyberwar has therefore emerged as a topic of global concern at a moment when the teleological certainties of Marxism seem broken or reduced to cruel caricature. This is not a coincidence. As we will argue, **the** emergence of cybernetics from the military-industrial complex **of the United States** at the end of the Second Word War **was an important part of that nation's ascent as a new imperial leader for the** capitalist **system. Computers and networks**, both in their military and economic applications, **played an important role in eventual U.S. victory** over the USSR **in the Cold War. And their extension into** electronic commodities, industrial automation, supply-chain logistics, and financial trading **was a crucial part of** the **globalization** in which a reinvigorated capitalism from 1989 on disseminated itself around the planet, **under the shelter of** the global hegemon's **cruise missiles, smart weapons, and satellite intelligence. This** armed pacification of a world market **has**, however, **not had the finality many expected. Rather, it has generated new wars**, of two major types, both misnamed and ill defined but each a consequence of capital's global triumph over its socialist opponents.The "war on terror" is, of course, the conventional and ideologically laden name for the protracted sequence of conflicts set in motion when mujahideen, armed and financed by the United States and its Saudi Arabian ally to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, turned on its imperial patron with the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001. **These conflicts, centered on the Middle East but** radiating across the planet**, include the** invasion and occupation of Afghanistan**; world-distributed terrorist attacks; and** counterterrorist operations **across Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Mali, Libya, and many other theaters**. If the "war on terror" is sometimes colloquially used to include the U.S. invasion of Iraq, this craven acceptance of the spurious rationalizations offered by the Bush administration could be only retroactively justified, as U.S. occupation generated first both Sunni and Shia insurgency and later, in its aftermath, the rise of ISIS. **This so-called war on terror interpenetrates other regional conflicts, such as** those in **Kashmir between India and Pakistan, Russian actions in Chechnya, and Saudi Arabia's intensifying clashes with Iran in Yemen and elsewhere, and also overlaps with Israel's constant operations against Palestinians, wars with neighbors, and determination to maintain** its regional **monopoly of nuclear weapons.** It is not our aim here to map the noxious vectors of the "war on terror," only to highlight how **its** mutating fronts **have been a bleeding edge for the development and use of cyberweaponry**, **in** counterinsurgency **operations, domestic** surveillance**, and** digital strikes and sabotage against nuclear weapons facilities.

### Link – Deterrence

#### Effective deterrence strategies require a silent war against racialized threats -- their every 2AC claim that “threats are real” is a performative gesture of *sly civility* that renders America the policeman of international politics

Mathur 16. Rita Mathur is a Professor in Political Science and Geography at UTSA and has a PhD in polisci from York. "Sly civility and the paradox of equality/inequality in the nuclear order: a post-colonial critique." 2016. Nuclear Politics: Beyond Positivism.

**Sly civility can be understood as a concept encompassing practices of racial etiquette and strategic orientalism** as discussed below. The **practices of racial etiquette came into play** with such speed **in the establishment of the nuclear order** that ‘the previous longevity of anti-egalitarian and racist sentiment can and was easily lost sight’ (Furedi 1998, 15). The **practices of racial etiquette are conscious of** the formal principles of **equality among sovereign states, induce an epistemological silence against any overt statements on racial inequality but stubbornly refuse to give up on** the idea of **political mastery**. Frank Furedi argues that **practices of racial etiquette represent a ‘**second form of colonization**’ that does not have any serious commitment to anti-racism but seeks to** indulge in a ‘silent war’ to ‘produce over time, social formations and even world orders that were macrostructural systems of inclusion and exclusion’ (5). These practices of racial etiquette are further reinforced by contemporary practices of strategic orientalism. Edward Said articulated the concept of ‘Orientalism’ to demonstrate how the West constitutes its own identity on the premise of its differences with others often seen as a source of threat (Said 2001). **In these iterative practices of representation** the **cultural differences are** effectively **deployed to** differentiate the West **and** discipline the others **in the international order**. Keith Krause and Andrew Latham suggest that the continued exercise of this disciplinary power necessitates maintenance of military superiority in the post-Cold War period. **The West** then **deploys ‘**strategic orientalism**’ as a ‘**new conceptual template**’ that enables the West to impute ‘politicostrategic objectives and purposes’ to Third World countries in a manner that is** ‘**informed** more **by Western fears and prejudices** than by the realities of politics in these states’ (Krause and Latham 1998, 38). **It transforms** ‘essentially **contestable interpretations of danger’ into ‘“objective” and incontestable facts** regarding the sources of threat and insecurity in the international system’ (38). An effort to map these intersecting practices of racial etiquette, orientalism and strategic orientalism on a continuum reveals practices of sly civility. A grasp of these practices of sly civility facilitates an understanding of the nuclear order with its practices of inclusion and exclusion and the West’s efforts to control the narrative of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this narrative **there is an assumption that** the **Western practices of arms control and disarmament are ‘rational’, ‘benign’ and provide** for the **global ‘public good’** (Krause and Latham 1998, 23). **The control of the narrative and its representation** of these standards **is a prerequisite in the exercise of power over others**. Any resistance to this narrative is through practices of racial etiquette and strategic orientalism to be marginalized as peripheral and a source of instability and chaos. These **practices of strategic orientalism or sly civility are not sensitive to the ‘ethnocentricity’ of** their **underlying assumptions** and exhibit a ‘distinct matrix of beliefs and dispositions’ towards others in the field of arms control and disarmament (23). **It is**, therefore, imperative that **practices of** sly civility be ‘caught in the irredeemable act of writing’ (Bhabha 1994, 133). Homi K. Bhabha suggests that **the ‘practice of writing’ is a ‘strategy of colonialist regulation’** (134). This writing ‘puts on trial the very discourse of civility within which representative government claims its liberty and empire its ethics’ (136). The **writing makes visible the ‘nationalist, authoritarian tone’ that polices** the **‘culturally and racially differentiated colonial space’** of arms control and disarmament (134). This authoritarian tone is embedded in a narrative that is narcisstic in its insistence that the other recognize its authority. In its insistence for this recognition it is willing to calculate and deploy tactical measures such as ‘skeptical conceits’ that dismiss any efforts of the others that seek to challenge its authority (141). Any resistance unleashes acute anxiety and a ‘paranoia of power’ that generates ‘political and psychic’ contestations on authority to regulate the borders of arms control and disarmament (141–2). Despite this anxiety, it is important to scrutinize arms control and disarmament texts as ‘despatches of hyprocrisy’ that seek to ‘moralize’ but exhibit a specific ‘discursive doubleness’ that exists between the lines as an ‘effect of the ambivalent, deferred address of colonialist governance’ (Bhabha 1994, 136). It is in this space ‘**between the civil address and its colonial signification**’ with ‘**each axis displaying a problem of recognition and repetition**’ that there ‘**shuttles the signifier of authority in search of a strategy of surveillance, subjection, and inscription**’ (136). **The signifier of authority traverses through time and through its repetition** deepens the crisis of authority **experienced in** practices of **arms control and disarmament**. This crisis of authority encourages ‘projections’ compelling the ‘native to address the master’ and reproducing the native as ‘partially aligned or reformed’ in discourse ‘endangering the boundaries of truth itself’ (142). Any effort to address this crisis necessitates an exposure of practices of sly civility to encourage a confrontation with the ‘colonialist governmentality’ in the field of arms control and disarmament. **This confrontation will make it** increasingly **difficult for the West to ‘normalize its own history’ and ‘inscribe the history of the other in a fixed hierarchy of civil progress’** (136). These confrontations have been initiated and are now generating a momentum towards disavowal of the strategies of sly civility demanding redressal against the experiences of ‘institutionalized humiliation’ (Parek 2009, 31). The **practices of sly civility often fail to grasp that** humiliation is not simply an affect **but** ‘**a claim or claims of certain kinds**’ and it is important to ‘explore the structure of these claims, their logical or conceptual conditions, and their role in the reproduction of relations of power’ (Palshikar 2009, 81). Bhikhu **Parekh locates** organized or **institutionalized humiliation** in an ‘unequal society **in which some enjoy considerable power over others and exercise it with relative impunity**’ **and** these **powers are vested in** ‘**social institutions and practices**’ **that** ‘**embody disrespect for**, and systematically violate the **self-respect of groups of individuals**’ (Parek 2009, 31). **The** pathos of this experience of humiliation among **the** subalterns **became acutely visible at a time when the use of nuclear weapons in Japan reinforced the message that**: **locations in the hierarchy of states are marked off in part by specific weapons**, so the possession of certain weapons is considered the sine qua non for claiming places higher up the international order. Perhaps of central importance in this regard are nuclear arms. (Mutimer 2000, 137) **This particular experience of humiliation has been compounded with repetitive threats to use nuclear weapons**, specifically **by the USA**, **in wars of intervention in the Third World** (Petras and Morley 1988, 151). **It is against these experiences of vulnerability**, **suffering and humiliation that discourses on sly civility have to contend with to address** the paradox of **equality/inequality in the nuclear order**. A clear conceptualization of practices of sly civility above encourages us to now survey the system of recordation of the paradox of equality/inequality in the texts on arms control and disarmament. For the purpose of this paper we will limit this exercise to three representative samples of writing that traverse through time vacillating between ‘what is always “in place”, already known and something that must be anxiously repeated’ (Bhabha 1994, 95). These texts display a liberal willingness to entertain the problem of equality/inequality in arms control and disarmament in some measure. The willingness to question the assumptions informing ‘a desirable and feasible’ nuclear order is constrained by the desire to rationalize and make it appear natural that the inequalities should persist in the existing nuclear order (Bull 1987, 191). The treatment meted out to the equality/inequality paradox deserves careful consideration as they make visible the practices of sly civility that are responsible for the hierarchical international nuclear order. In the initial period of the Cold War, Hedley Bull, a representative figure of arms control and disarmament acknowledges the hegemonic control that exists in the nuclear order (1987, 191). He concedes that ‘the vision of the world order that is projected by our arms control arrangements is one against which the majority of states are in revolt’ and that ‘one finds different degrees of opposition to these arrangements, deep mutual divisions’ (191). However **he insists on the need for maintaining this nuclear order because those that ‘wish’ to break down this hegemony ‘have nothing in mind with which to replace it’** (191, emphasis added). **Bull specifically cites countries such as China, India, Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria and argues** that ‘the **objection of the third world countries is not to the quality of order in the present international arrangements**; it is rather to the way in which these arrangements discriminate against them’ (191, emphasis added). Thus, **Bull** not only specifically identifies the countries that are opposed to the inequality in the nuclear order but **is** also **insistent in making a division between those that have a mind and others that are mindless in their quest for change in the nuclear order**. **He** further **argues that states located on the third rung of the hierarchical nuclear order harbour grievances not to the quality of order but the arrangements within this order that are discriminatory against them**. This split discourse on quality of nuclear order and responsibility for the arrangements within the nuclear order is further buttressed by the suggestion that ‘those who have special interests recognize the special responsibilities that go with them, and conduct themselves in such a way as to engage general support for the system whose custodians and guarantors they are’ (Bull 1968, 1987, 143–50, 214, emphasis added). **The racial etiquette practiced** by Hedley Bull **becomes more pronounced in his statement that the** ‘**Third World’s lack of power, including military power** – its sense of impotence and vulnerability **in relation to the Western countries’ makes it rail against the existing international nuclear order** (1987, 201–2, emphasis added). It is with an inquisitorial insistence that he demands they articulate an ‘alternative conception of world order’ to be taken seriously (191). A similar tone of authority persists in the text of Joseph S. Nye as he writes in the last decade of the Cold War. Nye undertakes a purposeful investigation of the ‘logic of inequality’ in the nuclear order (1985, 123). The sincerity of his undertaking is belied by attributing theatrics to those claiming to harbour grievances against the existing nuclear order prior to the investigation being completed. At the very outset of this investigation, he describes the allegations of discrimination, hypocrisy and failure to live up to commitments levied by the diplomats of non-nuclear weapons states against the superpowers as a ‘drama’ (123). Nye then suggests that there is a ‘basic intuitive compact underlying the NPT’ and describes the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) itself as an ‘imaginary compact’ (1985, 124, 129) He then stipulates that ‘under certain conditions’ and ‘other things remaining equal’ nuclear inequality is acceptable (124–126). This reluctance to engage with historical circumstances and insert ceteris paribus clauses to advance abstract conditions of arguments is a questionable exercise. According to Akeel Bigrami and Priya Chacko this reluctance exhibits a ‘technological mindset’ that ‘fosters an abstract view of the world and relies on an understanding of truth as cognitive rather than as lived moral experience’ (Bilgrami 2003, 4164; Chacko 2011, 191). Nye deliberately insists on investigating the logic of inequality only as a technical problem susceptible to failure and denounces any investigation of the problem as embedded in racial roots. He emphatically insists that, ‘nuclear inequality has nothing to do with racism on the part of weapons states or with the irrationality that some claim to see in Third World leaders’ (Nye 1985, 126). **This impatience to denounce charges of racism is coupled with fearful portents that questioning the logic of inequality could lead to the possibility that ‘**deterrence will fail**’** (126). The failure of deterrence it is argued **‘**is likely to be much higher in **most** regional situations **because of the shaky political conditions found in most states seeking nuclear weapons as well as their** limited experience with nuclear command and control systems**’** (126). The existing inequality is further justified on grounds that with ‘new proliferators’ the threat of breaking ‘nuclear taboo becomes that much more likely’ (127). The reference to ‘shaky political conditions’ belies an element of suspicion and uncertainty of a stabilized and legitimate influence in these regions that fuels the need for assertion of hegemony in the nuclear order. There is little effort to balance these observations with acknowledgement of the risks that the possession of nuclear arms by Western powers has exposed to the world (Sagan 1995). The maintenance of inequality is further proposed in the following terms, ‘under many circumstances the introduction of a single bomb in some non-nuclear states may be more likely to lead to nuclear use than the addition of a thousand more warheads to the US and Soviet stockpiles’ (Nye 1985, 128, emphasis added). **This** particular **statement reveals the** entrenched **psyche of fearful discrimination and reignites the racial trauma of colonization in the subaltern that is to be severely penalized should even a single, rusty weapon be discovered in its possession by the colonizer** (Memmi 1967, 93–4). **Nye is confident** in his assertion **that**, ‘**nonproliferation is not an inconsistent or hypocritical policy if it is based on impartial and realistic estimation of relative risks**’ (Nye 1985, 127). **But he is oblivious to the consideration that** the power to make calculations pertaining to risk of failure of deterrence are all vested in the West **and** violation of taboo are all sourced to ‘new proliferators’ that need to be policed (Nye 1985, 131). **Nye does not problematize the task of policing as a shared responsibility of all countries but** reiterates that the task of policing is **‘traditionally** the domain of great powers in international politics**’** (131). Any **resistance to this policing function perceived as ‘the domain of great powers’ is** further **circumscribed by polarized choices between ‘some ordered inequality in weaponry’ or ‘anarchic inequality’ an oxymoron that is described** by Nye **to be ‘more dangerous’** (Nye 1985, 130). Nye casually entertains the possibility that ‘third countries may hold the superpowers similarly accountable’ but fails to provide any account of how this might be undertaken as he only insists on ‘alliance guarantees’ to stem proliferation and readily concludes that the NPT’s ‘Article VI obligations cannot be interpreted as simple disarmament’ (128). The transfer of nuclear technology even for energy programmes is also to be grounded in an ‘evolutionary approach’ and susceptible to additional deliberation on a ‘region’s stability and of the susceptibility of the technology to safeguards’ (130). It is this entrenched mindset **of political master and paranoia of displacement of power** that is displayed by Nye four decades into the Cold War. Nye displays little desire to question the legacy of attitudes that he has **inherited from those that have been revered and** are **woven into the traditional discourse on arms control and disarmament.**

### Link – Disease/Bioterror

#### The invocation of disease as a threat to security paves the way for permanent warfare waged via global networks of surveillance, sanctions, and violence that constitutes a necropolitical destruction of Otherness – this is operationalized through a legacy of bio-orientalism that constantly views Others as bio-weapon – an unhygienic threat to the cleanliness of Westphalian democracy

Kong 19 – John F. and Dorothy H. Magee Associate Professor of Asian Studies and English at Bowdoin College, PhD, English Language and Literature, University of Michigan [Belinda, “Pandemic as Method,” October 2019, Prism 16(2):368-389 DOI:10.1215/25783491-7978531, DKP]

The most proximate scene of biosecurity's solidification is the post-9/11 US security state's War on Terror. The extent to which the American government came to coopt the language of disease emergence was illustrated by Donald Rumsfeld's oft-cited speech from a 2002 Department of Defense news briefing in which he observed: "There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These are things we don't know we don't know."24 As Bruce Braun points out, Rumsfeld's logic mimed the contemporary perception of the "virtuality of molecular life": just as biology increasingly gets articulated in terms of virtual networks of unknown and dangerous viruses that "circulate and recombine in novel ways, threatening our bodies and identities," so national security came to be couched in terms of hidden networks of sleeper cells and emerging threats.25 Melinda Cooper calls this the "biological turn" in US foreign policy after 9/11, but more than a simple rhetorical resonance, she argues that this turn reflected a fundamental phi-osophical reconceptualization of warfare by the Bush administration. Moving away from the previous geopolitical doctrine of mutual deterrence, the US government strategically "conflate[d] public health, biomedicine, and war" so as to make operative a security agenda of "full-spectrum dominance, counterproliferation, and preemption."26 The epidemiological tenets of microbial emergence, resistance and counterresistance, and humans' permanent warfare against germs were transferred over and made central to defense policy. Within this new security framework, war became integral to the very conceptualization of life, or as Cooper puts it, "as if permanent war were simply a fact of life''27 In the reverse direction, national security now propels biological research— including the creation of new infectious diseases. In anticipation of potential bio- terrorist attacks, the US government's agency for developing cutting-edge mili­tary technology, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), has been actively inventing antibiotics and vaccines for not only known pathogens but also ones that do not yet exist. In the name of biodefense, "DARPA finds itself in the paradoxical situation of having first to create novel infectious agents or more virulent forms of existing pathogens in order to then engineer a cure," thus "blurring the difference between defensive and offensive research."28 For Cooper, this ideological convergence between biomedicine and biosecurity represents the culmination of neoliberalism's politics of life, which entrenches ideas of specu­lative preemption and catastrophe risk so as to disable a counterpolitics. What we can further emphasize is the real geography that underlies the post-9/11 bios- ecurity imagination. Despite rather postmodern descriptions of Al-Qaeda as a fluid organization of dispersed and fluctuating networks, the actual targets of US antiterrorism measures remain fixed in Asia and Africa. As in the case of the 2003 Iraq War, Rumsfeld's invocation of "unknown unknowns" served to justify Amer­ican military invasion of Iraq in the absence of evidence that it was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Concurrently, the formulation of a prototerritory of infectious disease emergence took place against the backdrop of this geopolit­ical theater of war.

Yet the consoll dat ion of the biosecurity posit ion predates 9/11 and can be traced back to the late 1980s and 1990s, as part of the US response to post-Cold War geopolitics after the dissolution of the USSR. As Susan Wright details, up until the 1980s, the American government mostly regarded terrorism as a "sec¬ond- or third-tier security problem—a problem that happened elsewhere," so that proponents of biological defense remained marginal in national security discus- sions.29 With the end of the Cold War, however, the former template of the Soviet threat was replaced by the discourse of hostile third-world "rogue states," and the prospect of nuclear warfare was superseded by the menace of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Before 9/11 gave a concrete context to this logic, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway provided biosecurity advocates within the US government with an early platform. This attack, they warned, represented the "index case" for contemporary acts of bioterrorism: a vital "threshold" had been crossed, a taboo lifted, and henceforth, terrorists of all stripes would follow suit by employing bioweapons on civilians.30 Bioterrorism, they argued, was "no longer the stuff of science fiction or adventure movies" but "a reality which has already come to pass, and one which, if we do not take appro¬priate measures, will increasingly threaten us in the future."31 As Wright recounts, this "alarmist" stance overtook Washington during the 1990s, and the congressio¬nal budget for counterterrorism defense soared.

Biological research benefitted directly from this political paradigm shift, as the study of infectious diseases now became a security priorlty. Significantly, a small cohort of prominent scientists was instrumental in linking infectious disease to biowarfare as coterminous national security threats. These scient ists served as key advisers in Washington, organizing research forums and participat¬ing on government panels as well as supplying successive White House admin-istrations with numerous reports on bioterrorist scenarios. They presented their views as impartial and nonpartisan extensions of scientific expertise, and their voices carried tremendous weight in determining government policy and budget allocations as well as the direction of scientific research. Two figures in particular stood out. Donald Henderson, the elder statesman of American epidemiology credited with eradicating smallpox in the 1960s and 1970s, was crucial in lending his support to the biosecurity position. At a 1998 CDC-sponsored confer¬ence on emerging infectious diseases, for instance, he categorically dismissed the objections of bioterrorism skeptics, and in a report later that year by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council, he warned that it would be a "grave mistake" for the government to delay biodefense preparations.32 In that same year, he was named the founding director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, with an earmarked $1 million in congressional funding.33 Even more influential than Henderson was Joshua Lederberg, Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist and scientific adviser since the 1950s for nine consecutive White House administrations. He organized and supervised many of the research panels at the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine, and in his reports to the government, he repeatedly forecast the calamitous impact of biowarfare, even handpicking experts specifically to dramatize for politicians apocalyptic scenarios of bioterrorist attacks on American cities. He was the one who identified the 1995 Tokyo subway attack as a "threshold event," claiming that "Aum Shinrikyo has done us a favor by . . . making it obvious that there is a very serious threat; that terrorists would use any means imaginable at their disposal."34 Again, Asia enters into this history as a strategic site, this time as a "threshold" of biothreat to be held at bay, in a coordinated narrative of bioterrorism. As Wright notes, Lederberg too reaped financial benefit from his political advocacy, as he later became a board member of EluSys Therapeutics, a biotech¬nology company with a biodefense research focus.35 The intertwined interests of neoliberal and neoconservative forces with public health became entrenched in this era, even if only a handful of high-profile scientists were directly implicated in this development.

In fact, the basis for the coniunction between biomedicine and biosecurity was set already in the historic 1989 NIAID/NIH Conference on Emerging Viruses held in Washington, DC. This conference was attended by over two hundred American scientists and pubiic health experts, includ ing both Henderson and Lederberg, and it was the forum where the term emerging viruses was first coined by the conference's principal organizer, epidemiologist Stephen Morse.36 In his follow-up landmark edited volume, Emerging Viruses, Morse captured the core message of the meeting:

The problem of emerging viruses is not likely to disappear. If anything, it will increase; episodes of disease emergence are likely to become more frequent. . . . Constructive action has been paralyzed in the past by a combination of apathy and uncertainty. The AIDS epidemic is a powerful reminder of the price of apa¬thy. It is also a demonstration that infectious diseases can still be a major threat to human life. Although we cannot yet predict specific disease outbreaks, and may never be able to, we now understand many of the factors leading to emer¬gence. . . . Part of the question therefore becomes whether people will continue unwittingly to precipitate emerging diseases and suffer the consequences, as has happened throughout history, or will begin to take responsibility for these human actions.37

According to Morse, since recent human history has witnessed waves of epi¬demics culminating in the AIDS crisis, we need to understand outbreaks not as "acts of God" but within a framework of "disease emergence." He therefore coined the phrase emerging viruses to desi gnate not just new pathogens but also known ones that are "rapidly expanding their range."38 As Andrew Lakoff points out, this classification is powerfully "generative," for it unifies under one name an array of illnesses not previously linked. The term converts a "disparate set of disease threats" into a single "imperative" of biodefense preparation.39 So even if the category of EID seems "self-evident" by our time, it is a "relatively recent invention," by a relatively elite and invested group of microbiologists and epidemiologists.40

The 1989 conference laid the conceptual cornerstone for later biosecurity techniques. Nicholas King pinpoints this conference as the catalyzing moment for what he calls an "emerging diseases worldview." Not just a set of scientific explanations or policy proposals, this worldview, he argues, is deeply ideological: it "comes equipped with a moral economy and historical narrative, explaining how and why we find ourselves in the situation that we do now, identifying vil¬lains and heroes, ascribing blame for failures and credit for triumph," as well as providing "a consistent, self-contained ontology of epidemic disease" that allows for strategic intervention and management.41 As King shows, in the decade after the conference, leading scientists and health officials in the United States increasingly conjured pandemic scenarios and tied them directly to national security, helping to formalize and cement the emerging diseases worldview across multiple spheres of knowledge. Endorsing a system of global epidemic surveillance and medical commoditization, this worldview represents a model of capltallst biopower that seeks not only to be omnipresent and omniscient but to profit from sickness everywhere.42 Indeed, in his edited volume, Morse already strongly pro¬moted global disease surveillance as an "essential first step" for securing national and human health.43 He cited Henderson's proposal for creating a fleet of interna¬tional disease surveillance centers modeled on the CDC, as well as global surveil¬lance systems for early detection and rapid tracking of outbreaks, electronic data¬bases for instantaneous accessing of medical information, and the marketization of health commodities such as drugs and vaccines.44 In fact, given the advent of internet technology and the global pharmaceutical industry, Henderson's blue-print has been not only reallzed but surpassed. Current systems of syndromic surveillance, which gather real-time data from numerous sources and monitor for patterns of symptoms distributed across populations, now work to "identify potential outbreaks while they are still invisible to healthcare professionals," effec¬tively relocating disease knowledge from physicians and patients to the infor¬mation systems overseen by national security authorities.45 In turn, this disease governance template has been exported to the WHO by American CDC officials, and from there it has disseminated into the public health institutions of countries such as China, becoming ever more established on a global scale.46

Echoing King's analysis, we can also see a penchant for moral parables in the champions of infectious disease and biosecurity discourse. On their account, in a narrative that has become canonized as scientific lore, Morse and Henderson consistently portray themselves as the longtime underdogs in American public health, the unjustly ignored wise men who were never complacent, the small but marginalized contingent of microbiologists and epidemiologists who valiantly disputed the earlier era's status quo and ultimately came to be vindicated by the microbes' vengeful return. In short, they were the heroes to William Stewart's vil¬lain. Ironically, it turns out that Stewart's infamous line about "closing the book on infectious diseases" is itself the stuff of urban legends—one that, as far as the records indicate, originated in this very 1989 conference on emerging viruses, in a personal correspondence between none other than Henderson and Morse.47 Henderson had apparently heard the remark secondhand, from unnamed people who were in turn recalling a speech from memory years later, and he went on to repeat this anecdote both at the conference and in his essay for Morse's volume.48 Morse, for his part, footnoted the quotation and attributed it to Henderson in a medical textbook a few years later.49 Two journalists who attended the conference reported this line in the media, and one of them, Laurie Garrett, further popu¬larized it in her 1994 bestselling book The Coming Plague.50 But Stewart himself never made the alleged statement, and on the contrary, he expressed the opposite view on multiple occasions that "warning flags are still flying in the communi¬cable disease field" and that "we cannot turn our backs on microbiology."51 That the notion of emerging viruses was bestowed official birth at exactly the same moment as the mythic invention of the Stewart quotation, and by the same group of ascendant scientists, intimates just how essential the fable of a benighted villain is to the founding legitimacy of the infectious disease paradigm, as if the latter must create its own dark prehistory to claim an epochal birthright.

Finally, if we trace the NIAID/NIH 1989 conference and its ideological roots further back, we arrive at the Cold War as another vital scene of pandemic dis¬course's emergence. Before Morse coined the term emerging viruses, microbiolo¬gist Rene Dubos was the first to use emergence in the 1950s to describe the behav¬ior of microbes. According to Dubos, microbial evolution was far from stable or linear but radically unpredictable and disruptive, and since humans are locked in an unremitting coevolving ecology with microbes, there can be no final overcom¬ing of them. Cooper sees in Dubos's germ theory "an alternative vision of warfare and a counterphilosophy of disease" that would ultimately culminate in the post- 9/11 biosecurity credo of permanent, preemptive, speculative warfare.52 Along with his proteges, Dubos developed models of disease ecology in these early years of the Cold War.53 As Lakoff contends, this was the period of the decisive rise of an "ideology of preparedness" in US politics and public health. Toward the end of World War II, some US military strategists argued against demobilization, main¬taining that the country needed to remain prepared to respond to new enemy threats such as a nuclear attack. They campaigned for "military and civilian readiness, in peacetime, for an anticipated future war," in effect projecting a state of "permanent mobilization for total war."54 This preparedness model was transferred over to natural disaster management beginning in the mid-1950s, when defense officials started to treat environmental disasters and modern warfare as bearing "a close affinity."55 It also led to the founding in 1951 of the CDC's Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) by Alexander Langmuir, the father of infectious disease epidemiology and Henderson's mentor. Langmuir advocated an approach of "hypervigilance" against epidemics, of "continued watchfulness" on a global scale, and he proposed a global network of centers that would provide around- the-clock surveillance and early rapid detection for both natural and unnatural outbreaks.56 Henderson's later template of global disease surveillance was consciously modeled on Langmuir's. As he noted in his essay for Morse's volume, the contemporary issue of infectious disease surveillance is not unprecedented but had been raised "at least once before"—in 1950, at the start of the Korean War, when fears of a biological attack on civilian populations prompted the creation of the EIS.57 In this essay, Henderson vividly resurrected the Cold War language of permanent total war, writing that "the world is increasingly interdependent, and .. . human health and survival will be challenged, ad infinitum, by new and mutant microbes, with unpredictable pathophysiological manifestations."58

The 1989 conference, then, had a direct lineage in Cold War epidemiological frameworks, with its presiding scientists pushing for not just a revival but permanent normalization of Cold War biosecurity techniques. Again, this history is anchored in a US geopolitics in which Asia figures repeatedly and strategically as the site of multiple forms of potential biothreat, requiring exceptional modes of power to be mobilized at home. Infectious disease discourse therefore epitomizes the insufficient deimperialization of contemporary conditions of knowledge. So far, I have used pandemic as a prism for a geopolitical archaeology. Now I turn to pandemic as a method for diagnosing contemporary bio-orientalism and tracing it to one particular historical formation.

Pandemic as Bio-orientalism

As a theory of the ways politics captures biological life into its domain—as "pow¬er's hold over life," in Michel Foucault's original formulation, "the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a livfng befng"59—biopolitics seems ideally suited as a framework for analyzing the operations of disease governance. Indeed, disease plays a paradigmatic, one might say narratively indispensable, role in Fou- cault's history of power. Most famously, the plague inaugurated for him projects of disciplinary power, exemplified by mechanisms of panoptic surveillance and control, but this plague template was also preceded by leprosy's "rituals of exclu¬sion." As Foucault underscored, different diseases gave rise to different "ways of exercisfng power over men" and different "pofitfcal dream[s]": "The leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure . . . those sick of the plague were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning . . . the great confinement on the one hand; the correct training on the other. The leper and his separation; the plague and its segmentations."60 Yet, as epidemics were superseded by endemics, "illnesses that were difficult to eradicate ... affecting a population" as "something permanent," so too did sovereign and disciplinary power structures give way to a contemporary "'biopolitics' of the human race," represented by a modern "med¬icine whose main function will now be public hygiene, with institutions to coor¬dinate medical care, centralize information, and normalize knowledge."61 Later, Foucault would call this last type of power security: where sovereignty excludes as in the case of leprosy and discipline quarantines as in the case of plague, secu¬rity inoculates as with smallpox.62 Each biopolitical moment has its correspond¬ing disease. Philipp Sarasin calls this recurrent motif a minor "trace of infection" in Foucault's writ ing,63 but we can flip the order of priority here and postui ate that the history of Western disease governance has been that which underlay the inception of contemporary biopolitical theory.

To be sure, for later theorists, the most telling scenes of biopower will change. For Giorgio Agamben's models of sovereign power and bare life, the intractable historical prototype would be the Nazi death camps; for Achille Mbembe's necro- power, slavery and colonialism; and for Brian Massumi's ontopower, the post-9/11 War on Terror. What these subsequent articulations make ever more visible is that biopolitics becomes conceptually relevant not merely when there exists a politicization of any life but when the life to be excluded, surveilled, disciplined, detained, stripped bare, subjugated, slain, or preempted entails some form of otherness, whether racial, colonial, or geopolitical. Yet biopolitical theories often take recourse in an abstracted language of space, however real and acknowl­edged the historical referents, whether it is Foucault's panopticon or "spaces of security";64 Agamben's "state of exception," "zone of indistinction," or "camp as nomos";65 or Massumi's "prototerritory."66 Mbembe is perhaps most explicit and steadfast in reversing this intellectual movement from history to theory when he moves instead from imagined geographies back to historically politicized ones. For him, the colony is "the location par excellence" for not just particular vari­ants of biopolitics but also the accumulated operations of it: the colony, as with the plantation system and the apartheid regime, has been a consummate site for the "concatenation of biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege." And "crucial to this concatenation," he emphasizes, is "race."67

Following Mbembe, I would suggest that Asia, akin to the colony, has been the rationale for the concatenation of multiple manifestations of Western bio- power; as such, it has occupied a key place in the geopoiitical history, if not the conscious theorizing, of biopolitics. As we saw, over the course of the past century, Asia has been variously and strategically cited within US discourses of infectious disease and biosecurity as the threshold of bioterrorism as well as the biological other that justifies preemptive biodefense. A more recent exam­ple of the nexus between Asia and global biopolitics centers on the 2003 SARS epidemic. As the new millennium's first pandemic, with its origins in southern China, SARS incited deep anxieties and fears about the contemporary world and its breakdown of the boundary between first-world health and third-world contagion.68 The Chinese communist government's initial cover-up of the outbreak at home further fueled age-old orientalist tropes of China as the site of exotic and unhygienic culinary traditions as well as authoritarian secrecy, a lethal com­bination for global health security.69 It was partly in the context of these orien­talist perceptions that the WHO began to act routinely beyond its jurisdiction in response to SARS, bypassing and sometimes overriding state authorities to issue travel advisories, collecting disease data from nonstate sources, and dissem­inating this information to other countries without the consent of affected gov­ernments. Most controversial among these measures was WHO's unprecedented global travel advisory for Hong Kong and Guangdong, a move calculated not just to safeguard global health but also to pressure the Chinese government into compliance. In 2005, the World Health Assembly would go on to revise the Inter­national Health Regulations to formalize these powers for WHO and to grant it additional authority, from everyday surveillance and intelligence gathering to crisis management. David Fidler argues that SARS radically transformed global health governance into a "post-Westphalian" paradigm, which centralizes med­ical authority and regulatory power on a global scale more than ever before.70 If for Mbembe colonialism and slavery are the historical forms of life that enact theories of biopolitics, we might say that bio-orientalism similarly haunts global biopolitical history.

Contemporary pandemic discourse further sustains this biopolitical history. In popular culture as much as public health arenas, Asia is frequently depicted as the birthplace of one wave of infectious disease after another. A 2004 issue of Time magazine typifies this bio-orientalist pandemic imagination: the cover image shows a giant egg about to be hatched, with a bird's beak poking through a crack in the shell, while the headline poses the ominous question, "Bird Flu: Is Asia hatching the next human pandemic?" As the article goes on to assert, the avian flu was the "latest scourge to emerge from Asia." Barely a year after the containment of SARS, the bird flu was already "spreading with alarming speed through Asia's poultry farms," with outbreaks in South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand. Though the virus was not yet virulent among humans, "the great fear of health officials around the world is that the virus could, like SARS, jump the species barrier, mutate into a deadly and highly contagious form and set off a worldwide pandemic." This "next deadly global epidemic" would be what epidemiologists call "a slate wiper," but what endangers the world is not just the virus itself but "dissembling and stalling by local governments [that] have already allowed the pathogen to spread in Asia—not only in birds but also among the men and women who raise them for a living and the kids who gather eggs or simply kick up infected dust in their vill ages."71 Given the combination of Asia's dishonest and corrupt governments, the poor hygiene and general level of medical ignorance of its rural residents, as well as the rapidity of international travel enabled by globalization, Asia stands to jeopardize public health the world over. The expertise of health officials and epidemiologists is summoned, and even the experts, the article declares, are afraid. As Priscilla Wald has demonstrated, cultural narratives of disease outbreaks follow formulaic conventions, one of which is a "geography of disease" where "timeless, brooding Africa or Asia" is imagined as "the birthplace of humanity, civilization, and deadly microbes." Infectious diseases are constructed as third-world problems "leaking" into the global North, in a one-way traffic of emergence.72 The underlying message of the pandemic orientalist narrative seems to be that, while we may lament the loss of Asian lives to deadly microbes, we should not slacken our vigilance toward Asian bodies precisely because they may host those microbes—if not every single body in actuality, then the collective Asian body in potential.

#### This has been super-charged by COVID – their rhetoric has a one-to-one correlation with Anti-Asian violence

Siu and Chun 20 – \* Associate Professor Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies Chinese Diaspora, Cultural Citizenship, Cultural Politics of Food, Diaspora / Transnationalism; Asians in the Americas, Ethnography PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University, MA, Anthropology, Stanford University, BA, Anthropology, minor in Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley \*\*Ph.D. student at the University of California, Berkeley in the Department of Ethnic Studies, 19-2020 recipient of The Catherine and William L. Magistretti Graduate Fellowship, B.A. in Politics and Social and Cultural Analysis from New York University. [Lok, Claire, Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 23, Number 3, October 2020, pp. 421-440 (Article), DKP]

In the early weeks of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States, President Trump put out many mixed messages, but he remained consistent with one—that China was to blame for the spread of the virus. Repeatedly, he insisted on calling the novel coronavirus “the Chinese virus,” despite mounting public criticism against the racialization of the deadly pathogen. Many noted the inflammatory nature of this anti-Asian rhetoric. During this same period, reports ranging from verbal abuse to intimidation to physical assault against people of Asian descent documented the sudden rise of anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States and globally. According to Human Rights Watch, an Asian woman in Brooklyn, New York, suffered a racially motivated acid attack, and in Texas, a Burmese American man and his two children were stabbed by a man who claimed he thought the family was “Chinese and infecting people with the coronavirus.”1 The Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council in the United States reported over one thousand cases of anti-Asian incidents in a two-week period in March 2020.2 Outside the United States, a Singaporean student in the United Kingdom was violently kicked and punched by an angry group of men after they uttered, “we don’t want your coronavirus in our country” (my emphasis).3 In Australia, a survey taken by the community group Asian Australian Alliance recorded a total of 178 reports of anti-Asian incidents in two weeks, ranging from racial slurs to physical assault.4 Though President Trump has dropped the “Chinese virus” for “kung flu” and tweeted on March 23 that “It is very important that we totally protect our Asian American community . . . the spreading of the virus is NOT their fault,” it seems that Sinophobia and racial violence against Asian Americans have been unleashed.

Make no mistake, as long as President Trump continues to take a confrontational stance, using the rhetoric of blame against China with the intention to punish it with new sanctions, tariffs, and even the cancellation of U.S. debt obligations,5 the racial aggressions against Asian Americans will continue to rise, if not intensify. By now, it is widely accepted that the novel coronavirus emerged first in Wuhan, and scientists believe that the zoonotic disease might have jumped from animals to humans at Wuhan’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market where vegetables, seafood, meat, and a small number of exotic wildlife were sold. Despite this, on April 30, President Trump casually offered a new theory, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted: that COVID had originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which houses a biosafety level-4 lab, and that the virus might have “leaked” from that lab. The implicit suggestion is that China had either intentionally bioengineered the novel coronavirus to cause massive destruction, thereby attributing malice, or carelessly leaked the virus due to scientific negligence, thereby attributing incompetence. In either case, these kinds of unsubstantiated speculations work to further stoke anger and disdain against the Chinese state. More disturbingly, they traffic in the idea of China as a biotechnology threat, resonating with pre-existing filmic representations of futuristic dystopian worlds.

The immediate and unqualified responses from the scientific community reveal the danger of these potentially incendiary speculations. Responding swiftly, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a press release the morning of April 30 stating that “The Intelligence Community . . . concurs with the wide scientific consensus that the COVID-19 virus was not manmade or genetically modified . . . ” (my emphasis).6 Within days, the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease, Dr. Anthony Fauci, attested that the virus “could not have been artificially or deliberately manipulated.”7 These assertions sought to extinguish any attribution of malice to the Chinese state. Even with firm contestation, however, the very invocation of the idea of biotechnology warfare has tapped into and perhaps even fueled our existing techno-Orientalist anxieties.

As the COVID pandemic story transpires in real time, engulfing the entire global community, taking unexpected twists and turns, making divergences and transgressions, we have become increasingly aware that the layers of entanglements cannot be easily parsed out, nor will we know anytime soon how and when the story will end. We offer a query into how we might assess and make sense of the intensifying Sinophobia and xenophobia in this current context. To do so, we must resist the temptation to confine our analysis to the narrow parameters of the pandemic. Rather, we insist on examining the rise of anti-Asian aggression within the concomitant vectors of the pandemic, the escalation of the U.S.-China trade war, and the growing concerns about cyber- and techno-security. Here we assert that the ideology of yellow peril set within a techno-Orientalist imaginary is powerfully animating the racial form and racial affect mediating the multiple terrains of public health, technology, global trade, and national security. While it is tempting to treat this historical conjuncture as extraordinary, it is crucial that we situate the current unfolding within the long history of Asian racialization, one that indexes the abiding tension between the political impetus to define national belonging and the shifting economic imperatives of the nation-state.8

### Link – Hegemony

#### US hegemony is an inherently unstable a global project of white supremacy – the foreign echoes the domestic – military brutality abroad and police brutality at home cannot be separated from massive violence against black and brown people cloaked in a language of “security” and “stability”

Kizer 20 - MA in Democracy & Governance from Georgetown University, BA in Middle Eastern & North African Studies from UCLA [Kate, “US HEGEMONY RELIES ON DEHUMANIZATION AND WHITE SUPREMACY,” 6/10/2020, <https://inkstickmedia.com/us-hegemony-relies-on-dehumanization-and-white-supremacy/>, DKP]

When I began writing this column, Black Hawk helicopters were still circling over Washington, DC, flying low to intimidate and disperse protestors demanding justice for yet another murder of an unarmed Black person, this time George Floyd by Minneapolis police.

While the spread of popular uprisings against police brutality across the United States feels like an unprecedented tipping point, the impunity with which police and military forces operate is not new. Nor is it isolated to domestic policing. The willingness to weaponize state power against those expressing their discontent and calls for change has long been a part of both US domestic and foreign policy.

Some Washington national security professionals have made laudable statements committing to do better to address the structural inequities that keep the profession majority-white and cis-male in the face of this repression. Yet these efforts have not addressed the fundamental problem at hand: the state violence taking place in streets across the United States is a natural outgrowth of decades, if not centuries of domestic and foreign policy that first and foremost relies on the dehumanization of Black and brown people to pursue hegemony at home and abroad. Until we reckon with this fundamental truth, we will continue to fail to actually address the institutionalized and structural racism that has led to decade after decade of state violence against Black people in this country and people of color around the world.

In the United States, this dehumanization has its roots in the founding of our country. The prosperity the white majority in the United States enjoys today cannot be divorced from the genocide of Indigenous people and the enslavement of Africans, all for the economic benefit of white colonizers. The violent domination of the white colonial project and its basis in exploitation and white saviorism not only defined the foundations of early US society, but is echoed today here at home, and in US foreign policy.

For decades, the United States military has used many of the same tactics abroad that are used against Black and brown people by police in the United States. The use of force is never a last resort, but instead the preferred tool to ensure submission. Local conditions, individual experiences, and other drivers to violence, dissent, or crime – often rooted in governance failure, human rights abuses, and economic and/or political disenfranchisement – are ignored. Instead, a more pernicious, dangerous motive is assigned to all members of subjugated groups once one individual decides to resort to violence or commit a crime.

A violent response is then justified in cloaked language about patriotism, security, and saviorism. The United States military is undertaking dangerous missions against “extremists” to “save” the Afghan people, to “secure freedom” for Iraqis; just as in the United States police are keeping the streets of the US “safe,” tracking “extremists” that threaten the status quo and private property. As the experience of the past several weeks has shown, however, violence from the oppressive force ultimately begets more defiance. The idea that violence can quell dissension is ultimately rooted in the orientalist, racist belief that non-white people are inherently threats that must ultimately be silenced in order for stability to take hold.

The US government’s use of force is continuously justified by its stated intention to create safety — but safety for whom? Surely not the countless innocents killed in endless wars abroad, the diaspora communities surveilled, or the Black people murdered by police here at home. The Trump administration’s current militarized response to the popular uprisings sweeping the country is merely an outgrowth of long-standing policies that have devalued Black and brown lives, and ignored the unique injustices and inequities these communities face in achieving safety, well-being, and liberation. The post-9/11 police state and outdated slavery-era laws merely provide useful levers for Trump to pull in the face of this new challenge to his power.

If people in power continue to see these latest instances of violence and repression as isolated, unfortunate instances that “don’t reflect who we are as a nation,” then we will have failed to truly challenge and disrupt the forces and systems at play that have allowed white supremacy to infiltrate every aspect of US public life, including foreign policy.

The solution is not merely to end the transfer of US military weaponry and equipment to police departments, even though this is an incredibly important, short-term reform. The solution lies in a larger awakening in this country and a willingness to confront the systemic racism and white supremacy that drives our government’s engagement domestically and abroad. It means accepting that our current policies empower and export white supremacist violence. It starts with divesting from the institutions whose primary purpose is to terrorize people of color at home and abroad to maintain white supremacy – the Pentagon, CBP and ICE, state and municipal police. It begins with investment in restorative and community solutions to conflict and violence that seek to uplift individuals from poverty, ensure and value the rights and dignity of every human being, and make amends for past injustices.

### Links – NATO

#### NATO is founded on the maintenance of global white terror – the construction of threats justifies policing, surveillance and coercive foreign policy that produces psychological warfare

CAMPBELL 19 – Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University [Horace, “[Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis](https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/),” 4/9/2019, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>, DKP]

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran. Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. The ostensive reason for the founding of NATO was to ‘thwart’ Soviet aggression, but in practice the organization was a prop for western capital and after the fall of the Berlin Wall, became the core prop for Wall Street. In this year, there will be many commentaries on the fact that the existence of NATO reflects a Cold War relic, that NATO is obsolete and lost its mandate, but very few will link the expansion of NATO to the military management of the international system. Prior to 1991, the planners of NATO could justify the existence of NATO on ideological and political grounds, but with the threat of a multi polar world and the diminution of the dollar, NATO expanded to the point where this author joined with others in labelling this organization Global NATO to reflect its current imperial mandate. The Global thrust of NATO now comprises 29 members from Europe and North America along with 41 ‘partners’ that had started off under the banner of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. Since that time, NATO has launched a lengthy war without end in Afghanistan, colluded in the destruction of Iraq and conspired with militarists to forge ‘Partnership for Peace’ (with most members of the former Warsaw Pact states). The core 29 members are now enmeshed with treaties and undertakings from states involved in the Mediterranean Dialog and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. There are also the ‘partners’ from across the globe: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. This enlargement served the military purposes of encircling China and Russia who military planners in the West targeted. There is no shortage of literature on NATO and its milestones, but very few have documented the real crimes of this global network of anticommunist operatives who precipitated real terror and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America while supporting mass atrocities from Algeria to Indonesia, and South Africa. Books such as that of NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe by Danielle Ganser and The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War, by Stephen Kinzer used rigorous research techniques to uncover the dark history of NATO. These two books can be distinguished from the bland international relations texts that discusses NATO inside the old calculations of ‘strategy,’ ‘concert of democracies’, ‘security cooperation’ and the balance of power,’ and spheres of influence. Most recently, this IR rendering of the history of NATO has been served up in a document entitled, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Published by Harvard University with one of the coauthors being a former US ambassador to NATO. This document spelt out ten challenges.[1] However, in a testimony before Congress, Nicolas Burns boiled down the challenge of NATO to one objective; that the current role of NATO must be to contain Russia and China.[2] On the day before the actual 70thanniversary, on April 3, the Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg delivered an address to a joint session of the US Congress advocating an expansion of the alliance while promoting a military buildup against Russia. [3] European progressives will have to reflect deeply on whether the current sanctions regime and the special propose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), is ushering in another round of inter imperialist rivalry reminiscent of the currency wars of 1929-1939. Then, the shifting alliances yielded confusion among working peoples who ultimately went to fight against each other in Europe, spreading barbarism throughout the world, from Auschwitz to Hiroshima. The continued struggles for bread, peace and justice ensure that it is only the authoritarian leaders from the Global South who are compromised on the real meaning of the existence of NATO. In the present era, there is a new capitalist competition while North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serves as an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure. Recent experiences have demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya that the moguls of Wall Street are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve the dominance of US capitalism. The destruction of Libya was a classic example of the convergence of finance as warfare, the weaponization of information and incessant bombing to destroy a society. Where at the start of NATO the war scare was the propaganda method, In the current digital age, brain hacking and the engineering of smart phones have placed the giant technology firms of Apple , Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook at the forefront of the new weapons platform of NATO and Wall Street. This analysis is in three parts spelling out the rationale for the call for all progressive forces to join together to concentrate their energies in the dismantling of NATO. NATO at Birth: Stay behind armies, directed terrorist organizations and psychological warfare against Europeans. In the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall there were major press reports on the role of NATO’s stay behind armies that had been operating inside Western Europe since 1949.Ten years earlier, when the kidnapping and killing of the former Italian Prime Minister, Aldo Moro rocked western Europe, it emerged that his demise had been authored by clandestine paramilitary network code-named “Operation Gladio” that was a false flag operation of NATO. Danielle Ganser’s book, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe had meticulously documented how NATO funded and often even directed terrorist organizations throughout Europe in what was termed a “strategy of tension” with the aim of preventing a rise of the left in Western European politics. NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In the specific case of Italy, Aldo Moro had committed the unforgivable crime of contemplating a government that included Italians who belonged to the Italian Communist Party Right from the start of the Cold war, the CIA and MI6 had worked closely with former fascists to oppose citizens and organizations in Western Europe that were anti-capitalists. Under the leadership of US planners such as Allen Dulles, William Colby, Frank Wisner and later James Angleton, these operatives weaned and nursed a network of agents and secret arms dumps across Europe, a network that would remain secret but active throughout the Cold War. [4] Ganser elaborated on the extensive operations of Operation Gladio all across Europe with the explicit aim of subverting the democratic wishes of European citizens who were opposed to oppression. It is worth quoting at length the role of the secret armies. “NATO’s “secret armies” engaged in subversive and criminal activities in several countries. In Turkey in 1960, the stay behind army, working with the army, staged a coup d’état and killed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes; in Algeria in 1961, the French stay-behind army staged a coup with the CIA against the French government of Algiers, which ultimately failed; in 1967, the Greek stay-behind army staged a coup and imposed a military dictatorship; in 1971 in Turkey, after a military coup, the stay-behind army engaged in “domestic terror” and killed hundreds; in 1977 in Spain, the stay behind army carried out a massacre in Madrid; in 1980 in Turkey, the head of the stay behind army staged a coup and took power; in 1985 in Belgium, the stay behind attacked and shot shoppers randomly in supermarkets, killing 28; in Switzerland in 1990, the former head of the Swiss stay behind wrote the US Defense Department he would reveal “the whole truth,” and was found the next day stabbed to death with his own bayonet; and in 1995, England revealed that the MI6 and SAS helped set up stay behind armies across Western Europe.”[5] The mainstream media and University commentaries have not been able to confront this history in so far as the manipulation and deception that gave rise to the birth of NATO is still at work against the citizens of Europe and the United States. War Scare, NATO and psychological warfare against the citizens of Europe and North America. At the end of World War II, the defense Industries in the USA had been faced with the choice of conversion and retooling the factories that made weapons or continue the massive subsidies for the industries vested in military and armaments production. The choice was eventually made to embark on a propaganda war scare to justify the need for an expanded army and it was in this context when NATO was conceived. To sustain the WW II armaments enterprise, there needed to be a cycle of war scare and the fabrication and inflation of threats and enemies. It was in this context that Lawrence D. Bell, President of Bell Aircraft Corporation, in a statement to the U.S. Air Policy Commission Finletter Commission) on September 29, 1947, stated that “as soon as there is a war scare, there is a lot of money available.” [6] According to Andrew Cockburn, “The aircraft corporations that had garnered enormous profits during the war on the back of government contracts had discovered by 1947 that peace was ruinous. Despite initial high hopes, the commercial marketplace was proving a far harsher and less accommodating environment than that of wartime, especially as there were far more companies than required by the peacetime economy. Orders from the civilian airline industry never lived up to expectations, while efforts to diversify into other products, including dishwashers and stainless steel coffins, proved disappointing and costly.” [7] In the spring of 1948, the U.S. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and top officials of the Harry Truman administration began to sound alarm about a looming Soviet attack against Western Europe. It is now known, from declassified documents, that the officials were aware that there was no credible evidence to back up their war scare. Some analysts have argued that the war scare of 1948 was devised to save the aircraft manufacturing industry from plunging into bankruptcy. And this goal was achieved. In the book Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948, Frank Kofsky states thatwithin 2 months of the emergence of the scare, the Trumanadministration revamped the aircraft industry by embarking on a 57% increase in purchase of military aircraft, and the total budget of the Pentagon was increased by 30%. NATO was born on April 4, 1949 out of this propaganda war to deceive the US citizens about a pending attack of the Soviet Union on Western Europe. The task of organizing the deception of the citizens of the West was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. There are now so many books and articles on the role of the CIA in deception, propaganda and psychological warfare that we will not spend a great deal of time on the role of the Covert agencies in giving legitimacy to the idea of a Soviet threat. Stephen Kinzer and David Talbot are two writers who have documented extensively how the Dulles brothers ensnared every major profession in the USA in this deception. [8] It was especially chilling how Universities were suborned to be surrogates for this psychological warfare. Noam Chomsky has dealt with this aspect of the period of the birth of NATO in the work on the Universities and the Cold War.[9] Racists and anticommunists in the propaganda war It was not by accident that the thinkers and planners of these secret operations were known racists and Nazi sympathizers. Frank Wisner who hailed from Mississippi in the USA was a good example of the upright US citizen who was an architect of the false flag operations and the deception associated with NATO and western intelligence agencies. After the War, in 1948 Frank Wisner was appointed director of the Office of Special Projects. Soon afterwards under the direction of Allen Dulles, this Office of Special Projects was renamed the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC). This became the espionage and counter-intelligence branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. Later James Jesus Angleton was to take this brand of counter intelligence work to the highest levels of state assassinations. Wisner had been mandated told to create an organization that concentrated on “propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” It was from this opaque sounding name of Office of Policy Coordination where the brainwashing and virulent anti-communism of the Cold War era was refined. Evan Thomas reported in The Very Best Men: the Daring Early Days of the CIA, the OPC’s charter gave it responsibility for “propaganda, economic warfare; preventative direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.” NATO as the principal prop for international capitalism today.

#### NATO and the US construct threats that pave the way to justify invasions

CAMPBELL 19 – Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University [Horace, “[Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis](https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/),” 4/9/2019, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/09/global-nato-a-70-year-alliance-of-oppressors-in-crisis/>, DKP]

[15] Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal deepened their links to NATO but in 1956, Dwight Eisenhower halted the planned offensive of the British and the French in the Suez war. After this war, both the currencies of Britain and France suffered sharp declines with France seeking cover inside the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), while the British pound accepted its place as a prop to the US dollar in the global economy. Within a year after the Suez debacle, France had pushed for the Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the European Economic Community to be a competitive force with US capitalists. Within the context of the competition between European capitalists and US capitalists, Charles De Gaulle exhibited pique at the organization of NATO that supported the armaments culture of US capital. Charles De Gaulle partially pulled France out of this alliance in 1966 after it became clear that this military organization was dominated by the United States and Britain (supporting their military industries). De Gaulle argued for an independent nuclear arsenal while remaining a signatory to North Atlantic Treaty and participating in the North Atlantic Council. Nicholas Sarkozy ended the farce when France returned to the fold of the NATO military structures in 2009. The duplicitous actions on the part of the French leadership were always based on calculations meant to preserve the dominance of French capital in Africa. When the US devalued the dollar in 1971 and broke the agreements of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it was the French who complained about the Exorbitant Privilege of the Dollar. For a short period, both the President of France and the Chancellor of West Germany had chafed under the privilege and had worked hard to bring into being the Maastricht Treaty and the Europe Union to end the dominance of the dollar in the international capitalist system. It was known than the one necessary aspect of this emerging common currency in Europe would be the dismantling of the military occupation of Europe by US military personnel. Hence, both Giscard de Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had linked the common currency, the European Central Bank and common foreign and security policy (CFSP), with the expectation that ultimately Europe will break from the traditions of NATO. It was in the face of this threat and the fall of the centrally planned economy that the forward planners expanded NATO. Emergence of Global NATO and the myth of ‘humanitarian intervention’ Usually, when an alliance is formed for a specific purpose such as halting the spread of communism, that alliance is folded when the mission is complete. Hence, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected by those seeking the ‘peace dividend’ that the mission of NATO would be scaled down. Instead, NATO expanded, seeking to encircle Russia by extending its membership to include former members of the Warsaw Pact countries. Progressive scholars have documented the cynicism of the US military planners who orchestrated the ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the Balkans in order to advance the hegemony of US capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union. The scholarship on this manipulation of the European working peoples to entrench NATO is rich and needs to be revisited at this moment of the celebration of the 70thanniversary of the founding of NATO. Richard Aldrich in the book, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence’ brought out evidence to expose how the massacres in the Balkans, helped give a new impetus to US hegemony.’ [16] David Gibbs had argued, “How the Srebrenica Massacre Redefined US Foreign Policy.” It is worth quoting at length how the Balkans war was used to manipulate public opinion in Europe, “Perhaps most importantly, the massacre helped give a new impetus to US hegemony, contributing to its post-Cold War legitimacy. In bolstering America’s hegemonic position, the significance of the Srebrenica massacre cannot be overstated: The massacre helped trigger a NATO bombing campaign that is widely credited with ending the Bosnian war, along with the associated atrocities, and this campaign gave NATO a new purpose for the post-Soviet era. Since that time, the Srebrenica precedent has been continuously invoked as a justification for military force. The perceived need to prevent massacres and oppression helped justify later interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, as well as the ongoing fight against ISIS. The recent UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which contains a strongly interventionist tone, was inspired in part by the memory of Srebrenica.” [17] The more nefarious aspect of this manipulation of humanitarianism was the ways in which elements such as Bernard Kouchner used their credentials as former members of the left and progressive forces to give cover to US imperialism. Since the war in the Balkans it is now accepted by the military planners that humanitarian intervention acts as a force multiplier. [18] This position was explicitly stated by General Colin Powell who noted, “Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom NGOs are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team.” These observations can shed light on the relationship between NGOs such as Doctors without Borders and the International Rescue Committee in global militarism. The fiction of collective western security was effectively broken while after the Asian economic crisis, US capital mobilized NATO to defend Wall Street. In this defense of Wall Street, NATO incessantly bombed Kosovo for 79 days in 1999 as it gave itself a new mission to enlarge US military power right up to the doorstep of Moscow. Gingerly, NATO expanded under US President Bill Clinton from 12 members to 16, then to 19, then to 26 by 2004 and by 2009 to 28 members. Despite vocal opposition from Russia, the discussion of expanding NATO now proceeded to develop the idea of Global NATO. In 2019 there were 29 members of NATO. In his presentation before the US Congress Stoltenberg advocated for a further expansion of NATO and boasted of the high state of readiness of the NATO Response Force (NRF) which had been created in 2002. NATO and the Weaponization of finance Global NATO was the preeminent force to orchestrate the weaponization of everything. Michael Hudson has outlined finance as warfare and the weaponization of finance in the current phase of imperialism. It will be important to grasp the present sanctions regime of the USA as a form of warfare. In the current literature on imperialism, the term weaponization of finance refers to the foreign policy strategy of using incentives (access to capital markets) and penalties (varied types of sanctions) as tools of coercive diplomacy. The multiple wars agains Iran represent a model example of the weaponization of finance, the weaponization of information and the weaponization of trade. Under the Presidency of Barack Obama,Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, noted that the weaponization of finance offers to the US “a new battlefield…one that enables [the US] to go after those who wish [the US] harm without putting [US] troops in harm’s way or using lethal force.” Instead of fighting countries militarily, the US can now “cripple them financially. The Obama administration had retreated from a full scale weaponization of finance with Iran by signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA ) with Iran in 2015. Under the terms of this agreement in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany),[a] and the European Union, it was agreed that Iran would accept the P5+1 would ensure that Iran did not develop nuclear weapons. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel had opposed this agreement. When Donald Tromp became President of the United States, his administration renounced the JCPOA in 2018 and then signed an executive order reimposing sanctions on any foreign company that continues to do business with Iran. The order gave companies 90-day or 180-day grace periods to extract themselves from existing Iranian contacts or face punitive US measures. Those NATO partners of the USA who signed the JCPOA refused to accept the sanctions imposed on Iran and in 2019 agreed to create a special purpose vehicle to manage their trade with Iran. Britain, Germany and France rolled out INSTEX in February 2019 as one way to break the weaponization of Finance by the USA but in the cat and mouse game of economic warfare, the Foreign Ministers of Europe have not yet been transparent on the full mandate of the special purpose vehicle. These developments mirror the weaponization of trade [19] and finance within NATO and the problems of inter imperialist rivalry in West Asia. The threats against the countries that created a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to help facilitate trade with Iran must be taken very seriously, especially in the context of the political insecurity generated by BREXIT. This period reminds the world that of the depression when trade wars and currency wars eventually fueled open fighting in World War II. Finance as warfare Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, there have been efforts by countries holding US debt to limit their exposure to the dollar. In 2009, the Russians and the Chinese worked to establish an alternative international institution involving Brazil, Russia, India and China, later including South Africa and called BRICS. Within the context of BRICS, the Chinese set about a slow process to internationalize its currency, the RMB and undertook currency swaps to avoid the US dollar. After failing to negotiate successfully within the Bretton Woods institution for an increase of its drawing rights commensurate with its volume of international trade, the Chinese embarked on major economic and financial ventures under the banner of One Belt One Road and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. When the AIIB was launched in 2015 with 57 countries, the former Treasury Secretary of the US, Lawrence Summers noted that the launch of the AIIB was a turning point and ‘the creation of the AIIB will undermine the leadership role the U.S. has long enjoyed in global finance.’ Both Russia and China intensified their swap trading efforts and Russia settled its crude sales to China. “In March 2018 news broke that Beijing is planning a pilot project for the second half of the year to pay for imported crude oil with renminbi instead of dollars. The two countries allegedly selected for the pilot are Russia and Angola, with rumors that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may become involved. If this venture is successful, it will act as a spur to similar schemes for other imports and primary products.” China was joining the leaders of Europe and the countries in Asia and West Asia who were calling for a multi-currency financial system. Many progressive economists noted that it was not a matter if more countries would flee the dollar, but when. One economist writing from Singapore wrote, “the emergence of a multicurrency or multi-asset international payments system will take time. It doesn’t portend a collapse of the global payments system, but does point to a redistribution of global wealth. The seigniorage harvested by the US as the world’s banker will gradually fall, narrowing the room for maneuver in US economic policy, which for the last 70 years has had the greatest influence on markets globally. As the power of the dollar wanes, the US will be pressured to adjust to a world economy vastly changed since 1945.” [20] The German financial leaders along with France were maneuvering to speed this change with the establishment of the special purpose vehicle to continue trading with Iran. At this time of writing the specific details of the specific purpose vehicle called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) is still being worked out, but the statements of former Ambassador Nicholas Burns before Congress on March 26 made it clear that the Foreign Policy establishment in the USA will not retreat from the weaponization of Finance, especially since INSTEX allows members of NATO to continue trading and financial arrangements with Iran, China and Russia. In so far as Global NATO is serving the task of defending the dollar, the extent to which China has created an alternative clearing system in the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) will be seen as another blow to US financial hegemony. Although in its first rollout of the CIPS system, the Chinese went to great length that it would cooperate with the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, the current US intelligence war against the Chinese telecom firm Huawei point to the integration between Finance, information warfare and cyberwarfare. [21] In the book, The Perfect Weapon, David Sanger discussed the debates within this highest levels of US intelligence and the Federal Reserve of whether the USA should use its Federal Reserve and cyber warfare to backdoor into the Russian Central Bank to make money disappear. It is in this context where one can note in the planning of NATO strengthening the cyber capabilities is at the top of the Agenda. The Harvard study emphasized the importance of winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age. The convergence of cyberwarfare, economic warfare and information warfare is being taken to new levels under the current administration with its wide ranging sanctions against countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Traditional books on NATO had surveyed the integration of diplomacy, sanctions and weapons procurement, but the new push of the USA in formulating its position of unrivalled dominance is turning out to be another front for defending the dollar. In a world where the USA had imposed sanctions on Cuba, Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Turkey, North Korea, Syria, Sudan along with individual sanctions against individuals in Somalia, South Sudan, Libya, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, the logic of these sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Treasury has now clarified to the allies of the USA in NATO the importance finance was warfare. It was the former Treasury Secretary, Jack Lew, who had warned that the over use of sanctions could dull their effectiveness. His logic was simple: Sanctions work because they cut targets off from dealing with U.S. citizens and American financial institutions—a complete severance from the world’s largest economy and its most important financial center. If Washington used this power idly, Lew suggested, it could encourage countries to find partners outside of the United States, and undermine sanctions’ deterrent effect. What Lew did not acknowledge was the relationship between the Treasury, Global NATO and the financial wars. Much of the scholarship on the printing of dollars miss the way in which the infusion of capital in emerging economies further enmesh these societies into the instability of the system. Ultimately, the export of the oscillation of the US economy deepens social and political challenges on the world and reinforces the militarization of the international political economy. Michael Hudson outlined three ways in which flooding of dollars through debt leverage and QE supported the military: (1) the surplus dollars pouring into the rest of the world for yet further financial speculation and corporate takeovers; (2) the fact that central banks are obliged to recycle these dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bonds to finance the federal U.S. budget deficit; and most important (but most suppressed in the U.S. media, (3) the military character of the U.S. payments deficit and the domestic federal budget deficit. He continued, “Strange as it may seem and irrational as it would be in a more logical system of world diplomacy the “dollar glut” is what finances America’s global military build-up. It forces foreign central banks to bear the costs of America’s expanding military empire effective “taxation without representation.” Keeping international reserves in “dollars” means recycling their dollar inflows to buy U.S. Treasury bills U.S. government debt issued largely to finance the military.” After the financial crisis in Europe, Quantitative Easing was extended to the Eurozone and Japan, but in the continuing re alignment, of global capitalism, US capital is working hard to decapitate Russia and China as opponents of Global NATO. The currency wars and weaponization of finance is now accompanied by the weaponization of trade and the weaponization of information. Sanger’s The Perfect Weapon War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Agehas opened one window into how full spectrum dominance and the militarization of space is now linked to the weaponization of information and cognitive hacking. We now have new terms of warfare, terms such as “fake news”, “disinformation,” “weaponized information,” “post-truth” and “alternative facts.” Weaponized information (WI) defines a new method messaging and dissemination of content that contains falsehoods, facts taken out of context and pieces of truth strategically released, in an attempt to manipulate knowledge and beliefs. The NATO destruction of Libya was one clear example of how falsehoods were refined to lull workers in Europe to support the destruction of Libya The weaponization of Finance and the Destruction of Libya Not enough is being done to expose the real role of Global NATO and the role of so called humanitarian operatives in ensuring that humanitarian interventions become a force multiplier. Currently, many countries of the EU collaborate with France in the North African region in the fabrication of terror to ensure the deployment of the US Africa Command and French forces in Africa. In Western Europe, NATO has been very successful in ensuring confusion, demoralization, paralysis, and apathy in relation to western imperialism in Africa. African scholars and progressives are very clear that while calling for the dismantling of NATO there must be a call for the EURO to break from the CFA franc zone. Nicolas Sarkozy was very clear that the intervention in Libya was to save the Euro. Africans cannot have a Newtonian view of the struggle against imperialism to assure those from the European left who want solidarity with Africans while supporting French imperialism in Africa. Global NATO and French machinations are involved in a delicate dance and there is silence from the left in the EU when it comes to Europe’s 4000 km strategic radius that covers the entire area of West Africa, North Africa and down through East Africa to Somalia. It is beyond this commentary to delineate the ways in which German scholars, religious organizations, German foundations and non-governmental organizations are now implicated in the criminal acts of France in Africa, especially the war on terror. It is the task of the progressive movement to penetrate the areas of cooperation and conflict between European capitalists and Wall Street so that European workers do not continue to complicity support ‘humanitarian interventions.’ When 200 African scholars wrote the open letter on the impending crime against the peoples of Libya, there has been and continue to be silence on the part of the left in Europe and the United States. Barack Obama had described the intervention in Libya as a mistake and the British Parliamentary Committee outlined how the Libyan intervention had been based on lies. Obama may have considered the intervention a mistake, but his understanding of the process did not reveal how Goldman Sachs was thoroughly implicated the destruction of Libya. The case in the London High Court of the Libyan Investment Authority vs Goldman Sachs brought out revealing evidence of how firms such as Goldman Sachs and others involved in the financialization of the energy markets sought to mobilize the resources of oil rich states with Sovereign Wealth Funds to keep alive the private equity, hedge funds and structured derivatives markets of the global capitalist economy. Most societies and peoples in the world want these banks to be brought under control. But Goldman Sachs benefitted in the ruling because in 2014, two and a half years after the case was brought before the High Court, there was a war in Libya and there was no government therefore one could not represent the Libyan Investment Authority in this arena. We see therefore that the financial institutions are direct beneficiaries of the warfare that is going on in Libya. When the United Nations passed Resolution 1970 and resolution 1973 in 2011, those who had signed these resolutions did not understand then that the resolution was for regime in Libya.[22] The current fighting in Libya remains one of the most inglorious aspects of the 70 year history of NATO but there is silence among those celebrating 70 years of NATO. [23] Since the writings on Finance capital over a century ago by Rudolph Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and Nikolai Bukharin the role of finance in the international system has grown beyond the parameters outlined by those who linked finance capital to modern imperialism.[24] After the collapse of the dollar/gold system of 1944 the financial industry of the West has become the axis on which international capitalism spins.

### Link – Russia

#### Their framing of conflict in Ukraine is the Starwarsification of violence – voting aff obviously does nothing, but endorsing the 1ACs feeds into the fantasy of war machine

Eid 3/5 – [Hanna, “Russia, Ukraine, and the Desert of the Real,” 3/5/2022, [https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/blog/russia-ukraine-and-the-desert-of-the-real, D](https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/blog/russia-ukraine-and-the-desert-of-the-real,%20D)KP]

According to Baudrillard: "We are all hostages of media intoxication, induced to believe in the war just as we were once led to believe in the revolution in Romania, and confined to the simulacrum of war as though confined to quarters"(1). This is so visible in this case: immediately after the Russian operation, we saw all of the signs of a manufactured narrative in something which felt quicker than real-time. Infographics, the 'Ghost of Kiev', Zelensky as 'war bae', quippy one-liners from Zelensky that read as if they are from the latest Call Of Duty installation: "I don't need a ride, I need ammunition". In a much darker vein, Pornhub's number one search is ‘Ukrainian women’, the 'refugees are welcome here' discourse from the liberals, 'anti-war' protests being staged (in reality they are pro-war and pro-sanctions). One person went as far as to create a list of fascist flags for people to avoid at pro-Ukraine rallies across the USA. All of this created the conditions for more sanctions on Russia in less than a week. It’s not sanctions just on "The Oligarchy", but on Russian cinema and sport as Russia was suspended from F1 and FIFA. The ruble crashed and is now worth less than one cent. Interesting to note is that the US' own oligarchs (Bezos, Musk, Zuckerburg, Branson, etc) are not called as such. Oligarch is a term the US reserves for the likes of Putin who belong to the "oriental despotism" that seeks to undermine American freedom and democracy.

Baudrillard continues: "our virtual has definitively overtaken the actual and we must be content with its extreme virtuality which, unlike the Aristotelian, deters any passage to action"(2). By this, he means that the event exists primarily in the media (even though real bombs drop). We can see this through the use of the same images to signify different things for either side. Videos of wounded soldiers claimed to be Russian and Ukrainian at the same time show us that.

It seems that this obsession with the passage to action today governs all our behavior; obsession with every real, with every real event, with every real violence… [a]gainst this obsession with the real we have created a gigantic apparatus of simulation...which allows us to pass to the act "in vitro"...[we] prefer the exile of the virtual, of which television is the universal mirror, to the catastrophe of the real(3).

This war is taking place on television for those in the occident, and as such, it assumes the relations of television. The Harry Potterification of the conflict, the Star Warsification of the event. "Thus 'real time' information loses itself in a completely unreal space, finally furnishing images of pure, useless, instantaneous television where its primordial function irrupts, namely that of filling a vacuum, blocking up the screen hole through which escapes the substance"(4).

When one tries to speak of Russia's military operation in Ukraine in power-political terms, they are called a Putin apologist or a shill for authoritarianism. Anouar Abdel Malek spoke about this tendency within the Western socialist camp 40 years ago:

The basic approach towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century was, and remains to a very large extent, an ethical approach. Violence, armaments, were viewed as an 'evil' pursuit, and peace, disarmament, as a moral, humanistic, endeavor. Any attempt at a content analysis of speeches, resolutions, writings, and expositions on war, violence, peace, or disarmament would reveal a very heavy load of moral considerations and a much lower percentage of power-political analysis. (5)

This shows how important it is that we focus on the real material implications of the event, not on the moral character of the players involved. The occidental media has created a scenario in which the Ukrainian government can put out a call for mercenaries that is answered by those who have been duped by the media message. These ragtag mercenaries who want to go defend Ukraine have no scruples in regards to the type of people they will fight alongside to ‘defend Ukraine’. Another piece of evidence against bringing this occidental, protestant morality into the mix when speaking of geopolitics is the fact that some are saying Putin is both the next manifestation of Adolph Hitler and a Soviet revivalist. History is relegated to the shredder, and the martyrs of the Red Army who died fighting Nazism have their legacy denigrated in the desert of the media.

In sum, what we are seeing is the USA-NATO nexus reacting to the new reality of multipolarity in the world system by desperately attempting to control the flow of information. Russia has been removed from SWIFT, as stated earlier the ruble has crashed and is now worth less than a penny. Yet, China and Russia have already been in talks to create a system parallel to SWIFT for some time now, and earlier this year announced an era of ‘friendship with no limits’. Multipolarity and the de-dollarization is one step towards dismantling the US-led financial regime of the IMF and World Bank which is militarily insured by NATO. According to Michael Hudson: “While America’s allies are told to bear the costs of US sanctions, Russia and China are benefiting by being obliged to diversify and make their own economies independent of reliance on US suppliers of food and other basic needs”6. How this multipolarity will shape up is not yet known, but the current military escalation between Russia and Ukraine shows us that we are definitely moving towards a world in which the United States can no longer reign unchecked and unchallenged, even within its massive media narrative control system.

#### The 1ACs reading of Russia as aggressive expands a cartography of violence – Ukraine isn’t an isolated or uniquely horrific war zone but instead an extension of decades of imperial bloodshed waged by Whiteness

Cockburn 3/25 – author of War in the Age of Trump, prominent and award-winning war journalist [Patrick, “Ukraine Could Turn Into Another Endless War, Especially if NATO Decides More Than Just Peace is Needed,” 3/25/2022, <https://www.counterpunch.org/2022/03/25/ukraine-could-turn-into-another-endless-war-especially-if-nato-decides-more-than-just-peace-is-needed/>, DKP]

People look at a map of Europe and express horror that a large part of it is once more in flames. Pundits point out with alarm that for the first time since 1945, one European country has invaded another and we are witnessing the first big military conflict on the continent since the Balkan wars in the 1990s, aside from some earlier fighting in the Ukraine itself.

But if we look at a larger map that includes not only Europe but the Middle East and North Africa, we get an entirely different impression because Ukraine is no longer a blood-soaked exception in a zone of peace. It is, on contrary, the new northern extension of a giant zone of war that has extended over the last twenty years east-west from Afghanistan to north-east Nigeria and north-south from Turkey to Somalia and Yemen.

Parallels are occasionally drawn between the Ukrainian war and a dozen or so conventional and guerrilla wars being fought out in this vast area of conflict to the south of Ukraine. When similarities between these conflicts are noted, it is usually on the grounds that Russian shelling and bombing of cities like Mariupol and Kharkiv is similar to that of Damascus and Aleppo by Russian-backed Syrian forces. This is true enough, but keep in mind that the bombardment of Gaza by Israel and Raqqa and Mosul by the Americans likewise led to massive physical destruction and heavy civilian loss of life.

But there is are other more ominous similarities between the war in Ukraine and the wars in the Middle East and North Africa. Most of the latter developed into stalemates with no final winner or loser, while the countries being fought over were wrecked from end to end. Ceaseless violence generated mass flight of the population, the ruin of the economy, and the disintegration of society.

The standard of living in Iraq was close to that of Greece in 1980, but had fallen to that of Mali forty years later. Skilled surgeons who had once worked in Baghdad or Damascus hospitals fled to California or New Zealand and were not coming back.

Could the same thing now happen in Ukraine? The war there has turned into a stalemate in a surprisingly short period and the result may be akin to that in the Middle East wars. The Russians have failed to destroy the Ukrainian government and army, take the cities or even encircle them, gain control of the air or stop Ukraine being resupplied with arms by foreign powers. It does not look as if Moscow can mobilise enough soldiers and equipment to recover from these setbacks.

But at the same time, Russia has not been militarily defeated and it can keep pounding Ukrainian cities into rubble even though it cannot easily capture them. It is unlikely to agree to serious peace talks until it has made some significant gains on the ground and these may be a long time coming. Already large parts of these Ukrainian cities look like opposition areas in Damascus and Fallujah west of Baghdad.

### Link – Scenario Planning

#### Scenario planning itself is violent - Invoking extinction to justify emergency governance is a tool for securing White Futurity.

Anderson et al. 19 – \*Professor in the Department of Geography at Durham University, PhD at Sheffield University, \*\*Kevin Grove, Associate Professor of Geography at Florida International University, PhD in Geography at The Ohio State University, \*\*\*Lauren Rickards, Professor in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, Interim Director of the Urban Futures ECP and co-leader of the Climate Change Transformations research program, RMIT University, \*\*\*\*Matthew Kearnes, Associate Professor, School of Humanities & Languages, University of New South Wales, PhD at the University of Newcastle [Ben, “Slow emergencies: Temporality and the racialized biopolitics of emergency governance,” Progress in Human Geography, [Volume: 44 issue: 4,](https://journals.sagepub.com/toc/phg/44/4)page(s): 621-639, 5/16/2019, DKP]

II Governing through emergency

A range of work in geography and allied fields has traced the work emergency does in the advent and (re)production of existing and new forms, practices and relations of power. Stimulated by the ‘war on terror’, research has shown how contemporary liberal order is secured by governing through the logics of Emergency with a capital E (Adey, 2016; Amin, 2013; Agamben, 2007; Anderson, 2015; Aradau, 2015; Cooper, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Grove, 2013; Graham, 2011; Massumi, 2009). On the one hand, events or situations which are designated as emergencies are governed in ways that are designed to contain and curtail classes of events, and people that are designated as threats to an existing order. Governing through emergencies primarily hinges on draining an event of its eventfulness, by reducing its potentiality to disrupt, end, or overturn. On the other hand, liberal order governs through emergency in the sense that claims to an emergency – sometimes strategic declarations that an emergency has happened, is happening or will happen – can justify actions that (re)order bodies and relations for pre-existing reasons. Within this broad emphasis on ‘governing through emergency’, two main lines of research have developed.

First, a line of research concerned with emergency as exception has unpacked the work that the ‘state of emergency’ as juridical-political category and instrument does in the (re)making and (re)ordering of spaces and bodies (Neal, 2006; Coleman, 2007; Braun and McCarthy, 2005). Here the emphasis is less on the materialities and affects of the event designated as an emergency, and more on what is enabled through the act of formal declaration and the acts that follow. Building on Agamben’s (1998) neo-Schmittian engagement with sovereignty and the exception, research has disclosed the intensely uneven geographies of exclusion that are founded through the ‘state of emergency’, and the myriad ways in which people suffer and are damaged in the name of emergency. This emphasis on the ‘state of emergency’ reflects the fact that emergency declarations and subsequent actions often reveal the relation between democratic life and its authoritarian others as fractured and fragmented (Ophir 2007). In a ‘state of emergency’ visible impacts and effects of power manifest in and through bodies, typically framed in terms of the production of ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998). Research into racial violence following Hurricane Katrina (Braun and McCarthy, 2005) and the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Mullings et al., 2010), for instance, shows how action in a state of emergency draws on and reproduces black disaster victims as disposable lives (Giroux, 2006) while pursuing a goal of sustaining the existing socio-ecological order.

A second strand of work troubles this emphasis on the ‘state of emergency’ by approaching emergency as one technique of liberal rule amongst others. Governing through emergencies happens through innumerable mundane techniques designed to enable either the continuation or swift return of the non-emergency everyday. These techniques include exercises (Anderson and Adey, 2012; Schoch-Spana, 2004; O’Grady, 2016), shelters (Fredricksen, 2014), scenarios (De Goede, 2008; De Goede and Randalls, 2009), and participatory activities (Grove, 2014a). This research examines: the problem that situations designated as emergencies pose for governance; efforts to grasp such situations and render them actionable as emergencies; and how the practical operation of particular techniques of governance change what an event is and might become (De Goede and Randalls, 2009; Lakoff and Collier, 2008; Lentzos and Rose, 2009). Governing through emergencies is shown to involve a set of disparate, partially connected activities that happen through spatially distributed networks of anticipation including: forms of preparedness, preemption and precaution action (Amoore, 2013; De Goede and Randalls, 2009; Cooper, 2008; Lakoff, 2007; Massumi, 2009)); detectiondiagnosis (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2016); and response and recovery (Anderson, 2015). Rather than a juridico-legal category confined to the spaces and topologies of the exception, governing through emergencies appears here as simultaneously ordinary and extraordinary, materializing in scenes and situations of emergency, before returning to the background life of otherwise unexceptional spaces (see, for example, Barker, 2012; Hu, 2018).

Despite important differences, work on emergency-as-exception and emergency-as technique emphasize how emergency as a juridical-political category, set of governmental techniques, and atmosphere functions to sustain liberal rule. Following MacIntyre’s (1989: 345) assertion that liberalism’s teleological goal is ‘no more and no less than the continued sustenance of liberal and social order’, emergency is at once an occasion in which liberal rule is placed in question and (re)consolidated. Governing through emergency promises to bring events to an end by attempting to (re)produce recognizable cyclical or linear sequences of, for example, order-growth-development, disruption stabilization-recovery, or disruption-adaptation transformation. The goal is to drain an event of its eventfulness, making it into a recognized, completed happening and bringing the potentiality that the term emergency gestures towards to an end. This foreclosure of potentiality is by no means always a problem; as Povinelli (2011) reminds us, the burden of becoming-otherwise is often unevenly distributed. But it becomes a problem as it is harnessed to the goal of perpetuating liberal order, and emergency and disaster management are transformed into forms of ‘institutionalized anti-action’ designed to ‘ward off unexpected novelty’ and ‘block contingency rather than exploit its opportunity’ (Hu, 2018: 103).

Work on ‘governing through emergencies’ offers and rests on a critique of how governing through emergency ends, forecloses or redirects potentiality and thus (re)produces harmful or damaging conditions in the name of securing existing order. While it has mainly focused on liberal democracies in the Global North (exceptions including Hu, 2018, and Grove, 2013, 2014a, 2014b), we take four key points from this literature. First, ‘governing through emergencies’ orientates inquiry to how and with what consequences events or situations are claimed and thereafter related to as ‘emergencies’: claims of emergency demand action from those who govern, and it is important to attend to how subsequent in-action generates its own harms. Second, how certain events and situations become more perceptible and actionable than others is an important line of inquiry. Activist, public and artist claims of emergency often go unheard, ignored, or are dismissed by the state and other apparatuses through which emergencies are governed. Third, how everyday lives are partly composed through the techniques, objects, institutions and practices of governing through emergency requires exploration. Emergency techniques, objects and so on are encountered and become palpable with the atmospheres and moods that give everyday lives a particular feel.

Finally, work on ‘governing through emergencies’ reminds us that the relation between emergency and the everyday is at stake in emergency governance. Everyday habits, practices, and events may be governed as a source of potential or proto emergencies, with governing happening as dispersed phenomena across multiple sites and scenes in addition to visible, punctual scenes of emergency. This final point importantly connects to longstanding questions on what counts as a time-space of emergency when the line between exceptional and everyday becomes blurred. Walter Benjamin’s (1968: 257) observation that ‘the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we live is not the exception but the rule’ has shaped anthropologists’ and geographers’ studies of banal forms of violence throughout the Global South (e.g. Taussig, 1992; Scheper-Hughes, 1992; Das, 2007; Rose, 2014). More recently, geographers and other critical theorists have turned to concepts including ‘slow violence’ (Nixon, 2011) and ‘slow death’ (Berlant, 2011) to examine how racially and economically uneven processes of environment (in)justice fold harm, suffering, risk and premature death into the fabric of everyday life, particularly among poor and marginalized communities. Taken together, this and other research highlights that emergency is not only a dry juridical category, but signals a form of life structured through biopolitical techniques and mechanisms of racialization that delimit what lives can and should be exposed to banal forms of exceptional violence. The next section explores the multiple time-spaces of this form of Anderson et al. 5 life – what we are calling here racializing emergency.

III Racializing emergency

One of the more influential literatures in geography on everyday violence comes from work on environmental racism. Drawing variously on, inter alia, black geographies, political ecology, and feminist geography, this body of research reflects Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s (2007: 28) definition of racism as the ‘state sanctioned and/or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death’. In contrast to interpretations of racism as subjective prejudices, Gilmore’s approach directs attention towards structurally-produced forms of violence that have created and sustained capitalist political ecological order and continue to do so in the present day. Illustrating this approach, Katherine McKittrick (2013) demonstrates how colonialism operated through a geographic language of racial condemnation that created both difference and value in colonial economies: the figure of the black slave that embodied the possibility of violence without limits. Here, blackness is less an indicator of phenotypic difference than a political, juridical and philosophical category that constructed certain spaces as unlivable and marked those inhabiting these areas as less-than-human. This racialized designation formed the material and discursive foundations for the emergence of the uniquely European experience of finitude. The temporal experience of the future as an open-ended domain of progressive change, growth and betterment, amenable to human intervention and calculated improvement (Dillon, 1996), emerged literally on the backs of enslaved peoples from the African continent designated as ‘black’, whose forced labor and premature death in plantation economies created previously unimaginable sources of wealth and prosperity for European slave traders and slave owners (Thomas, 2016; Smith and Vasudevan, 2017).

These ‘racialized imaginative geographies of the uninhabitable’ (McKittrick, 2013: 7) continue to shape the present. McKittrick (2013: 7) stresses that:

in our present moment, some live in the unlivable, and to live in the unlivable condemns the geographies of marginalized to death over and over again. Life, then, is extracted from particular regions, transforming some places into inhuman rather than human geographies.

Geographic work on environmental (in)justice has unpacked how this ‘geographic management of blackness’ plays out in contemporary liberal societies. For example, Pulido’s (2000) seminal study of environmental racism in Los Angeles demonstrates how the urban landscape has been shaped by historical trajectories of white residents’ movement away from both polluted industrial areas and minority neighborhoods. Whiteness – and white privilege – is produced in this relational movement away from spaces and communities marked as ‘black’ and thus subject to greater levels of hazardous material exposure. The exposure of black bodies to harmful contaminants, and their resulting poor health and premature death, operates not only through direct and intentional means, but also through more insidious and banal practices that produce the toxic environments these bodies inhabit (Bullard, 2000; Tse, 2007; Mohai and Saha, 2015).

This literature has increasingly drawn on Rob Nixon’s (2009, 2011) concept of slow violence and Achille Mbembe’s (2003) concept of ‘necropolitics’ to unpack how power differentials unevenly distribute risk and harm in late modern capitalist societies. Nixon deploys slow violence to think through the subtle transformations in the spatial and temporal organization of violence under conditions of what Ulrich Beck refers to as ‘reflexive modernization’. Beck foregrounds how the institutions that structured modern societies throughout much of the 20th century, such as the territorially-bounded nation-state, full employment, and the maledominated nuclear family, have increasingly become destabilized in recent decades (Beck et al., 2003). While these institutions formerly provided the (white, male) modern individual with a sense of security and stability, their gradual erosion creates qualitatively new experiences of insecurity. Reading spectacular catastrophes such as the 1983 Bhopal chemical explosion and 1986 Chernobyl meltdown against the grain, he argues that the violence of these events is not confined to the immediate time-space of the event itself. Rather, the effects slowly reverberate across affected spaces and populations, gradually producing mutations, diseases, and debilitating injuries that erode vital capacities. But these drawn-out, attritional after-effects fail to receive the media attention and public concern these disasters initially received. Instead, they produce new subjectivities striving to survive in and through risky, inhospitable landscapes. Thus, while some adherents to Beck’s risk society thesis maintain that late-modern societies can be characterized by the democratization of catastrophic risk (see Bougen, 2003), Nixon demonstrates how the slow violence of advanced modernity is not evenly distributed across the population.

Environmental racism scholars have begun to articulate Nixon’s arguments alongside Mbembe’s (2001, 2003) sense of necropolitics to understand how this uneven geography of slow violence is shaped by racializing assemblages, or various legal and extra-legal techniques that produce differences within the population and expose some segments to premature death (Pulido, 2017; Davies, 2018). In short, Mbembe offers necropolitics as a corrective to Agamben’s formulation of bare life and sovereignty. For Mbembe, the colony, rather than the camp, is the paradigmatic scene where exceptional violence – the sovereign decision on the state of exception that brings the figures of both the sovereign and bare life into being – is contingent on banal practices that sustain colonial rule. Necropolitics names those techniques and practices that produce death-spaces inhabited by colonized subjects whose lives carry no juridical or theological value. Thus, for some researchers, slow violence signals ‘a form of late-modern necropolitics, where communities are exposed to the power of death-in-life’ (Davies, 2018: 1540). For example, Thom Davies’ research into the lived experience of toxic environments in the US’s so-called ‘Cancer Alley’ is rooted in a recognition that:

just as Mbembe’s colonialized bodies were kept in a state of gradual injury through processes of imperial domination, Nixon’s interpretation of slow violence shows how the uneven spread of globalization and pollution also keeps marginalized groups in situations and spaces of wounded subjugation. (Davies, 2018: 1540)

Similarly, Randi Gressgard’s (2019) innovative approach to urban resilience juxtaposes research on the necropolitics of colonialism with urban splintering to understand how practices of urban securitization are situated in antiblack racism and settler colonialism. These engagements with necropolitics draw out how contemporary forms of rule enact a subtle form of death-politics: the production of necropolitical geographies that render some places deathworlds whose slow forms of violence do not elicit shock or emergency response.

However, Jared Sexton (2010) cautions against Mbembe’s tendency to blur qualitatively distinct forms of racialized violence. In Sexton’s reading, Mbembe effaces the distinction between contingent violence that maintains colonial rule and the structural violence of slavery. He argues that by positioning slavery as one instance of a general phenomenon of modern terror, Mbembe loses track of

the singular commodification of human existence (not simply its [instrumentalized] labor power) Anderson et al. 7 under racial slavery, that structure of gratuitous violence in which a body is rendered as flesh to be accumulated and exchanged. (Sexton, 2010: 38)

Flesh is key to Sexton’s insistence that the experience of blackness is irreducible to that of other paradigmatic figures of modern deathpolitics in Agamben and Mbembe’s thought, such as the colonized subject or the refugee. Flesh is not biological; it materializes through racializing assemblages that inscribe racialized imaginaries onto human physiology (Weheliye, 2014). It thus offers an alternative to both the representational understandings of race and the abstract, ontological understandings of bare life that undergird Mbembe and Agamben’s readings of death-politics. It highlights the contextually- specific social formations – such as the New World plantation society – that, for African and indigenous peoples, are scenes of actual rather than potential mutilation, dismemberment and exile. For Sexton (2010), the social death that results from this ‘theft of the body’ (Spillers, 1987) distinguishes slavery’s structural violence from the colony’s contingent violence: the terror-formation Mbembe attributes to colonialism is already institutionalized in the structure of chattel slavery that denies the black subject kinship ties and mandates total submission of the enslaved before all whites.

While these arguments on racialized violence appear somewhat removed from work on governing Emergencies, they point to the racialized foundations of modern biopolitics that both Agambenian- and Foucauldian-inflected work bypass. If, as we saw above, the contextually specific transformation of persons into mere ‘flesh’ precedes any biopolitical division of the population into decontextualized categories of bare life (zoe) and valued life (bios), then the bios – the valued life in need of security and development – always carries with it the antihumanist negation of black flesh as its historical condition of possibility. Saidiya Hartman’s (1997) influential genealogy of freedom in the pre- and post-Civil War US offers an alternative account of how biology and politics intertwine. As she details, the definition of the slave’s legal status also established the scope of rights and liberties of the freed. This system of rights, liberties and privileges in white supremacist societies gave rise to particular experiences of daily life for white subjects that shaped normative expectations for how ‘valued life’ as such should unfold. Thus, post-emancipation and post-war legal struggles to eradicate discrimination revolved around the question of how to delimit black ‘freedom’ in a white supremacist society that continued to be structured around the exclusive privileges and value of whiteness. Biology – in the form of blood – became the means for managing life through the Jim Crow-era ‘separate but equal’ doctrine. The subject’s bloodline determined their capacity to claim the rights and privileges of whiteness, and determined the capacity of the state and other white subjects to legally deny those privileges to subjects marked as black. Thus, the expectations and comforts of whiteness were secured by white subjects through the continued classification of racialized subjects and the definition of the limits of their freedom.

Hartman’s analysis thus shows how the valued life that modern biopolitics takes as its object is an effect of racializing assemblages that extend the violence and deprivations of slavery into the present day. The possibility for specifying and managing various forms of collective life through techniques of emergency governance are thus founded on a ‘corporeal politics spanning the divide between slavery and freedom’ (Hartman, 1997: 9) that makes possible the experience of the future as openended and in need of securing through denying the possibility of this future to black spaces and subjects.

This argument offers an important corrective to work on governing Emergencies and slow violence by revealing that modern biopolitics carries within it multiple temporal registers that 8 Progress in Human Geography XX(X) express uneven and shifting economies of harm, suffering and insecurity within liberal societies. The anticipatory and open-ended temporality of the liberal subject is constitutively conjoined with at least two additional temporalities. First, the durative temporality of slow violence is not confined to contemporary late-modern societies, but defines the black experience of modernity since its inception in racialized slavery. The temporality of blackness as social death is not growth and development, but an incalculable, endured time with no interval or break. This ‘stalled present’ of ‘arrested movement’ (Scott, 2014: 6) offers no promise of transformation, betterment or improvement, only the exhaustion that comes from striving to endure unlivable worlds. As Sexton (2010: 64) emphasizes, ‘to be black in an antiblack world ... is to be inundated and under assault at every turn, pushed into an endlessly kinetic movement; which is to say subjected to an open and absolute vulnerability.’

This persistent ‘open and absolute vulnerability’ encompasses and exceeds both slow violence and necropolitics. But at the same time, we do not read blackness as an absolute, ontological category – following McKittrick (2016), we do not reduce black lives to death. Instead, Weheliye’s (2014) attention to racializing assemblages directs attention to the way the structural violence of racial capitalism hinges on topologically pliant and contextually specific configurations of different racializing techniques whose precise arrangement conditions the specific content of blackness as such. In this sense, the slow violence of late-modern societies is thus a topologically recalibrated form of the exposure to harm, suffering and premature death that has structured blackness since the slave plantation. As McKittrick (2013: 4) emphasizes, the plantation ‘uncovers a logic that emerges in the present and folds over to repeat itself anew throughout black lives’. This repetition of plantation violence – the recurrent demand for black social death as the possibility for liberal freedom – signals a second alternative temporality of modernity: the simultaneity of past, present and future that collapses open-ended futurity into a stalled present of enduring the violence of social death (Thomas, 2016). Christina Sharpe (2016) characterizes this simultaneity in terms of living in the wake of slavery. As a metaphor, wake signals an ongoing disturbance that folds the past into the present. Sharpe emphasizes that

living in the wake on a global level means living the disastrous time and effects of continued marked migrations, Mediterranean and Caribbean disasters, trans-American and African migration, structural adjustment imposed by the International Monetary Fund that continues imperalisms/colonialisms, and more. (Sharpe, 2016: 15)

Taken together, stalled time and disastrous time allow us to rethink the biopolitics of emergency governance in a way that situates liberalism’s anticipatory temporalities in relation to its constitutive racialized temporalities of duration and simultaneity. The life that emergency governance takes as its object carries with it multiple temporalities: the open-ended futurity of the white liberal subject and the repetitive and durative temporalities of black and indigenous subjects enduring the wake of slavery and genocide that denies these subjects the possibility of a future (Smith and Vasudevan, 2017). In this light, the biopolitics of emergency governance revolves around the uneven re/distribution of these distinct temporalities of modernity throughout the population. In clear distinction from all-encompassing visions of emergency and violence found in some Agambenian- and Foucauldian-inspired research, this reframing of biopolitics encourages us to look beyond the foreclosure of potentiality that works on governing through emergency details, and instead attend to expressions of actually-existing difference in the present that emerge out of and against contextually-specific racializing assemblages. The challenge here is to practice what Anderson et al. 9 we might call racializing emergency: racializing emergency involves situating emergency claims in particular socio-spatial contexts to examine how they contest the distribution of anticipatory, repetitive and durative temporalities and the forms of harm and suffering that are exercised through these uneven spatiotemporal geographies.

Explicitly recognizing the racializing assemblages that structure liberal biopolitics foregrounds the centrality of blackness to the modern category of emergency, and thus points to the need for critical analyses of emergency governance to take on board the coexistence of anticipatory, repetitive and durative temporalities. This decentering move radically opens up the relation between power and life that has been a central concern of research on governing Emergencies. As our review outlined above, geographers commonly read this relation in terms of governmental apparatuses that attempt to strategically control individual and collective life processes (a power over life) and an ontologically prior constitutive power of collective life. But this vision of a pluripotent life capable of generating new becomings must be radically expanded in light of the multiplicity of unevenly distributed temporalities that structure liberal order. In particular, analysis needs to account for a prior political economy of racialization that produces this uneven distribution in the first place. This opens the question of the threshold between different forms of modern life that are differentially governed through emergency logics and techniques. Importantly, this is not an ontological threshold that ultimately resolves into a clear Agambenian distinction between a valued life of the polis (bios) and the expendable life of homo sacer (zoe). Rather, this is a mutable and mobile threshold that is continually re/produced and challenged through the contextually-specific interplay of force relations, techniques, knowledges and strategies that differentially inscribes racial categories onto specific bodies, which are then open to being governed in some ways rather than others (Baldwin, 2012). In short, governing through emergency hinges on a prior politics of racialization that renders some lives governable through liberal techniques of emergency rule, and others not.

As Hartman (1997) patiently details, this politics of racialization allows some (white) subjects to claim protections from the state (or, we could add, any institution that governs) on the basis of an expected future of growth, security and development, and withholds the possibility of this claim from other (black/Indigenous) subjects (see also Povinelli, 2011). Racializing emergency allows us to approach Emergency as one sphere among others of liberal rule in which subjects may advance these claims. Emergency claims draw on and reiterate the racialized distribution of temporalities that structures liberal life. In doing so, racializing emergency opens a space of indeterminacy between emergency and life foreclosed by accounts of Emergency governance that equate liberal life with a purely anticipatory temporality. To rethink the spatio-temporal structure of liberal life thus also demands that we rethink the spatio-temporal structure of emergency as one terrain of liberal biopolitics. In the penultimate section, we articulate the concept of slow emergency to think through emergency governance in relation to a racialized understanding of emergency.

#### Scenario planning is hijacked and militarized which makes global war inevitable

Carr 10. Matt Carr is a writer and journalist living in Derbyshire. His latest book is Blood and Faith: the purging of Muslim Spain 1492–1614 [“Slouching towards dystopia: the new military futurism,” 2010, URL: http://www.thecyberhood.net/documents/papers/carr10.pdf]//vikas

Abstract: In recent years, **the military establishments of the US** and the UK **have produced a series of reports that attempt to ‘think the unthinkable’** in imagining future threats to the security of the West. **A new genre of military futurology has emerged which owes as much to apocalyptic Hollywood movies as it does to the cold war tradition of** ‘scenario planning’. Often outlandish and bizarre in its prophecies, and always dystopian, **this new military futurism sees threats to the western way of life** emanating not only from rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism but also from resurgent nationalism, conflicts over dwindling resources, migration, disease, organised crime, abrupt climate change and the emergence of ‘failed cities’ where social disorder **is rife**. This article provides a survey of the genre, showing how **the grim predictions of the military futurists provide a justification for** endless **global war** against enemies that may never exist. Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. Donald Rumsfeld1 Downloaded from [http://rac.sagepub.com](http://rac.sagepub.com/) at SUNY AT BUFFALO on March 1, 2010 14 Race & Class 51(3) There was a time when the future was considered a subject for prophecy and science fiction rather than empirical analysis. From Jules Verne and H. G. Wells onwards, science writers have combined fantasy with a serious examination of what the future might contain. But it was not until the last decades of the twentieth century that futuristic speculation began to transcend the category of entertainment, with the emergence of the discipline variously known as futurology, futuristics or future studies. Defined by the Encarta Dictionary as ‘the study and forecasting of the future, with predictions based on the likely outcomes of current trends’, futurology first emerged as a popular non-fiction genre in the early 1970s, with Alvin Toffler’s best-selling Future Shock and the Club of Rome’s environmental wake-up call Limits to Growth. In 1972, the University of Houston established the first graduate programme in futurism and today a plethora of university departments, thinktanks and research centres across the world are dedicated to ‘foresight’ and the study of ‘probable and preferable futures’, such as the Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies, the UK Horizon Scanning Centre, Foresight International and the World Future Society. **The military has** also **shown a keen interest in the study of the ‘possible future’** in the early twenty-first century, **particularly in the United States**. In 1997, **the US National Intelligence Council** (NIC) **published Global Trends 2010**, the first of three reports in its ambitious 2020 Project that aims **to predict the ‘forces that will shape our world’ over a two-decade period**. In 2001, the prestigious US Air Force thinktank, the RAND Corporation, established the Frederick S. Pardee Center for Longer Range Global Policy and the Future Human Condition. Since 2000, **the US Joint Forces Command has published two studies of the international military and security environment** over the next two decades **and its implications for the military.** Military and national security research institutions such as **the** **US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute** (**SSI**) **regularly stage conferences and symposia** on ‘Long Range Planning and Forecasting’, ‘Scenario Planning’ and ‘Projecting Future Battlespaces and Scenarios’. These **studies are not limited to purely military concerns**. Military futurists also devote considerable attention to more mainstream futurological subjects, such as social and economic transformation, demographics, urbanism, cultural trends and climate change. What explains the military’s interest in the future and what does this fascination tell us about the present? Military futurism is not a historical novelty in itself. Armies have routinely engaged in contingency planning ever since the German armed forces pioneered ‘long range planning’ in the late nineteenth century. **Military futurism really came into its own during the cold war, when the RAND Corporation** began conducting regular war games and simulations**to predict** the likely **outcomes of nuclear and conventional military confrontations** with the Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 1960s, RAND luminaries such as Herman Kahn, Leo Roster and Albert Wohlstetter built illustrious careers around ‘scenario planning’ and ‘systems thinking’, which attempted to provide US policymakers with **the** conceptual tools to anticipate ‘alternate’ or ‘surprising’ military futures**by ‘thinking the unthinkable’**. By the 1980s, forecasting, war-gaming and scenario planning had become routinely integrated into US military practice. While studies such as Innovation Task Force 2025 (1988) and AirLand Battle 2000 (1982) considered the transformation of the armed forces or rehearsed NATO war plans against the Warsaw Pact, others continued to explore the outer limits of the unthinkable future. One report published by the Department of Defense in the early years of the Reagan presidency imagined a nuclear war in which the White House, the Pentagon and much of civilisation were destroyed, but computers continued in the aftermath ‘to run a war no human mind can control’, directing space satellites, nuclear weapons and armies of robots ‘that can gallop like horses and walk like men, carrying out computerised orders as they roam the radioactive battlefield’.2 **Cold war military futurism also spilled over into the private sector**. In 1961, Herman Kahn founded the Hudson Institute, a conservative thinktank and research centre which aspires to provide ‘global leaders in government and business’ with the tools to ‘manage strategic transitions to the future’.3 In the 1970s, **Royal Dutch Shell pioneered the corporate use of scenario planning in the oil industry in response to what was perceived as a new climate of uncertainty and unpredictability** following the OPEC oil embargo. This overlapping nexus between the military and corporate futurism has continued ever since. Not only do the US military and the private sector share the same concern with geopolitical and international developments pertaining to US national security and the future of the capitalist world economy, but private companies and institutions specialising in scenario planning and risk management also work closely with the military in developing futuristic analyses. **The Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis produces regular studies for the military on the ‘critical variables’ and ‘nonlinear forces’ affecting international politics.**4 Both the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security have also commissioned futuristic studies from scenario planning specialists such as the Global Business Network (GBN) and the giant management consultancy firm Booz Allen Hamilton. In 2006, Booz Allen won a $32 million contract to provide the Pentagon’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) with war-gaming materials and simulations, whose aim, according to the company spokesman, was to ‘write the history of the future’ and provide the Pentagon with a ‘picture of the world between 2001 and 2025’.5 All this is in keeping with the tradition developed by Kahn and his RAND colleagues but the new military futurism is also strikingly different from its predecessors. Where the cold war futurists were primarily concerned with the Soviet Union and scenario planning for nuclear war, twenty-first century futurists are concerned with very different ‘threats’ and ‘challenges’. One of the most prolific producers of futurological studies is the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA), an obscure but influential thinktank run by the veteran RAND intellectual and military futurist Andrew Marshall. Each year, the ONA commissions dozens of studies from academics and thinktanks like the Hudson Institute and private consulting companies. Most of these reports are classified but the [talkingpointsmemo.com](http://talkingpointsmemo.com/) website recently used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain an index of ONA publications. These include titles such as Pandora’s Boxes: the mind of jihad (June 2007), Why they Won’t Know What Hit Them: are Arabs thinking about the consequences of another 9/11 (July 2006), Europe 2025: mounting security challenges amidst declining competitiveness (September 2008), Role of High Power Microwave Weapons in Future Intercontinental War (July 2007) and even German Liberals and the Integration of Muslim Minorities in Germany (December 2006).6 These titles are an indication of the new concerns of contemporary military futurism. The new military futurists also differ from their predecessors in their generally grim perspective on the future. In Rethinking the Unthinkable (1963), Herman Kahn attempted to demonstrate that a nuclear war might not be survivable and therefore ‘thinkable’. This scenario was intended to be positive – albeit from a hawkish foreign policy perspective – but contemporary military futurism is often extremely pessimistic in its depictions of the twenty-first century ‘security environment’. Such pessimism is partly a reflection of the prevailing mood in the US national security establishment. Ever since the end of the cold war, US security analysts have argued that the US was vulnerable to attack by elusive and unpredictable enemies that were potentially more dangerous than the former Soviet Union. Such predictions appeared to be confirmed by the catastrophic events of September 11. On the one hand, the 9/11 attacks were ‘predictable’, in the sense that an attack of some kind had been expected. At the same time, the attacks constituted what futurologists call ‘wild cards’, ‘discontinuities’ or ‘surprising events with huge consequences’, which force a new set of expectations about what the future might contain. Some US security analysts have since added the Iraq insurgency to the category of ‘strategic shocks’ and attributed the failure to predict it to the same ‘failure of imagination’ that helped make the 9/11 attacks possible. The result is a new willingness amongst the US national security establishment to consider further ‘strategic shocks’ by ‘imagining the unimaginable’ – a tendency which has generated imaginative scenarios that sometimes owe more to apocalyptic Hollywood movies, manga comics and science fiction than they do to sober analysis. Faced with a future that seems fraught with unpleasant surprises, the Pentagon has embarked on some outlandish and even bizarre attempts to try to reduce the element of uncertainty and unpredictability. One ongoing project aims to recruit social scientists to compile a computerised database of cultural, religious and political beliefs in every country in the world that will supposedly enable the military to predict which countries are most likely to succumb to unrest, insurgency or terrorism. In 2002, the Pentagon’s cutting edge Defense and Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) came close to introducing a ‘terrorism futures market’ based on the financial futures market, which invited bets on when and where terrorist events were likely to occur in order to predict them beforehand. This scheme was abandoned when it was pointed out that some organisations might deliberately carry out attacks in order to profit from them. In 2007, DARPA awarded Lockheed Martin a contract to develop an ‘Integrated Crises Early Warning System’ (ICEWS) that its designers claimed will ‘anticipate and respond to worldwide political crises and predict events of interest and stability of countries of interest with greater than 80 percent accuracy’ in the same way that meteorologists predict the weather.7 These initiatives cannot be attributed simply to an overzealous desire to protect the US ‘homeland’ from ‘another 9/11’. **The broad scope of contemporary military futurism is partly a consequence of changing concepts of warfare in** the early twenty-first century, with its new emphasis on ‘asymmetric’ warfare, terrorism and insurgency across the global ‘battlespace’ rather than conventional wars between states. **The commitment to ‘fourth generation warfare’ is fuelled by a new sense of the fragility and instability of the international state system, coupled with the belief that the nation-state** in the early twenty-first century **is** increasingly **vulnerable to global economic turbulence, civil and ethnic conflict and the violent activities of ‘non-state actors’** – all of which are perceived to pose threats to global security and even the future of globalisation itself. The ‘uncertainty’, instability and risk that military futurists project onto the future not only emanates from nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’ or ‘non-state actors’, however. A recurring theme in military futurist scenarios concerns the possibility that the emergence of China, India and Brazil as major economic powers may be accompanied by a decline in US – and western – global hegemony and that the ‘unipolar world’ of the post-cold war era may be drawing to an end. With the demise of the Soviet Union, US military thinking has been dominated by the concept of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) – a term used to describe periods of history in which one particular military power or group of powers outstrips all potential rivals. The display of US technological firepower in the first Gulf War convinced many military planners that this position is now occupied by the US. But this belief is often accompanied by a realisation of the limitations of US military power and anxiety that the RMA may not be permanent. The notion of the US RMA is often attributed to the Pentagon’s ‘futurist-in-chief’ Andrew Marshall at the ONA. Celebrated as a visionary genius by his admirers and denounced as a paranoiac by his enemies, Marshall is a long-time associate of Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, and was given a major role by Rumsfeld in the preparation of the 2002 Quadrennial Defense Review, which the US Armed Forces use as a medium-range planning guide to justify its budget requests to Congress. That same year, Marshall commissioned an 85-page monograph for the ONA from Booz Allen Hamilton entitled Military Advantage in History, which studied some of the most successful military conquerors of the past for lessons on how the United States ‘should think about maintaining military advantage in the twenty-first century’.8 Though the study identified the United States as the ‘dominant military power in the world’, it nevertheless warned that such dominance might not be permanent and that ‘barring a more innovative approach the process leading to its substantial erosion has already been set in motion’. To contribute to this process of innovation, the report sought inspiration from imperial conquerors such as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and particularly from Rome, whose 600-year dominance, the authors argued, ‘suggests that it is possible for the United States to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable of transforming its forces before an opponent can develop counter-capabilities’.9 Stripped of its anachronistic application of contemporary military jargon, its shallow scholarship and its unproblematic comparisons between the United States and previous empires, this document was essentially a variant on ONA futuristic studies such as Preserving American Primacy (January 2006) and Preserving US Military Supremacy (August 2001). The same objectives are shared by the neoconservative thinktank Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in its 2000 call for US military transformation, Rebuilding America’s Defenses. The PNAC couples a boyish fascination with sci-fi weaponry with a strident insistence on the need to preserve US ‘primacy’, ‘geo-political pre-eminence’, ‘dominance’ and a ‘global security order that is uniquely friendly to American principles and prosperity’.10 This determination to shape, control and ‘dominate’ the turbulent and conflict-prone twenty-first century in the foreseeable (and unforeseeable) future is a key component of the new military futurism. On the one hand, military futurism is a by-product of the megalomaniac military doctrine of ‘full spectrum dominance’. At the same time, its predictions about the future express very real fears amongst the US ruling elite that the United States is inextricably connected to a world that may be slipping out of its control. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, the new military futurists are often considerably more pessimistic than their predecessors and tend to paint a very bleak future of an unsafe and unstable world that demands a constant military presence to hold it together. From Yevgeny Zemyatin’s We to Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, twentieth-century writers have used dystopian visions of the future as a warning or as a satirical commentary on the often lethal consequences of twentieth-century utopianism. The **dystopias of** the new military futurists have a very different purpose. The US military often tends to perceive itself as the last bastion of **civilisation against encroaching chaos and disorder**. The worse the future **is perceived to be**, the more these dark visions of chaos and disorder **serve to** justify limitless military ‘interventions’, techno-warfare, techno-surveillance and weapons procurement programmes, and the **predictions of the** military futurists are often very grim indeed.

# AFF Answers

### 2AC – Extinction First

#### Extinction outweighs.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### 2AC – Extinction Reps Good

#### Preventing existential risk and framing it as a “we” claim is good.

Coles and Susen 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262)

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

For these reasons, my political, theoretical, and pedagogical engagements move across many different configurations and a wider range of situations, ideologies, modes, and commitments than most. Eschewing a single subject position, in Visionary Pragmatism, I experiment with first-person plurals in which the ‘we’ morphs in relation to the different loci of initiative that animate my reflections. Sometimes ‘we’ refers to proponents of radical and ecological democracy very broadly, sometimes to scholars in higher education, sometimes to political theorists, sometimes to the action research movement that formed among people at Northern Arizona University and its community partners, sometimes to a specific action research team, sometimes to all people facing the possibility of planetary ecological collapse. Among the many things I find compelling about the writing of James Baldwin is how he shifts his pronouns without notice – for example, sometimes using ‘we’ to represent black people, sometimes as an uncanny member of the white-majority United States. This rhetorical shiftiness encroaches upon and pulls his readers – especially white readers – beyond the ‘innocence that constitutes the crime’ of their assumed individual and collective white subjectivities in ways that work in visceral, relational, and conceptual registers (Baldwin, 1992, p. 6). Such uncertainty has significant capacity to erode habits and defences, as one finds oneself unexpectedly drawn into perspectives, locations, energies, and tendencies that unsettle and reorient one’s own subjectivity. Much of my work has theorized ‘moving democracy’, and my rhetorical shifting of the first-person plural is a textual practice that aims to enhance this in ways that facilitate reflection.

Throughout Visionary Pragmatism, I argue that there are powerful reasons for active hope. At the same time, we do not live far from tipping points beyond which planetary ecological collapse, globalizing neoliberal fascism, and violent chaos may overwhelm our efforts. I do not think so much in terms of pessimism or optimism as I do about seizing and co-creating opportunities for catalysing dynamic changes in theory and practice that foster a powerful movement of receptive democracy, for complex democratic commonwealth and ecological flourishing. In one sense, as Walter Benjamin’s discussion of Paul Klee’s ‘Angelus Novus’ makes poignantly clear, it is always ‘too late’ for so much and so many, as catastrophic history keeps piling wreckage at our feet. At the same time, there are what Benjamin (1968) calls ‘weak messianic powers’ that emerge as the retroactive force of salvaged aspects of past struggles ignite sparks with emerging struggles to explode the continuum of progress. In this sense, up to our day, it is never altogether too late. With the language of ‘game-transformative practice’, I argue that a visionary-pragmatic movement of radical democracy must do something analogous in response to the fierce urgency of now, to avoid a sixth extinction in which this possibility could well become a casualty.

#### Priming of existential risk focuses on *compassion* which results in progressivism

Vail et al, 9 (Kenneth E. Vail III, University of Missouri Department of Psychological Sciences researcher, Jamie Arndt, University of Missouri psychology professor, Matt Motyl, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs Masters in Experimental Psychology, and Tom Pyszczynski, University of COlorado at Colorado Springs professor and co-developer of terror management theory; "Compassionate Values and Presidential Politics: Mortality Salience, Compassionate Values, and Support for Barack Obama and John McCain in the 2008 Presidential Election," Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 263-266, IC)

The present findings extend those of Rothschild et al. (2009). Rothschild et al. showed that priming religious fundamentalists with compassionate values that were clearly tied to their religious foundations in either Christianity or Islam led to lower level of support for the use of violence against Iran among Americans and to less hostile attitudes toward the United States (including less support of martyrdom attacks) among Iranians; in the absence of priming these compassionate values, death reminders led to increased support for violence among both groups. The present study goes beyond a religious context to show that in the absence of being faced with compassionate values, death reminders increased support for John McCain; but when oriented toward compassionate values, MS increased support for Barack Obama. This study also provides convergent support for a growing number of findings that existential threat is capable of motivating defense of progressive, prosocial values like tolerance, egalitarianism, and empathy (Gailliot et al., 2008; Greenberg et al., 1992; Rothschild et al., 2009; Schimel et al., 2006). Because people possess a variety of resources for buffering existential fear, terror management trajectories can be quite malleable. Thus, increasing the salience of a particular aspect of one’s cultural worldview, such as the prosocial value of compassion, can motivate increased adherence to this value after reminders of death. As such, examining the effects of MS in light of individual differences in progressive value orientation might be a useful direction for the future research on the psychology of politics and/or intergroup relations. For example, emerging research suggests that compassion might be found in the perception of interdependence among diverse groups of people, helping to reduce or eliminate reactionary, hostile forms of worldview defense. Motyl et al. (2009) report that priming a perception of a common humanity attenuated an increase in anti-Arab prejudice and hostile immigration policy among Americans reminded of death. This compassionate perception of a common humanity can also be observed, rather ominously, in universal dangers (i.e., global warming) that threaten humanity as a whole. In research conducted with both Americans and Palestinians living in Israel, Pyszczynski et al. (2009) demonstrated that the perception of such global threat bolsters support for peaceful coexistence in the face of increased death awareness. Future research on these values and concerns might provide useful directions for those seeking peace and political harmony among groups embroiled in long-standing conflicts. The present analysis of compassion also offers potential insights into understanding reactions to other political figures. Weise et al. (2008) found that MS motivated securely attached adults to support John Kerry instead of Bush. Given that secure attachment is linked to compassion and empathy (e.g., Mikulincer et al., 2005), the existentially motivated activation of secure adult attachment systems may have increased support for Kerry to the extent that he was perceived as the more compassionate candidate. However, comparing the current study with Weise et al. suggests a crucial distinction between the ability of Obama and Kerry to capitalize on the MS-induced need to achieve psychological equanimity by rigorously defending culturally cherished values. Whereas both men might very well have been harbingers of compassion, for Kerry, this may have been obscured by his relatively dry speaking style and meeker presence; Obama, on the other hand, wore compassion on his sleeve (Steinhauser, 2008). Thus, it may have been that Obama’s frequent, eloquent outbursts of compassion boosted his support by priming thecultural defense of this value amid frequent discussion of issues involving reminders of mortality (e.g., healthcare, Iraqi occupation, Russian invasion of Georgia, etc.). It is important to note, however, that the present analysis does not imply that compassionate associations are limited only to Democratic candidates. Indeed, as the quote which opens this paper illustrates, then-President George W. Bush co-opted the term “compassionate conservative” during his second campaign, a move that may have helped garner support, assuming both that he was perceived as the more compassionate candidate and that such values were made salient. The present research also contributes to understanding the nature and specificity of responses to thoughts of death (cf, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, & Maxfield, 2006). Like a number of other studies, here we tested the impact of MS against that of personal uncertainty. Proponents of the uncertainty management model claim that MS effects are actually a result of increased personal uncertainty, which motivates efforts to regain a sense of certainty by defending the validity of one’s cultural worldview and confidently adhering to its norms and values (e.g., Van Den Bos, Poortvliet, Marjolein, Miedema, & Van den Ham, 2005). The present study demonstrates that uncertainty concerns did not impact political preferences, or produce reactions to cultural values (e.g., compassion) similar to those triggered by MS. The recently proposed uncertainty-threat model (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) claims that uncertainty and mortality threat both produce a shift toward political conservatism. Critics of this model (e.g., Anson et al., in press; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003), on the other hand, have argued that the motivated social-cognitive foundations (i.e., dogmatism; intolerance of ambiguity; personal need for closure, structure, or order; etc.) of political ideology are not limited to a conservative shift, but can readily trigger support for progressive change. The present study provides clear and direct evidence for the latter contention: MS-induced threat is indeed capable of motivating support for either conservative or progressive politicians, depending on the values that are salient at the time. This idea, however, does raise an interesting possibility with regard to interpreting the present effects. The compassionate value statements were designed for this study to directly emphasize the value of compassion. While the comparison statements were designed to lack such references, it is possible that these statements might have been construed as priming wisdom. Previous research (e.g., Landau et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2004, 2005) demonstrated that MS motivated increased support for authoritarian candidates, and for Bush specifically, without moderating factors such as a wisdom induction. This is consistent with the notion that Republican candidates tend to enjoy increased support from those reminded of mortality because these candidates tend to emphasize American superiority. However, McCain was considerably older than Obama and held his Senate seat for much longer; thus, he may have been seen as “wise” relative to Obama’s “na¨ıvete.” If this were the case, and if the neutral value condition’s statements did ´ prime wisdom, this may have motivated increased support for McCain after death reminders. While the participants in this study were by no means representative of the diverse American electorate, they provided crucial insight into the psychological impact of each candidate’s campaign and even of the candidates themselves. Embedded within a social climate boiling over with death reminders (e.g., war, terrorism, fear-mongering rhetoric, etc.), people may latch onto certain political leaders in an effort to affirm their faith in the permanence and validity of their particular culture. However, it would seem that the individual can achieve this leader-based worldview defense in several different ways. Depending on the salience of particular cultural values, a person might be motivated to follow a conservative leader who rigorously asserts the fundamental superiority of one’s culture and aggressively “defends” it from the clutches of evil, or they might be motivated to support progressive prototypes of their more compassionate social values. As Ernest Becker (1973, p. 139) concluded, “[The human] is a trembling animal who pulls the world down around his shoulders as he clutches for protection and support and tries to affirm in a cowardly way his feeble powers. The qualities of the leader, then, and the problems of people fit together in a natural symbiosis.

### 2AC – Scenario Planning Good

#### Scenario planning is good – our scholarship is not white silencing---IR can change from its racist origins---if predictions are false, there can be more studies that prove it wrong---their paradigm is worse because there is no falsification mechanism.

Monika Sus & Marcel Hadeed 20. \*Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator. \*\*Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance. February 2020. “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”. Contemporary Security Policy.

Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to fill the gap between IR theory and real-world problems, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of intellectual openness, recognizing both the need for greater flexibility in the theoretical formulations and the possibility of complementarity by other theories and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a complementary approach to traditional IR methods. The most obvious advantage of scenario analysis as a methodology, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to tackle future events. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to stimulate creative thinking by challenging the deeply held assumptions of their authors. In other words, this method is helpful for overcoming enduring cognitive biases—mental errors such as linearity, presentism, and group think caused by the subconscious and simplified information processing of humans (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce discontinuities into theory, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “deeper, otherwise left implicit, assumptions about continuous and linear patterns of development” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The process of scenario development invites the participants to reveal and question convictions which have so far remained unchallenged, and to question the linearity of world developments.

The ability of reexamining one’s own assumptions and going beyond linear patterns of development is essential for IR scholarship. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to exit the tunnel vision on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both innovative in terms of scholarship, and policy-relevant by offering a reflection on unexpected discontinuities. Thus, it can facilitate the intellectual capability to think the unthinkable (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with confronting one’s enduring assumptions and developing multiple causal possibilities, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to detect rapid and significant shifts in trajectories, or the forces behind them, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for further investigation (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to advance innovative research since it helps scholars drive their research into new areas, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics confront the uncertainties that are crucial for policymakers to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide comprehensive causal reasoning and thus to tackle complex issues. As mentioned in the introduction, the world’s complexity combined with abrupt shifts poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to accommodate multiple driving forces, to take into account different values they might take and finally to combine them with each other and see how they affect the dependent variable, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that scenarios are highly apt for dealing with complexity and uncertainty and providing academia with a tool for “actionable clarity in understanding contemporary global issues” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In security studies, for example, scenario analysis can connect the dots between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the interplay of economic-societalenvironmental and technological changes. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to counter the “hyper-fragmentation of knowledge” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables IR scholars to establish a channel of communication with policy-makers other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “deep and shared understanding between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards more exchange between academia and policy-making that can contribute to a better understanding between the two worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider long-term trends (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the relevance of their research agendas.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the policy dialogue benefits from scenarios’ accessibility to a broader audience. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are more suitable to the time- and attention-constraints of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research.

### 2AC – Fiat Good

#### Fiat is good -- foreign policy simulations teach students how allies and adversaries respond to U.S. policy -- fosters ideological reflexivity, accurate policy prediction, and argumentative agency.

**Esberg and Sagan ’12** [Jane and Scott; 2012; Special assistant to the Director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation; Professor of Political Science and Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; *The Nonproliferation Review*, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” p. 95-96]

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict. The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.

By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works. Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork. More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice. These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux. Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur. Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others. Acts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.

### 2AC – Debating Nuclear Risk Good

#### Debating nuclear risk is good.

**Bernstein ’18** [Aron; September 21st; Emeritus Professor of Physics at MIT; The Bulletin, “Reducing the risk of nuclear war begins in the classroom,” https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/reducing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war-begins-in-the-classroom/]

The need for education on nuclear weapons. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the students of today have less lived experience to draw on than older generations. Today’s typical college student was born after the end of the Cold War and has no memory of a time when most Americans were deeply afraid of nuclear war (excluding, to an extent, the fiery exchange of threats between President Trump and Kim Jong-un last year). Perhaps as a result, these students also have very limited knowledge about nuclear weapons. The majority do not have a strong understanding of what nuclear weapons are, their destructive power, or their role in the international order, and even fewer have a sense of how many nuclear weapons exist. They are not aware of the $1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program, in which the majority of costs come from modernizing and improving delivery systems rather than performing the technically necessary maintenance of the nuclear warheads. History education on the Cold War often addresses the US-Soviet arms race of that time, but nuclear weapons issues in other regions—such as the tense situation between India and Pakistan—are rarely ever mentioned. The distant, but persistent, possibility of an unintentional nuclear launch due to unauthorized access, technical failure, or a cyberattack on warning systems, is also overlooked, as is general information about which states possess nuclear weapons today.

In short, students in the United States (and likely elsewhere) typically graduate from high school having received almost no information on nuclear weapons. It is generally assumed that today’s American public simply doesn’t care about the **complicated** and somewhat **abstract** issues of nuclear weapons and deterrence because they rarely affect people’s lives directly. However, an alternative explanation exists: The American public doesn’t know enough about nuclear weapons to have much political opinion on them, but if they had more knowledge, that could change. If so, educating students on nuclear weapons on a large scale could have the long-term effect of creating an American public that is politically engaged on the nuclear issue and motivated to hold its elected leaders accountable for implementing nuclear policy that reduces the risk of nuclear war.

For some students, education on nuclear issues may have an impact beyond just putting nuclear weapons on their radar (pun intended). Today’s students are the next politicians, scientists, and journalists, and some of them will inevitably be tasked with addressing the nuclear issue in their careers. For these students, early exposure to the issues of nuclear weapons in an educational context could be useful preparation for grappling with those issues professionally. Indeed, for some students, learning about nuclear weapons could have a decisive impact on their career trajectory and inspire them to dedicate themselves to solving these problems.

### 2AC – IR Racist

#### IR isn't anti-black -- it's a minimalist theory to explain the occurrence of interstate war -- purity in scholastic exercises have zero concrete solvency.

Wæver & Buzan **’**20 [Ole and Barry; May 15th; Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen; Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics; KU, “Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit,” Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit; GR]

Racism is a powerful, malignant force in world politics, and our discipline, IR, has deeply problematic entanglements with it. It is a serious matter both to come intellectually to grips with this and to find the most effective strategies to act on it. We worry that more serious problems and possibilities are marginalised by an ultimately very inward-looking and scholastic exercise where a particular definition of racism and a specific theoretical perspective makes it possible to deem the vast majority of scholarship in IR ‘racist’, ‘methodologically white’ and ‘antiblack’- every work that does not explicitly follow one exact version of anti-racist scholarship. Especially, the role played in H&RM’s argumentation by our sins of omission does ultimately seem to rest on the premise that only their distinct form of scholarship can be redeemed, because even post-colonial scholarship and critiques of euro-centrism are not enough; you are a racist if you do not follow exactly this particular route. It is not important whether your scholarship actually supports or hinders anti-racist analysis or political engagement; it is all about who you cite and what declarations you make. Here, a theory is not judged by what can be done with it, but by the question whether self-appointed anti-racists can find supposedly problematic sentences somewhere in its key texts. In this section, we will first point out that the H&RM article is a personal attack on us for racism, despite their reassurances about the opposite. Then, we discuss what an analysis of structural racism (systems of power) could amount to, given that they claim to do one but utterly fail to do so, resorting instead to a pretend examination of the foundations of ST. Next, we discuss what could be methodological guidelines for actually proving whether or not a theory like ST is racist.

H&RM’s usage of the term racism for all scholarship that does not foreground race as the primary theme, means that 99% of IR will be ‘racist’. There will be no room for any other scholarship (unless you will live with the moniker of being racist). Not only does this seem very unproductive in terms of disciplinary conversations, not to talk of diversity and pluralism, it also means that it becomes very hard to use the category of ‘racism’ for critical purposes for those cases where it actually is at stake in a sense closer to what the rest of the discipline, and indeed the public discourse, means by it. It has been watered down by the fact that everyone but those in critical whiteness studies have been deemed racist, one by one, where we just happened to get the special honour of being among the first. H&RM might protest that this is not their plan, but we fail to see how this can be avoided when the logic they apply is that the term racist can be based primarily on sins of omission in the sense of a theory being focused around other categories.

As documented above, they claim numerous times that ST ‘occludes’ or ‘refuses’ various dynamics relating to race that they find important, but they never offer any basis for concluding that the theory makes it harder to see these things, only that it does not as such zoom in on them. This does not have to do with a choice particularly regarding race but the structure and nature of the theory as a general analytical apparatus that can be applied to all instances where actors try to securitize or desecuritize something, and the user is free then to include race more or less in this analysis, just as the theory is not deciding how important nationalism is or gender51, but it enables the analysis of the way different categories and distinctions become politically mobilised in security struggles.

H&RM will probably argue that if you do not mention race in these contexts, you ‘hide’ it. Three answers: 1) no, there is a difference between not mentioning and hiding, it takes a step more of the critic to show that the theory prevents something from being articulated or that it uses abstractions that stand in the way of articulating race; that certainly is the case for some theories, so it is a legitimate avenue of critique, but they haven’t shown this, 2) the theory is intentionally (as we have explained numerous times) minimalist in having a clear conceptual core and then not putting all kinds of factors like the role of media or populism into the theory -- not because we haven’t noticed these factors but because they belong in applications, and the theory exactly allows you to study these phenomena, 3) we are very explicit that one of the advantages of a minimalist theory is the ability to combine it with other theories especially general theories about the nature and structures of society; one should not build out ST to become a general theory of society or international relations, better in any specific usage of the theory combine it with the theories one finds productive for the particular research project. (Wæver 2011, 2015) The latter point has come up in replies to the ‘sociological’ version of ST (Balzacq), which has more of a tendency to add all relevant factors to the theory, while the classical Copenhagen version is tight and invites combination with theories that complement it, which could exactly be theories of race and racism. Our ultimate concern here is: how do we actually get to study racism in world politics in a practically and politically helpful way?

When developing our own framework, ST, we took care to make sure it could do critical work in concrete analyses, in our view on racism as well, and H&RM fail to show that this is not the case. In addition, we have then on a more mundane, human level engaged ourselves in various ways to foster non-Western scholarship and theories in IR (Tickner & Wæver 2009; Acharya & Buzan 2010, 2019). One has for instance co-founded a book-series with the aim to identify “alternatives for thinking about the ‘international’ that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West” and “provincializing the West” (quoting from the Routledge homepage of the book series); the other has amongst many other things re-written this history of the IR discipline to show both that it has ignored non-Western contributions and that the Western part of it is indebted to ‘scientific racism’ (Buzan & Lawson 2015; Acharya and Buzan 2019). Closer to ST, the project in Buzan & Wæver 2003 was to a large extent to challenge the euro-centrism enshrined in dominant conceptions of polarity and of the relationship between global and regional, to enable theories to be more attentive to actual security dynamics in ‘most of the world’.

Surely, all of these efforts can be critically assessed as to what has been helpful and what hasn’t. But we find it strange that H&RM choose to ignore completely the possibility of assessing the ability of ST to form the basis for helpful analyses of racism. They neither look at those analyses that have actually been done, nor do they show systematically why it would be impossible to do so. On the contrary, they limit themselves to highly abstract and indirect attributions of racism to the theory as such through various unconvincing routes. From this they deduce (without any discussion) that ST can’t inform studies of racism (and when it has actually done it, they presumably are able to magically make those publications go away) (see section 6 below).

H&RM offer no explanation as to how their type of analysis helps in combating racism. It is unclear if it is a kind of ground clearing operation to be followed up by new and better theories after getting us out of the way. Or whether they believe that we are so much a part of the oppressive structures that attacking us is in itself liberating. Or -- as we will consider below in more detail -- the whole exercise is more about making universities more inclusive and hospitable to students and scholars of colour. Closely linked to the latter option, their rationale could be that the attack is meant more as a kind of ‘happening’ drawing attention to the question of race. Especially in the latter case, it would be intentional that the article plays ambiguously with making a very personal attack while pretending not to.

#### IR scholarship regarding the liberal order is not irredeemably racist

Gideon Rose 16, editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2016, “Review of, ‘White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations,’” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2016-02-16/white-world-order-black-power-politics-birth-american

In this interesting and important yet flawed book, Vitalis seeks to bridge the “vast gulf divid[ing] international relations from Africana studies,” bringing the “racism [of the discipline of international relations] to light.” Conventional narratives of the field’s history, he argues, trace it to the rise of realism and national security concerns in the years around World War II, adding a few historical thinkers, such as Thucydides, to claim a timeless intellectual pedigree. But this ignores both the extensive mainstream scholarship of the first decades of the twentieth century that dealt with colonialism and racial issues and the pioneering work of African American writers in what he calls “the Howard School.” Consigning both to the memory hole, he says, paints a distorted picture of the discipline’s origins and nature, obscuring the role that international relations scholarship has played in the construction and perpetuation of white Western dominance. These are major claims, and some of them hold up better than others. Vitalis is correct to shine a spotlight on the forgotten academic work of the first third of the twentieth century and offers a timely reminder of just how prevalent racialized thinking was and how central a role imperialism—as opposed to straightforward great-power relations—played in global affairs. Back then, for example, “policy relevance” in political science often meant figuring out how to train good colonial administrators. Vitalis also provides a service by telling the story of scholars such as Alain Locke, Ralph Bunche, and Rayford Logan, enriching readers’ understanding of midcentury intellectual debates over U.S. foreign policy and tracing how racism operated inside various professional institutions. Vitalis is less convincing, however, in casting his analysis as an indictment of the postwar discipline of international relations, let alone its contemporary incarnation. To get there, one has to share his politics. Vitalis sees a project of U.S. imperial domination playing out over the course of the past century, with the “subjection” continuing today, “through new-old policies of intervention, tutelage, and targeted killings in new-old zones of anarchy and civilization deficit.” Given such a reading of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that he believes “the history of ideas, institutions, and practices [in the field] has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions”—or that he sees today’s mainstream international relations scholars as handmaidens of an evil national security state and as the direct descendants of their racist predecessors of a century ago. Scorning the notion that the postwar liberal international order represents anything particularly new or admirable, Vitalis scores a few points in noting how long it took for some earlier social and racial hierarchies, both international and domestic, to erode. But he refuses to accept the fact that they have indeed eroded. One is left wanting more analysis of how and why the attitudes and patterns of domination Vitalis describes gave way over time, and how the midcentury theorists and practitioners of the liberal international order understood and handled the paradoxes of its halting and inconsistent implementation.

#### There is no monolithic IR – the field is reflexive and effective – its track record of prediction proves. AND, sweeping criticisms of a fragmented field of research don’t answer the specificity of our studies.

Dan Reiter 15. Professor of Political Science at Emory University. “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools.” War on the Rocks. 8-27-2015. <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s. But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome. Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets. Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians? Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings. Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies. Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations. Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions. Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

### 2AC – Eurocentric

#### IR’s not intrinsically Eurocentric – they need to indict our specific studies, or their vague theoretical cards just don’t apply

Audrey Alejandro 19, Assistant Professor at the Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Western Dominance in International Relations?”, Routledge Publishing, forthcoming

Since the 1970s, a ‘critical’ movement has been developing in the humanities and social sciences denouncing the existence of ‘Western dominance’ over the worldwide production and circulation of knowledge. However, thirty years after the emergence of this promising agenda in International Relations (IR), this discipline has not experienced a major shift. This volume offers a counter-intuitive and original contribution to the understanding of the global circulation of knowledge. In contrast to the literature, it argues that the internationalisation of social sciences in the designated ‘Global South’ is not conditioned by the existence of a presumably ‘Western dominance’. Indeed, although discriminative practices such as Eurocentrism and gatekeeping exist, their existence does not lead to a unipolar structuration of IR internationalisation around ‘the West’. Based on these empirical results, this book reflexively questions the role of critique in the (re)production of the social and political order. Paradoxically, the anti-Eurocentric critical discourses reproduce the very Eurocentrism they criticise. This book offers methodological support to address this paradox by demonstrating how one can use discourse analysis and reflexivity to produce innovative results and decentre oneself from the vision of the world one has been socialised into.

### 2AC –Grove

#### Grove is wrong about everything.

Christopher Mott 20, PhD in Political Science from St. Andrews, Master’s degree from London Metropolitan in IR, former Scholar in Residence @ Helmerich Center for American Research at the Gilcrease Museum, Trickster’s Guide to Geopolitics, “Savage Ecology: War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, A Book Review”, <https://geotrickster.com/2020/01/01/savage-ecology-war-and-geopolitics-at-the-end-of-the-world-a-book-review/> \*note: the identity of the author isn’t immediately obvious but he links his book title in the comments, and you can look that up and it reveals his identity

Where I disagree with the author, however, is his very concept of the ‘Eurocene.’ If the present international state system wasn’t working for states across the globe it would be dying out, but it seems to strengthening. There is no way we are getting through what I will remain calling the anthropocene without some level of a command economy for resources and research direction for technologies. Many of these resources will be scare and will be competed over. The competitive nature of the state system means something Darwinistic is occurring, which is good as we do not yet have the answer for surviving our current era and so multiple approaches must be tried and the best will serve as models for others and the worst will die out. I also do not see anything particularly European about modernity anymore. While a new era did begin with the biological and demographic takeover of the western hemisphere and its forceable wedding to Europe-previously a minor and not particularly important subcontinental peninsula of Asia-any Eurasian actor could have potentially done the same thing. The bureaucratic state was first born in China and the agricultural state came from the Middle East, and those strike me as just as relevant to where we are now than the maritime-industrial states of post medieval Europe. Furthermore, as India and China move their way into full industrialization on their own terms and countries like Japan have long held that position dating back to the colonial era, I find little to argue for something called specifically ‘The Eurocene.’ That being said, the author is entirely correct that our currently unsustainable methods of development are a type of self-replicating virus imposed by force. But so too will any solutions have to follow that path. It may come as no surprise that I, a person very into geopolitics (and making speculative realist geopolitics in particular) also take a more neutral tone on the field than this author. I think geopolitics are as likely to get us out of this mess as they are to dig us deeper. Aside from general environmental goals, I see little universal in how we will escape from pollution and mass extinction and more a variety of paths which depend on the varying ecologies of different countries. As it is, some countries will benefit from climate change and their interests cannot be said to be comparable with those who will suffer. A stateless world is a de facto neoliberal world in practice and the author’s fear of political homogenization is not caused by realism or geopolitics but rather prevented by those same actors. Diversity can only thrive in the absence of grand universal projects. So our approaches are very clearly different as I see realist geopolitics as the guarantor of ideological, economic, and ecological diversity, not its foe. But Grove is an excellent writer so I enjoyed his take on it anyway.

#### Grove’s move is totalizing, preemptive, and cedes the present to fascists

Benjamin Tallis 20, Researcher at Institute of International Relations Prague, “Un-cancelling the future,” New Perspectives 1–18, 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2336825X20937580

Timeless pessimism, hopeless critique Hope is a Form of Extortion. (Jairus Grove, Savage Ecology, 2019: 25) Both Rutger Bregman (2014) and Franco Berardi (2011) have written extensively on this pessimism. In different ways and with different aims, they argue that despite the huge and real (although highly uneven and inequitable) progress that we (in this case, many of us who live in the West) have made in helping more people live longer, healthier, happier lives, we no longer believe we can improve further. We have become collectively disappointed by the failures of political and technological vision; shocked by the downsides of modernity, stunned by the scale and complexity of our challenges – and by the pace of change. As Jonathan Meades (2014) observed, change itself has changed: for many in the West, it used to mean change for the better2 but for too many people that is no longer the case. This fear of change itself has exacerbated the problem, leading to a stasis of ideas, a lack of daring, deficit of vision and vacuum of purpose. Even faced with the existential crisis of climate change, our responses have been piecemeal and incremental. Too often even the bolder proposals have been mealy mouthed or, worse, have framed human life itself as the problem (e.g. Sparrow, 2019; Wilkinson, 2020). A pious puritan streak in the environmental movement seems to relish in the idea of a future of less, a restricted and spartan life, purged of joy. It has not been widely embraced. Both Bregman and Berardi note that majorities or significant minorities of people in richer countries have long believed their children will be worse off than they are (see, e.g. Pew, 2019) – but they don’t wish to actively spur this process along. There has been no credible positive vision of radical change to countervail this negativity and so we drift, seemingly helpless as well as hopeless in the interregnum of ideas. As Bregman puts it: the real crisis of our times, of my generation, is not that we don’t have it good, or even that we might be worse off later on. No, the real crisis is that we can’t come up with anything better. (Bregman, 2014: 22) He goes on to note that we have become so wary of positive visions of progress that: today we stamp out dreams of a better world before they can take root. Dreams have a way of turning into nightmares, goes the cliche´. Utopias are a breeding ground for discord, violence, even genocide. Utopias ultimately become dystopias; in fact, a utopia is a dystopia. (Bregman, 2014: 23) Examples of this way of thinking are plentiful but, for convenience, one need to look no further than Jairus Grove’s scintillatingly pessimistic keynote at the Hamburg Sessions (forthcoming as an essay in NP and based on his 2019 book, Savage Ecology).3 It is not that Grove doesn’t make compelling critical arguments – he does and in brilliant, imaginative ways – but that they lack balance. And balance matters, whether we are reckoning with horrendous pasts or trying to boldly imaging new futures. To see, or certainly to dwell on, only the bad in what we in the West have collectively done (however, Grove or anyone else defines who we are), over the entire course of our past and present is grossly unfair. It also amounts, in effect, to a counsel of despair, however much Grove protests to the contrary or claims to eschew nihilism. In his keynote, having written off our past and present, Grove also explicitly urged us in Europe and the West to stop imagining better, progressive futures, arguing that this has led to precisely the problems he identified. Grove’s critique thus not only leaves us out of time (without an avowable past, present or future) but also leaves us without space for contesting negative, regressive and repressive political trends. In his book, he laments the ‘debilitating stupor’ in which the work of thinkers like Theodor Adorno and Giorgio Agamben leaves us (Grove, 2019: 238). But Grove’s own pessimism, if we took it seriously, would leave Europeans without a political leg to stand on. It would leave us in just such a stupor – or worse – with no solid ground and no lever: no way to move the world and no platform for positive, progressive change. Why bother, if everything we do only makes things worse? However much harm we Europeans and Westerners have done, we haven’t done, don’t and won’t only do harm. The real danger of Grove’s type of timelessly pessimistic and literally hopeless critique is that (again, if taken seriously) it breeds only damaging inertia, inaction and resentment – its hopelessness makes it a debilitating critique; its timelessness offers no possibility of salvage, let alone progress. It cedes the ground of action to those who many of us (including Grove) would explicitly disagree with – whether to exponents of ‘traditional’ approaches to IR who are more than happy to offer policy advice or, worse, to authoritarians and populists in practical politics (as ably described in Johanna Sumuvuori’s essay in this issue). Critical scholars too rarely see it as their task to construct positive visions of better worlds. Instead, too often they content themselves (if no one else) with evermore thoroughgoing deconstructive critique – including of other critical academics. Whether totalising or parasitic, even some of its leading proponents admit that IR’s critical project has, thus far, had insufficient impact on the world at large (Austin, 2017, 2019). Few critical scholars will thank me for this comparison, but, in their pessimistic, misanthropic zeal, they echo what French President Emmanuel Macron called the ‘sad passions’ of the author Michel Houellebecq4 (Carre`re, 2017). They may not share Houellebecq’s politics, but many critical scholars certainly share his exhaustive (and exhausting) disenchantment with contemporary (neo)liberal societies, the state of Europe and of the West. Too often they also share his miserabilist outlook on the impossibility of change for the better and the futility or harm of even trying to improve things. Grove does propose several forms of political action: micro-kindnesses, however vague (e.g. ‘the impossible generosity and affirmation of deconstruction’, 2019: 231); resistant acts by brave individuals (e.g. ‘William ‘‘Fox’’ Fallon, who sacrificed his prestigious position as head of [US Military] Central Command because he would not go along with the plan to attack Iran’, 2019: 232); embracing entirely new ‘forms of life5 ’; or welcoming apocalypse as driver of change (2019: 229–248). Grove will not be confused with Goldilocks anytime soon – these forms of action each seem either too little or (much) too much. Few of us would question the value of and need for kindness and, indeed, the most hopeful part of Grove’s book is the touching introduction where he details many of the kindnesses he has himself benefitted from, mainly from people in the West where he has spent most of his life. There is also, clearly, a role for resistance and for the kinds of acts that Grove notes have prevented executions and even nuclear war. Yet without a wider programme, without a bigger positive vision, kindness and resistance cannot sufficiently change our world for the better. Apocalypse, on the contrary, changes too much, junks too much that is good and is rarely likely to be an appealing option, or something we can all get behind. The apocalyptic aspect of Grove’s position, like that of many critical scholars, seeks to inflict destructive harm on Western institutions rather than constructively reform them – something Houellebecq would also relish. Apocalyptic change also smacks of the recklessly callous, negative sides of early 20th-century futurism (Marinetti, 1909), as Grove acknowledges when asking ‘How do we go wild without the cruelty of indifference?’ (2019: 280). Again, a more balanced approach to boldness would help. To be clear, major change is needed – that was the whole point of the Hamburg Sessions and the motivation behind giving it the theme of ‘Un-Cancelling the Future’. I’ve argued elsewhere that the kind of socio-economically regressive, technocratic, defensive liberalisms that have dominated large parts of the last 40 years in the West have a lot to answer for (Tallis, 2018). So too, of course, does the type of narrowly, teleological individually atomising (neo)liberalism that neither saw (Fukuyama, 1992) nor allowed (Fisher, 2009) alternative visions of politics, societies and economies. Mark Fisher (2009), echoing the artist Gerhard Richter (Elger, 2009), called this myopic liberalism ‘Capitalist Realism’. You don’t have to be a Marxist or even a leftist to see that a mandated lack of alternatives and a commensurate narrowing of possibilities and horizons is a bad thing. As noted above, both climate change and sociotechnical upheavals in the ways we work and live need bold visions to address the challenges they pose while also seizing the opportunities they present. It is, however, eminently possible to recognise the full horrors of Europe’s (colonial) pasts and presents without immediately discounting the possibility of improvement coming from the West, from Europe. Similarly, one can recognise the myriad problems that Europeans have caused while also celebrating the many positive things they have also achieved. Moreover, it is possible to use those achievements as inspirations for better ways of doing things – as catalysts to new, progressive creativity and to positive visions of the future. Just as Kraftwerk did in the fragile yet fertile Germany of the second half of the 20th century when they acknowledged the abyss yet still sought a better future, including as atonement for that past. The cancellation of the future William Gibson recently tweeted ‘‘In the 1920s, the phrase ‘the 21st Century’ was already popubiquitous. How often do we see the phrase ‘‘the 22nd Century’’, now?’’. And it’s true – we don’t have these dates anymore. As a boy, as a young man, I had mental pictures of the 21st Century. But I don’t have any sense of 2050 or 2100 – except as a deterioration or a collapse. (Simon Reynolds, Hamburg Sessions 2019, see essay in this issue) I return to Kraftwerk below but first, a little more is needed on the ramifications of contemporary hopelessness. Rather than striving to create new and compelling positive, progressive visions, many thinkers content themselves with critique (Austin, 2017) while others, like Grove, see positive, progressive visions and futures – especially those coming from Europe or the wider West – as being necessarily harmful in themselves. This is postmodernism as hangover. The depressed – and depressing – aftermath of the shortcomings, broken promises and unintended consequences of modernisms of different kinds, in which strange connections are made and selective, guilty memory runs amok (Fisher, 2014). Forgetting the good, it fuses the bewitchingly pertinent aspects of the post-positivist critical project (which influenced many of us, myself very much included), with more zealously (self-)destructive and paralysing tendencies. As Fisher puts it: ‘Deconstruction [is] a kind of pathology of scepticism, which induced hedging, infirmity of purpose and compulsory doubt’ (2014: 16). In this mode, scholarship no longer seeks to invent the train but fixates on the train crash or even pre-empts and precludes the train’s invention for fear of the seemingly inescapable imagined train crash to come. Like Grove’s denunciation of the future, many of the critiques of (popular) modernisms are not so much wrong as imbalanced (although some are wrong of course, others not even). They take insufficient account of modernisms’ multiple and meaningful successes (there’s no time here, but see, e.g. Fisher, 2014: 22; or Meades, 2014, for a flavour). This leaves us in an odd situation where many of the scholars, commentators and others who criticise neoliberalism, capitalist realism and so on, find themselves in de facto agreement with its notion that there should be no alternative. In this view, we simply shouldn’t do big vision politics because our ‘schemes to improve the human condition’ have not only ‘failed’ but will always, inevitably, do more harm than good (Scott, 2008). This approach, all post and no modern, will take us nowhere, even as it fast-forwards the academic careers of its exponents. The future visions that are left, on the left, tend to be Marxist ones (see, e.g. Grove, 2019: 198– 202). Tarred not only by the brush of the communisms that actually existed (and their distinctly less balanced ledger than that of modernism more widely) they understandably fail to inspire mass enthusiasm. Many of their proponents are still really more interested in explaining the failure to bring about the inevitable (full communism) in the past and present than in imagining new futures that go beyond the narrow world view and limiting subjectivity of too many Marxist approaches (see, e.g. Scribner, 2003; Sˇitera, 2015). This has done little to address the crisis of hope or to countervail prevalent contemporary pessimism. The loss of the belief in the progressive future – that tomorrow can be better than yesterday and today – and the related erosion of faith in our ability to positively shape our own destiny are what Berardi (2011: 13) called ‘the slow cancellation of the future’. As Simon Reynolds noted in his Hamburg Sessions keynote (included in this issue of NP), the cancellation may have started slowly in the 1970s, but, by the 2000s, it had picked up speed and its effects could start to be seen. The first of these – its more (neo)liberal variant – was the feeling of living in an endless present. For a lot of people in the West, this has been comfortable in many ways (although often unevenly and unfairly) and has had distinct advantages over the past (the extension of rights and opportunities to broader swathes of the population) but without much hope, optimism or greater purpose. Unless it provokes the nostalgic responses outlined below, this endless present can lead to a sense of ennui, a lack of direction and loss of momentum. The second, more overtly sinister, variant that fills the vacuum left by the dearth of positive, progressive visions for the future takes the form of darker re-enchantments focused on the (imagined) past (e.g. Campanella and Dassu`, 2019). Whether ‘making America great again’, ‘taking back control’ in the United Kingdom or claiming to offer an ‘alternative for Germany’, these movements are fundamentally premised on a backward-looking politics of nostalgia. The pessimism about the present and worries about the future on which these movements have each capitalised have given rise to an increasingly defensive politics of closing down and protecting, at the expense of opening up and integrating. Nativism and pessimism tend to go hand in hand: shrinking pies bring narrowed horizons and hasten the circling of wagons around exclusive and chauvinistic visions of national communities. Too often, this retro-rightism has been met only with retro-leftism or a tired centrism that merely seeks more of the same, to smooth the endless present. But that can change ...

### 2AC – Nation State

#### Analysis through nation-states and security is good.

Robin Luckham 17, an Emeritus fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, where he has been based since 1974. Following the publication of his book The Nigerian Military in 1971, he has researched and published extensively on civil-military relations, militarism, political violence, democratisation, security and development, security sector governance, security ‘from below’ and peacebuilding. Whose violence, whose security? Can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable people? 2017.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277009

6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested political authority. Often it is enacted through violent power, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But although security is a deeply disputed idea, it is also a highly necessary one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a frame for policy and as a moral narrative. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as essential to the preservation of peace. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to citizen and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the one hand, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily transforming the conditions giving rise to this violence or attending to the quality of the subsequent peace. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects socially embedded power, established property relations and social privilege – and reinforces global, national and local inequalities. On the other hand, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to social peace and protection from violence, abuses of rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. It connects to the idea of ‘positive peace’, including transformations in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the relationships between states and their citizens. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to respond to insecurity and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘Security in the vernacular’ paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by those who challenge the deeply rooted legacies of insecurity, exclusion and injustice. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law, and effective and accountable security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for constant vigilance to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

### 2AC – Heg Bad

#### Pursuit’s inevitable

Mearsheimer 11 John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

The downward spiral the United States has taken was anything but inevitable. Washington has always had a choice in how to approach grand strategy. One popular option among some libertarians is isolationism. This approach is based on the assumption that there is no region outside the Western Hemisphere that is strategically important enough to justify expending American blood and treasure. Isolationists believe that the United States is remarkably secure because it is separated from all of the world’s great powers by two giant moats—the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans— and on top of that it has had nuclear weapons—the ultimate deterrent—since 1945. But in truth, **there is really no chance that Washington will adopt this policy**, though the United States had strong isolationist tendencies until World War II. For since then, an internationalist activism, fostered by the likes of the Rockefeller Foundation, has thoroughly delegitimized this approach. American policy makers have come to believe the country should be militarily involved on the world stage. Yet though no mainstream politician would dare advocate isolationism at this point, the rationale for this grand strategy shows just how safe the United States is. This means, among other things, that it will always be a challenge to motivate the U.S. public to want to run the world and especially to fight wars of choice in distant places. Offshore balancing, which was America’s traditional grand strategy for most of its history, is but another option. Predicated on the belief that there are three regions of the world that are strategically important to the United States—Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf—it sees the United States’ principle goal as making sure no country dominates any of these areas as it dominates the Western Hemisphere. This is to ensure that dangerous rivals in other regions are forced to concentrate their attention on great powers in their own backyards rather than be free to interfere in America’s. The best way to achieve that end is to rely on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemons and otherwise keep U.S. military forces over the horizon. But if that proves impossible, American troops come from offshore to help do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked. Selective engagement also assumes that Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf are the only areas of the world where the United States should be willing to deploy its military might. It is a more ambitious strategy than offshore balancing in that it calls for permanently stationing U.S. troops in those regions to help maintain peace. For selective engagers, it is not enough just to thwart aspiring hegemons. It is also necessary to prevent war in those key regions, either because upheaval will damage our economy or because we will eventually get dragged into the fight in any case. An American presence is also said to be valuable for limiting nuclear proliferation. But none of these strategies call for Washington to spread democracy around the globe—especially through war. The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. From the Clinton administration on, the United States rejected all these other avenues, instead pursuing global dominance, or what might alternatively be called global hegemony, which was not just doomed to fail, but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy, which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system; and spreading democracy across the globe, in effect, making the world over in America’s image. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American, so the more the better. Of course, this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. With global dominance, no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.S. interests, because they are virtually limitless. This grand strategy is “imperial” at its core; its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states, but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen, instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests.

#### transition causes more entanglement and lashout

Michael Beckley 15, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf>

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension. For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

#### Even if they win an epistemology DA—explaining the absence of war among great powers means making *relative* not *absolutist claims*—winning heg bad requires them to *defend an alternative*

William Wohlforth 12, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Nuno Monteiro. “’Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful.’ Reviewed by William Wohlforth” October 31st, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR17.pdf

Third, setting up the article as a claim that unipolarity is not peaceful runs into a problem: Unipolarity is peaceful. The Most Peaceful. Ever. Period. No one expects any imaginable anarchic inter-state system to be perfectly peaceful, with no war at all. In my 1999 paper, I stressed that “unipolarity does not imply the end of all conflict... It simply means the absence of two big problems” — hegemonic rivalry and counter-hegemonic balancing—that were present in all earlier systems. As a result “unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers.” Like any statement about the war-proneness of any international system, this is a relative claim. International relations scholarship does not have theories that make anything other than relative predictions about the war-proneness of systems. Monteiro tries but fails to escape this reality. He writes: “Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature (12). The latter portion of this sentence is exactly right, but the former bit is contradicted just a few pages later when Monteiro presents evidence that “Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all systems .. .“ (18). While conflict researchers debate the causes, they are nearly united in agreeing that the post-1990 international system is the least afflicted by war.5 There are many ways to measure war

: the overall number that occur, the number of people killed, the probability that any state will be at war in any year, the size or cost of military forces compared to economic output or population, or, perhaps best, the probability that any individual will die as a result of organized inter-group violence. By all those measures, we are living in the most peaceful period since the modern inter-state system took shape in the seventeenth century. Indeed, Stephen Pinker assembles masses of evidence to suggest that there has never been a less violent time in all of human history.6 It is hard to think of any way to measure war that does not show the unipolar period as remarkably peaceful— except for the ones Monteiro uses: “the percentage of years that great powers spend at war, and the incidence of war involving great powers,” (18) with the United States defined as the only great power after 1990. That is a very convoluted way to say ‘Iraq and Afghanistan.’ The fact that the United States ended up in two grinding counter-insurgency operations in no way contradicts the claim that unipolarity is unprecedentedly peaceful. But that reaction concerns the framing rather than the substance of the article. One can dismiss as America-centric the claim that unipolarity is war-prone and still regard Monteiro’s carefully crafted arguments as promising advances. Further investment in refining and evaluating these arguments is warranted, for even if we agree that unipolarity has been pretty darned peaceful, it surely doesn’t seem that way to anyone in or around the U.S. military. Along with most security scholars, I’ve regarded the post-1991 military interventions as permitted but not dictated by unipolarity. That at least leaves open the possibility of strategic learning, as happened back in biplolarity. Even though the bipolar structure and U.S. grand strategy remained constant, bloody conflicts in Korea and Vietnam prompted Washington to get out of the direct military intervention business in favor of proxy wars and less costly covert operations. Similarly, the new “Iraq syndrome” might tame interventionist impulses even as unipolarity endures. But Monteiro’s message is gloomier. “The significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades,” he warns, “will continue as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.” (38). That’s a scary message even if that “significant level” is far lower than in any other known interstate system. So while I hope Monteiro is wrong, there is no doubt that his article has decisively altered the terms of the debate on this crucial issue.

### 2AC – China Threat Con

#### Empirically disproven.

Tenzin Dorjee 21. Senior researcher at Tibet Action Institute and a PhD candidate in the political science department at Columbia University. "Opinion: Anti-China is not anti-Asian". Washington Post. 4-6-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/06/anti-china-is-not-anti-asian/

However, some commentators are arguing that the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s criticism of the Chinese government is to blame for the domestic problem of anti-Asian violence. This specious claim, which China’s state-run media quickly exploited, has been most prominently advanced in the mainstream Western media by distinguished novelist Viet Thanh Nguyen and political scientist Janelle Wong, who claim that “bipartisan political rhetoric about Asia” and successive administrations’ “critical takes” on China fuel anti-Asian violence. This narrative, which weaponizes Asian American vulnerability to shield Beijing from international criticism, is as dangerous as it is fraudulent.

First of all, let’s be clear that there is no bipartisan political rhetoric targeting Asia, a continent of nearly 50 nations. Conflating Asia with China is the geopolitical equivalent of assuming all Asians are Chinese, precisely the kind of racial lumping that the writers themselves sensibly caution against.

To be sure, criticism of the Chinese government by policymakers in Washington has escalated in recent years. But the overwhelming volume of the rhetoric targeting Beijing has been prompted not by abstract geopolitical competition but by tangible grievances, including China’s genocide in Xinjiang, intensifying repression in Tibet, dismantling of democracy in Hong Kong and sweeping crackdown on Chinese civil society. Some of Beijing’s harshest critics are Asian Americans. Uyghur refugees, Hong Kong democrats, Chinese dissidents and Tibetan exiles such as myself, whose communities back home reel under Beijing’s boot, are urging Congress to censure China for its crimes. Asking lawmakers of conscience to hold their tongue on Beijing’s genocide to supposedly prevent racial violence here is to set up a false trade-off between Asian American safety and Uyghur lives, both of which should be treated as nonnegotiable.

Moreover, there is no research-based evidence that American lawmakers’ legitimate criticism of Beijing has a causal effect on violence against Asians. In fact, Washington’s political rhetoric has been rising steadily over the past half decade, during which Beijing built the Uyghur internment camps, demolished Hong Kong’s democracy and chipped away at the liberal international order. Anti-Asian attacks remained rare during this whole period, soaring only when the pandemic hit. If China had contained covid-19 within its borders, or if the United States had succeeded in keeping it out, no amount of congressional criticism against Beijing would have made us afraid to ride the subway at night.

market reforms, the Chinese people experienced the fastest increase so far in their standard of living.

#### Competition rhetoric doesn’t cause their impacts.

David **Shim 14**. Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen, Netherlands. 2014. “Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is Believing.” Routledge, pg. 25-26.

However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect' would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also, Dauber 2001; Eisensee/Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998. 2005; Robinson 1999, 2001). There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: l), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke ct ah 2002; Perlmutter 2005). Yet, it should also be noted that visuals function as unquestioned referents in international politics when underlining the necessity of such specific policy practices as sanctions, deterrents and/or military cooperation. A good example of this is satellite imagery, which plays a pivotal role in the surveillance and assessment of missile or nuclear proliferation activities by so-called 'rogue states' like Iran and North Korea. Regarded as providing compelling evidence about the stage of development of nuclear facilities or about the collaboration between suspect states, satellite images point to a nexus between visuality, knowledge and international politics wherein this way of seeing consequently enables governments to make legitimate statements, draw conclusions and take informed political action. In sum, the visual provides the foundation for knowledge generation and. in doing so, bestows political responses with legitimacy (cf. Moller 2007). A now famous case-in-point is Colin Powell's PowerPoint presentation at the United Nations Security Council in February 2003. In the briefing, the then US Secretary of State showed satellite images that allegedly proved the existence of Iraqi 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. What was remarkable about Powell's presentation was that the visual emerged as the primary referent for the US government's casus belli, which, in the words of MacDonald ef ai (2010: 7-8), disclosed the fact that the 'logic of geopolitical reason is now inseparable from its visual representation' (see also, Campbell 2007c; Der Derian 2001). The causal theory of the 'CNN effect', or what Perlmutter (1998: 1) has called above 'visual determinism', misconceives of how the visual recasts the political realm itself (Hansen 2011). Rather than asking whether an image caused an intervention, it should be asked instead how the visual has been involved in structuring the understandings of legitimate action, and how visual representations of different policy options affect particular security practices (Williams 2003: 527). For instance, many scholars have shown that images can provoke particularly emotive responses (Bleiker/Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Hariman/Lucaites 2007; Mercer 2006; Ross 2006). Just one example of the (deliberate) evocation of an emotional reaction is the numerous fundraising campaigns that have been run by different humanitarian aid organizations over the years, in which imagery plays an essential role (Bell/Carens 2004; Dogra 2007; Manzo 2008).

#### No mutual exclusivity---the perm solves because we can criticize the Chinese government AND combat racism.

Josh Rogin 21. Columnist covering foreign policy and national security. George Washington University, BA in International Affairs 2001; Sophia University, Tokyo "Opinion: The United States must confront the Chinese Communist Party and racism at the same time". Washington Post. 3-25-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-united-states-must-confront-the-chinese-communist-party-and-racism-at-the-same-time/2021/03/25/63fe8308-8d9c-11eb-9423-04079921c915\_story.html

The United States must compete with China and confront the Chinese government on a range of issues while simultaneously combating the rise of anti-Asian racism at home. These two missions are not at odds with each other, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would have you believe. In fact, they must go hand in hand. In Alaska last weekend, Chinese government leaders sought to stoke our country’s racial divisions, accusing the United States of having “slaughtered” African Americans, to deflect criticism over Beijing’s mass atrocities against its Uyghur Muslim population. Meanwhile, CCP propaganda outlets have been using the killing last week in the Atlanta area of eight innocent people (six of them Asian) to cast aspersions on those who are condemning the Chinese government’s atrocities. Beijing’s goal is to conflate and confuse two related but distinct issues: challenging the Chinese government and the need to fight racism in the United States. But their gambit amounts to presenting a false choice between doing one or the other. “It is part of a broader strategy that the Chinese Communist Party is enacting to undermine our democracy,” Rep. Stephanie Murphy (D-Fla.) told me in an interview. “So when you see them creating that false equivalency . . . it is their way to sow discord in our society, because they understand when we are not united, we are weaker in leading the world in confronting their bad behavior.” Murphy, a former Pentagon official who came to the United States as a child refugee from Vietnam, said that the use of racist language by former president Donald Trump and other GOP officials plays into the CCP’s hands. Yet at the same she emphasized that U.S. leaders have to be able to speak honestly and critically about the CCP’s negative behaviors, including its mishandling of the covid-19 pandemic. The rise of racism against Asian Americans not only hurts the United States’ ability to deal with China, but also it harms efforts to make common cause with our regional allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Those governments’ ability to join the United States in confronting China is hurt when members of their diaspora communities are mistreated in the United States. “We have to be able to make a very clear distinction that our adversary and competitor is the Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese people, and certainly not the Asian Americans who live here and who have contributed so much to this country,” Murphy said. “When we attack Americans of Asian descent, we attack ourselves.” Some American commentators argue that the effort to confront the Chinese government’s behavior has fueled the staggering rise in hate and violence directed at Asians and Asian Americans in the United States. It’s certainly true that Trump’s racist rhetoric regarding the coronavirus fueled hate and conflated the two issues, tragically. And U.S. government efforts to confront CCP influence operations in our country have at times unfairly targeted people of Chinese origins. Such targeting of Asians and Asian Americans makes us weaker at home and abroad. We must learn from, not repeat, examples from history when U.S. foreign policy negatively affected American minorities, including the mass internment of U.S. citizens and noncitizens of Japanese descent during World War II and the mistreatment of Arab and Muslim Americans after 9/11. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), the son of Indian immigrants, told me that the United States has to out-compete China without replicating the paradigms of the Cold War. But, he said, we must also stand up to the authoritarian and repressive model the Chinese government is putting forward without ceding our moral authority. “That has to be the balance, enhance America’s strategic interest but clearly reject provocative rhetoric that’s intended to play to a base,” he said. “There’s a way to frame our moral position as a liberal democracy . . . without coming off as demonizing an entire civilization in a way that hurts Chinese or Chinese Americans.” Khanna and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) have co-sponsored a bill, the Endless Frontier Act, to revamp the National Science Foundation to try to out-compete China through technological innovation. Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Sen. Todd C. Young (R-Ind.) are cooperating on companion legislation in the Senate. These efforts will be a major test of whether bipartisan cooperation on the China challenge is possible. It’s not the drive to confront China that is fueling hate and racism against Asians in America. Political opportunists are abusing that effort by fueling bigotry to score political points. This makes a unified strategy to confront the Chinese government only more difficult to achieve. In fact, addressing racism at home is crucial to winning the competition with China in the long run. “We have to be aggressive in our policies and working with our allies to combat the violations the Chinese are making, but at the same time, we can hold the CCP accountable without scapegoating Asian Americans,” Murphy said. “And we have a responsibility to do that.”

#### Aff outweighs the link OR it’s non unique

Brands 22 (interviewed by Noah Smith) – an American scholar of U.S. foreign policy. He is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. (Hal, "Interview: Hal Brands, international relations professor and author," Noahpinion, 1-25-2022, https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/interview-hal-brands-international, Accessed 1-27-2022, LASA-SC)

N.S.: One question I have is, will there be buy-in from the American public for a Cold War style confrontation? Americans remember quite vividly how the Bush administration lied about WMDs in Iraq and pushed us into a pointless and horribly destructive war. On the other hand, negative opinions of China are running quite high, and a recent poll showed that for the first time, a majority of Americans support using military force to defend Taiwan. So where do you see public opinion going on this issue? Also, a follow-up question here. Some people are worried that a Cold War style confrontation with China will result in a racist backlash against Asian people in the U.S. That seems plausible given the recent wave of anti-Asian attacks, which seems to have been exacerbated by Trump's "China virus" language in 2020. And of course the memory of how the U.S. treated Japanese Americans during World War 2 looms large. What can we do at the policy level to ensure that there's no such backlash? H.B.: Let's side aside Iraq for a moment: I think the idea that Bush lied is an overstatement, but that's a separate debate (and the war was indeed destructive and counterproductive). There are certainly the makings of a bipartisan consensus on China in the United States. COVID turned Americans against China to a degree that Beijing building bases in the South China Sea never did: It showed how the CCP's cynicism and irresponsibility could cause concrete harm to Americans and their livelihoods. There is bipartisan support in Congress for measures to strengthen America's competitive posture. And, while we shouldn’t make too much of "would you want to defend X" sort of questions, Americans are clearly more concerned about the fate of Taiwan than they were before. For now, the consensus is still broader than it is deep--politicians want to compete with China, but not if it means doing something that would cause even a minor correction in the stock market--but I think this may change over time. As for the racism issue, this is something that good leadership can help with. We didn't have a massive anti-Muslim backlash after 9/11, in part because Bush, whatever his other failings, modeled good behavior in that regard. And while the Cold War left some ugly political legacies--red-baiting and the like--it also led the United States to invest in domestic reform and rejuvenation. The breaking down of segregation, the creation of the world's best university system, the building of our interstate highway system, and other constructive measures were all rooted, at least partly, in the imperative of making America more attractive and competitive in the Cold War. So hopefully our leaders will treat competition with China not as a reason to bring out our worst impulses, but as an opportunity for America to become a better version of itself.

### 2AC – China War Securitization

#### No self-fulfilling prophesy---securitizing the danger of US-China war creates the caution and risk-aversion necessary to avoid it.

Wang 20, Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. (Yuan-kang, 11/9/20, "Roundtable 12-2 on *Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations*", *H-Diplo | ISSF*, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)

Throwing the Baby Out with the Bathwater? Chan warns that the discourse on Thucydides’s Trap and power transition can create a self-fulfilling prophecy. If leaders believe in Thucydides’s Trap and act accordingly, it may create the anticipated conditions that make war more likely. Talking and thinking in terms of Thucydides’s Trap will influence the state’s construction of its identity as well as its definition of interests and preferences. The discourse is harmful because it encourages ‘othering’ the opponent and contributes to confrontation. Should we, then, throw out the proposition that war is more likely when the system is undergoing a power transition? It might be worthwhile to go back to what Thucydides’s Trap refers to: “the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to upend a ruling one. In such conditions, not just extraordinary, unexpected events, but even ordinary flashpoints of foreign affairs, can trigger large-scale conflict.”[112] Instead of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, this statement should induce caution from leaders in Beijing and Washington. Understanding the danger of war is the first step to avoid being trapped in it. Like Chan, Allison seeks to offer “a set of principles and strategic options for those seeking to escape Thucydides’s Trap and avoid World War III.”[113] Obviously, historical analogies cannot completely capture an ongoing event. Allison himself cautions against “facile analogizing” and emphasizes that “the differences matter at least as much as the similarities.”[114] The purpose of analogizing Thucydides’s Trap is not to shoehorn China and the United States into the roles of Athens and Sparta respectively, as Chan suggests (17-18), but to underscore the enduring feature of international politics throughout the ages. The dynamics of conflict highlighted by Thucydides remain as relevant today as it was two thousand years ago. Many scholars accuse structural theory of determinism, as Chan does, (14, 34), even though structuralists do not adopt it. States can go to war for a variety of reasons. Attempting to isolate a single cause for all wars is impossible. The proposition that war tends to break out during a power transition is better understood as a probabilistic—not deterministic—statement. The structural tensions cause by power shifts can substantially increase the probabilities of war, much like dry leaves waiting for a spark, but it does not mean that war will inevitably break out. Properly understood, Thucydides’s Trap cautions us to be prepared for the danger of war during a power transition. Overall, Chan’s book provides a stronger critique of power transition theory than of Thucydides’s Trap. Students of power shifts should take his argument seriously and avoid the pitfalls he identifies. We should not, however, hastily dismiss the warnings of Thucydides’s Trap.

#### Attempting IR predictions about China is both possible and desirable---even if inaccurate---because giving up on bounding assessment of threats results in security dilemmas

Joseph K. **Clifton 11**, Claremont McKenna College, “Disputed Theory and Security Policy: Responding to the "Rise of China”,” 4-25-2011, http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1164&context=cmc\_theses

First, motives can be known. Mearsheimer is correct in observing that assessing motives can be difficult, but this does not mean that the task is impossible. There clearly are ways of finding out information about the goals of states and the means with which they plan to achieve them. One of the most important roles of intelligence analysts, for example, is to determine state interests and expected behavior based on obtained information. The possibility that information may be flawed should not lead to a rejection of all information. People make decisions based on less than perfect knowledge all of the time. This ability to know motives extends to future motives, because an analyst can use information such as historical trends to observe consistencies or constant evolutions of motives. Prediction of the future is necessarily less certain in its accuracy, but the prediction can still be made.104 Second, even if there is still some uncertainty of motives, the rational response is not to assume absolute aggression. Assuming aggressive motive in a situation of uncertainty ignites the security dilemma, which could actually decrease a state’s security. Mearsheimer calls this tragic, but it is not necessary. An illustrative example is Mearsheimer’s analysis of the German security situation were the United States to withdraw its military protection. Mearsheimer argues that it would be rational for Germany to develop nuclear weapons, since these weapons would provide a deterrent, and it would also be rational for nuclear European powers to wage a preemptive war against Germany to prevent it from developing a nuclear deterrent. 105 This scenario is not rational for either side because it ignores motives. If Germany knows that other states will attack if it were to develop nuclear weapons, then it would not be rational for it to develop nuclear weapons. And if other states know that Germany’s development of nuclear weapons is only as a deterrent, then it would not be rational to prevent German nuclear development. The point is that the security dilemma exists because of a lack of motivational knowledge, so the proper response is to try to enhance understanding of motives, not discard motivational knowledge altogether. Misperception is certainly a problem in international politics, but reducing misperception would allow states to better conform to defensive realist logic, which results in preferable outcomes relative to offensive realism. 106 Assessing motives is vital in the case of the rise of China, because mutually preferable outcomes can be achieved if China is not an aggressive power, as offensive realism would have to assume, but is actually a status quo power with aims that have limited effect on the security of the U.S. and other potentially affected countries. I do not mean here to claim with certainty that China is and will always be a status quo power, and policymakers likely have access to more intentional information than what is publicly known. At the very least, valuing motivational assessments empowers policymakers to act on this knowledge, which is preferable because of the possibility of reducing competition and conflict.

### 2AC – Realism/Perm

#### Perm do both – IR is reflexive, constantly changing and can be re-appropriated

Abraham, 17—Johns Hopkins University (Kavi Joseph, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” International Political Sociology (2017) 11, 221–238, dml)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to deem realism, in all its complex and contradictory manifestations, as a failed, unethical, and fundamentally racist/imperial project. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an epistemic register, selectively taking insights from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing does not delegitimize other realist insights. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better. The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither dismiss constituencies that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to tactically align with them; rather, establishing resonant connections among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, highlighting shared dispositions to difference, is to push the latter toward repositioning itself on new ethical lines that limit contemporary forms of violence. To recover a minor position in realism is not to accept all realist positions, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to amplify the shared spirituality that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward prudential rather than imperial defenses of difference. It is to furnish current research agendas with an anti-imperial focus, to seek the creative possibilities that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements. Thinking from the Present By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a counter-imperial machine, to cultivate a shared spirituality that can gather diverse and divergent constituencies to confront dangerous practices. In my estimation, countering an imperial machine that operates in complex ways and at complex sites requires a political strategy as unwieldy and diffuse, linking constituencies that we may otherwise dismiss. That a tradition of realism regularly circulates through halls of power across the globe should be reason not to reject righteously but rather to leverage its authorized status. We can talk about imperialism, knowledge production, and race here, while they can talk about anarchy, power, and self-interest there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that reverberate among us. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” this argument involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward new research agendas and new forms of critique that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention. Needless to say, drawing together realist and postcolonial thought, as this essay has done, can be met with analytical skepticism and political hostility. A mode of argumentation that refuses comparisons of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of analytical evasion. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, the argument anticipates strong political reservations: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an unethical tradition of militarism and realpolitik? To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, reducing “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only obscures the complexity of their thinking (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) but reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity that some realists use to authorize unethical policy programs in the first place. More critically, however, in embodying an unproductive ahistoricism, it poses conventional realist categories of anarchy, selfinterest, and military power as the political problem to confront whereas the present historical context demands attunement to how some of these drives (militarism, national interest) connect with discrete problems of liberalism and imperial practices. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that countering imperial formations may benefit from resonances established not just among postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but contemporary realists who identify links between liberalism and imperialism (Walt 2013). Indeed, if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is entangled with current militaristic and imperial interventions, we should push the premise of this statement, that difference should be defended, in anti-imperial and prudential directions. Doing so may allow new openings to emerge in the present sense of closure, new strategies to think and defend alternative politics. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.

#### Balance-of-power concerns structure state behavior, even if they can’t explain everything states do.

Blagden, 18—Senior Lecturer in International Security at the Strategy and Security Institute, Department of Politics, University of Exeter (David, “Realism, Uncertainty, and the Security Dilemma: Identity and the Tantalizing Promise of Transformed International Relations,” *Constructivism Reconsidered: Past, Present, and Future*, Chapter 12, pg 205-216, dml)

The previous section documented how social variables might be taken as having the potential to transform international politics. This section now turns to an explanation of why it is so hard to fulfill such seeming transformational promise. Running throughout is the argument that while playing a particular social role or expressing a particular cultural identity are certainly state interests, they are necessarily subordinate to political survival (as a sovereign entity with control over its own foreign policy), “physiological” security (the safety from death and harm of the state’s population), and economic prosperity (a baseline level of which is necessary to ensure physiological security). Put simply, if a state and its population do not exist, it cannot achieve anything else—such as fulfilling a social role or expressing a cultural identity—either.36 And since survival, security, and prosperity all have a material base—as Wendt recognizes via his “rump materialism” (he simply does not think the material base yields determinate outcomes)—so too must states necessarily put the defense of such interests ahead of social role fulfillment if they want to be in a position to play any sort of role in future.37 That is not to suggest that states do not sometimes—or, indeed, often—make ideationally driven foreign policy choices that are detrimental to their other interests. It is simply a description of states’ incentive structure, which much of the time they end up following. It is necessary at this point to defend the notion that there is, in fact, a material base independent of the social world and that characteristics of that material base can yield causal outcomes. After all, military technology does not descend as manna from heaven, but rather is created via human agency in response to perceived threats, and thus it necessarily contains a dose of military culture and broader social identity from the outset. The same goes for the overall share of national economic resources allocated to defense, and indeed, money itself is a socially constructed store of value, albeit one premised upon underlying materially underpinned wealth.38 Any assessment of strategic priorities is necessarily filtered through the strategic-cultural lens of the institution(s) doing the assessing; asking one’s navy for an analysis of the relative merits of sea denial versus power projection, for example, necessarily delivers an answer infused with that navy’s historical trajectory, its sense of its role in the nation and the world, its internal politics, and so forth. The broader question of whether the sea— like other geographical features—constitutes a strategic barrier or a highway similarly requires cultural interpretation. Even technologies with such seemingly self-evident destructive power as nuclear weapons are not self-evidently “good” or “bad,” either morally or strategically, absent social interpretation. One might see them as “bad” because of the potential humanitarian consequences of their use (or because of the constraints they impose on conventional military options), or “good” because of the casualties in conventional war they prevent (and deterrence that they enable at low relative cost). Their political meaning is thus socially constructed, even if the physiological effects on human bodies of their detonation have only one possible outcome. If military technology and resources require a social component to be both developed and meaningfully deployed, then Wendt’s contention that there is indeed a “rump” material base but that it is simply indeterminate—in the absence of a friend/enemy distinction—as a cause of international outcomes becomes alluring.39 Crucially, however, each of these social choices involves a decisive material effect that is not open to interpretation. It may be debatable whether nuclear weapons are “good” or “bad,” but the effect that one will have on the city and its population of frail, carbon-based human animals over which it detonates represents a single, determinate outcome—and a state facing another state armed with them must therefore make certain necessary calculations based around that capability.40 In the same vein, while the strategic threat/opportunity constituted by geographical features, such as the oceanic moats enjoyed by the United States and United Kingdom, may be a matter of interpretation, the underlying material factor—humans’ inability to cross water without spending resources on capital (ships) that could otherwise have been spent on further ground forces—yields certain necessary outcomes. Indeed, the very foundation of relations between major powers after 1945—secure second-strike nuclear deterrence and its disincentivization of conventional aggression41—rests on a physical “fact”: the relative impenetrability of water to the electro-magnetic spectrum and the associated survivability that it provides to ballistic missile submarines. The same goes for the decision over what share of national economic resources to allocate to defense. Choosing a proportion may indeed be a socially and ideationally informed political choice, but the underlying size of the resource pools—and the military potentiality that they underpin— rests on the total size of the state’s capital stock (both human and physical), which is not a matter of social interpretation. And while military technology is indeed developed in response to human agency, it is done so from within the technical bounds of the feasible. Such rebuttals apply more widely: while the balance of power, including resources and technology, is indeed necessarily interpreted through states’ social lenses, it nonetheless conditions the bounds of the possible even in the absence of social content. And when those possibilities include hostile use, certain behaviors are necessitated by prudent states seeking survival for their populations. Realists should indeed be castigated if they infer predictions solely from the balance of currently existing military hardware—a thin and intellectually impoverished understanding of relative power—and critics are correct to point out that a large stock of materiel is not the same as being able to compel another to do that which they would not otherwise have done, in line with the behavioral output understanding of power commonly associated with Dahl (as distinct from the input understanding).42 But viewing total state power in terms of overall assets, defined as the state’s total stock of physical,43 financial,44 and human capital,45 does a better job of first encompassing all the relevant resources—equipment, stores of value, human bodies and brains—and, second, providing an effective measurable proxy for the underlying causes of behavioral power (given that the latter can only be observed ex post, and is therefore not an effective predictor of outcomes). None of this is to deny that there is a social element to the construction of all these power resources, or indeed that the “material” itself involves a large dose of social input, and this chapter is therefore not attempting to “settle” the debate over the precise nature of the relationship. It is simply to point out, rather, that states’ power resources and their effects are not wholly socially constructed and that the nonsocial element produces certain effects. Turning to specific arguments over states’ pursuit of status, the notion that achieving a particular elevated status and thus fulfilling a certain international-social role might be a goal of states is relatively uncontentious.46 For instance, one insightful recent constructivist work on Britain’s pursuit of international status suggests at the outset that states’ social roles are not the same as their interests, ambitions, values, or capabilities.47 Yet the same work later asserts that social role actually produces national interests, thus implying that states cannot in fact have interests besides those constituted by identity.48 Such conceptual tensions are symptomatic of a theoretical dilemma: the more minimal former assertion is the harder to refute, yet the more ambitious latter claim is necessary if constructivists are to escape the realist retort that fulfilling a social role is merely an interest of states—and a subordinate one to materially underpinned survival at that—rather than the interest. Escaping this retort is in turn necessary if constructivists are to be able to claim that anarchy is indeed what states make of it socially, since transforming the prevailing culture of anarchy would require states to lower their guard against each other—and thus accept higher risk to their survival, at least while the hoped-for transformation was taking place—in pursuit of an international-social value. The less contentious point—that playing a particular social role is one of multiple interests—opens the way to conceding that the most fundamental state interests remain “political” survival (of state territory and institutions), “biological” security (of the citizenry’s bodies), and preserving some baseline level of economic prosperity, since a state that cannot survive cannot achieve anything else. But if that is the case, then from these materially underpinned vital interests follows a need to be capable of defending them against potential foes—and that, if it comes to it, means accomplishing certain military missions.49 Such military capability is necessarily underpinned by material resources, even as it also has a socially constructed dimension. Such capability can be provided independently (internal balancing), via allies (external balancing), or through some combination of the two—prudent strategy, including eschewing avoidable confrontation and aligning with the preferences of powerful allies, is a key aspect of state success50—but either way, it rests on some friendly actor’s underlying resources. And reliance on external balancing brings its own dangers, as recently experienced by European NATO, when one’s allies turn coercive.51 In short, such an analysis—while conceding that social role and status are important to states, all else held equal, and that such concerns sometimes drive them to act in imprudent ways—nonetheless suggests that hedging against abandonment, coercion, or outright destruction via balance-of-power positioning is likely to remain pervasive. This is not to say that there will not be variation in the extent and severity of such competition. All manner of ideational variables might exacerbate or reduce tensions, as discussed above, and even in the absence of such social forces, overt, intensive competition may yield self-destructive outcomes if it increases another side’s insecurity and causes them to adopt a more offensively capable strategic posture in response.52 The point, rather, is simply that conflict will never be a wholly absent possibility and that that reality must condition states’ calculations—often to the point of some level of defensive hedging, if the state has the resources and technology to make that feasible—even in times of broadly cooperative relations. A similar retort can be made against the claims that threat perception and military doctrine are both so fundamentally skewed by culture that they may be commonly and wholly disconnected from balance-of-power concerns, and which subsequently allow for an end to military balancing, mutual threat, and security competition. While this short chapter is clearly not the place for an extensive review, the success of many states— particularly resource-rich ones—in aping military technological and professional best practice would seem to suggest that much of the time states are able to achieve what Gray, borrowing from marketing theory, dubs “good enough” force postures in the face of strategic uncertainty.53 Similarly, when states do “die” in the face of foreign aggression—a rare occurrence in post-1945 international politics—it is more often as a consequence of their relative military weakness and geographical vulnerability than as a consequence of a failure to perceive a looming threat.54 Indeed, a key contribution of the neoclassical realist research program has been to demonstrate that while domestic-political variables may filter strategic behavior in multifarious and often nefarious ways, there are still underlying balance-of-power structural pressures at the international-systemic level that states usually respond to, even if they do so belatedly or imperfectly.55 In short, while Waltzian “socialization” toward accurately perceiving threats and formulating effective military doctrine may frequently be hindered—and sometimes terminally compromised—by cultural factors, as a description of the workings of the international system as a whole (as he intended his theory to be), realist predictions of enduring concern and possible competition over the distribution of material power are not undermined by this recognition.56 Tellingly, despite their strong ideational commitments toward democracy promotion and human rights enforcement under the banner of upholding international order, Western states have recently had the reprioritization of balancing against increasingly capable rivals forced upon them by developments in the balance of power, whether that be China’s rise in Asia for the United States or Russia’s (partial) resurgence in Europe for the rest of NATO.57 Finally, even national identity and the nationalism it engenders—the ideational “master variable” underpinning the nation-state system—is itself forged by the interaction of political group identity and the survival imperative under structural anarchy. To paraphrase Tilly, war makes the state, and the state makes war.58 Modern nation-states may have originated as political groups of individually weak human beings with some shared identity connection, but their choice to form states as protective war machines capable of generating the military power necessary to defend against similar political units, and the subsequent mutual reinforcement of national identity and state strength, is very much consistent with realism’s predictions of the consequences of international structural anarchy. Indeed, as noted earlier, Mearsheimer uses these grounds to argue that nationalism and realism are mutually supportive theories.59 In the post– Cold War world, moreover, mutually threatening political groups’ need to generate the military power necessary for security under anarchy—the security dilemma, in short—helps to explain the explosion of ferocious ethnonationalist and sectarian conflict within and between the new states emerging from the collapse of previously multiethnic communist federations, secular Middle Eastern autocracies, and so forth.60 Such conflict has in turn forged the identity of the states and state-like entities emerging from it. In short, while it is certainly not impossible for national identities to shift, as noted above, the process of their generation nonetheless suggests that they are endogenous to—rather than readily capable of exogenously shifting to transform—international systemic security competition and balance-of-power positioning, that they are as much a dependent variable as an independent variable. Uncertainty and the Menacing Shadow of the Future The previous section outlined why some of the otherwise most convincing constructivist variables at work in international politics nevertheless cannot promise to transform international politics away from a world of “realist,” security-motivated balance-of-power positioning. This section turns to discuss why this is something that social variables will continue to struggle with as long as there is an international system. The principal barrier to states ever setting aside their inclination to guard against each other and instead embrace each other as “friends”—no matter how strong their leaders’ or citizens’ desire to transform the culture of international anarchy—is uncertainty over others’ intentions, particularly their future intentions.61 Following the logic of the prisoners’ dilemma, a state62 that trusts that another means it no harm while the other state concludes that it now has an opportunity to pursue advantage may be punished severely for its complacency, rendering such trust perilous, particularly in security affairs, where defection from cooperation could result in the end of the “game” for one party.63 The meaning and implications of this “uncertainty” assumption merit consideration, however. Human beings are constantly trying to impose certainty on a contingent world via cognitive heuristics and neural shortcuts, for the sake of their own mental well-being.64 Indeed, since humans derive meaning and value from the self-imposed certainty of ideational reinforcement, so too they can derive benefit from the entrenchment of both amity with and enmity against “others,” even when this creates other complications and dangers.65 As a result, much of international politics is influenced by habit, both the habit of friendship and the habit of animosity.66 “Uncertainty” also means different things to different people: for realists, it is a condition from which to infer fear about others’ possible behavior; for constructivists, by contrast, it may simply refer to the inherent indeterminacy of information until it is imbued with social content.67 It may be possible to build trust in others’ benign intent over time and thereby escape security competition, meanwhile, through their costly signaling: forgoing capabilities and policy options that a potential aggressor would not want to do without.68 States can also have the certain “friendship” of those with whom they are balancing against a third-party threat, and if that threat is long-lived, then so too may be the certainty of alliance.69 Illustrating this “uncertainty about uncertainty,”70 consider one of the highest profile oft-invoked security dilemmas: the Cold War escalation of U.S.-Soviet hostility, during which the most seminal security dilemma theorization took place.71 Robert Jervis—one of the concept’s foremost progenitors—subsequently questioned whether the Cold War can be understood as a security dilemma after all, understood as a tragic cycle of mutual threat between nonrevisionist security seekers driven by uncertainty over the other’s intentions. Neither side was “uncertain” over whether the other was an adversary. And as subsequent archival revelations document, each side did want to destroy the other, and correctly inferred as much of its opponent.72 Jervis’s “recantation” of the Cold War-as-security-dilemma is itself bounded, however, and this bounding sheds light on the ways in which varieties of uncertainty can still operate even between states with “certain” mutual intent. “Greedy” states versus “security-seeking” states are themselves binary ideal types that mask an underlying spectrum. Practically all states are greedy, in terms of wanting to improve their lot, if the costs are low enough.73 Conversely, few states are greedy to the point of total unconcern for security; not even Nazi Germany desired limitless global war. While there may not have been uncertainty over each side’s Cold War intent, therefore—enmity-driven desire to defeat and ultimately destroy the other—there was still uncertainty over underlying motivations. 74 A desire to exterminate an enemy population may entail quite different behavior than a desire for ideological supremacy, for example, and the two may therefore merit different policy responses, even though both fall within the domain of “hostile” intent. Such doubt over motivations—even within the cognitively “certain” domain of U.S.-Soviet enmity—still added up to a variety of security dilemma: the most salient question for Americans was not “is the Soviet Union an enemy?” but rather “what might Moscow do about situation X, in Y circumstances, at time Z?” The same is evident in major power politics today. Washington is not “uncertain” over whether or not China and Russia are its “adversaries,” defined in broad and obvious terms, but there is a high degree of uncertainty over what types of rivals they represent and their associated future strategic choices. Recognition of uncertainty’s nonbinary nature, in short, does not undermine the argument that states’ inability to know others’ future behavior with perfect reliability incentivizes them to worry about possible future dangers. Realists disagree over prospects for avoiding security competition through signaling motivations, of course,75 but all variants are united by recognizing the enduring significance of the balance of material power.76 On top of these qualifications to the uncertainty-over-intentions assumption come disagreements over the most appropriate response to such uncertainty. Conceding that we can never know another state’s future intentions with mathematical certainty, and therefore that the worst-case outcome—surprise attack by a concealed aggressor—will always remain a hypothetical possibility does not necessarily imply that security is maximized by treating such a scenario as likely. Provoking war for fear of possible future war is like committing suicide for fear of death, and given the balancing often generated by hostile behavior, provoking others into uniting against oneself through attempted power maximization can ultimately reduce one’s security.77 While worst-case contingencies always merit consideration, policy planning—particularly decisions over how much of the national resource base to devote to defense (“guns”) versus consumption and productive investment (“butter”)78—necessitates probabilistic calculations of the relative dangers of overarmament (provoking balancing alongside domestic economic immiseration) versus underarmament (attack by a better-armed adversary).79 Intense security competition can therefore be an irrational and self-defeating response to mere uncertainty over future intentions, in the absence of other threat data.80 Both “realist” and “constructivist” variables can feature among this threat data and therefore play a crucial part in determining the optimal strategic response to such intentions uncertainty, and that in turn conditions whether the potential threat posed by each side’s capabilities, be they latent or realized, manifests itself as a security dilemma. For many realists, the offense-defense balance of technology and geography determines whether uncertainty over others’ intentions merits military confrontation and determines the (in)stability of states’ strategic relations.81 For constructivists, the solidarity/enmity borne of sociocultural similarity/difference may be equally decisive. But neither of these observations—that uncertainty neither carries a single meaning nor prescribes a single strategy—undermines the core claim that survival has a material base that necessitates continual security-motivated concern for one’s position in the balance of power. Survival may indeed be “multiply realizable,” with social/ideational variables informing the path taken, alongside various “realist” variables. But given all states’ need to safeguard a materially based hierarchy of interests without wholesale reliance on others’ politically contingent (and therefore capricious) benevolence—whether that be potential abandonment by erstwhile allies, potential attack by erstwhile neutrals, or potential coercion by either—their position in the balance of power will always remain relevant to their future security. And given that situation, the conditions for mutual threat and an associated security dilemma to re-emerge are unlikely to be permanently expunged, despite such a deterioration going unrealized indefinitely in many cases due to other overlying factors.82 Fear of future conflict—at least against some state, if not against any specific state—thus remains an endemic feature of international politics. And much of that is still down to the enduring concerns of structurally based realism: international-systemic anarchy, its absence of a reliable sovereign enforcer of global peace, and the associated dangers of offensively capable peers of unreliably benevolent intent. Tellingly, while many contemporary states have achieved mutual “friendship,” they have rarely sustained it once the strategic factors holding them together—such as alliance against a mutual threat, shared membership of a great(er) power’s dependency network, or some other mutually beneficial exchange—have disappeared. This suggests that such “friendship” is as much a dependent variable (an outcome of realist balancing behavior) as an independent variable (a transformational force in international politics).83 Even within the zone of friendship that had come to characterize the European “community” by the late 1980s, for example—probably the deepest case of intersubjective recognition, cooperation, and sovereignty pooling to date—Britain and France still worried intensely about the potential power imbalances created by German reunification, and they were not content until reunified German power was subordinated via a restated US commitment to NATO.84 As noted previously, moreover, via both Trump and Brexit—ideationally motivated shifts in foreign policy orientation85—Euro-Atlantic security relations have recently displayed a dramatic backsliding, raising the specter of alliance breakdown and coercive confrontation. The relative power of all sides is critical to their ability to resist/dispense such coercion and safeguard future security even in the possible absence of alliance support. Even within the EU, the ability of members to resist or dispense coercion comes down to relative power: witness Greece’s experience at German hands in the context of the Eurozone crisis, and contrast it with the lack of sanction for Franco-German breaches of EU rules.86 And between NATO and Russia, a 1990s moment of optimism over developing friendship has retrenched to coercive confrontation as an outcome of each other’s choices.87 All these developments—which can be interpreted as negative movement along the spectrum between cooperation and conflict—illustrate the continuing centrality of relative power to safeguarding a hierarchy of national interests without dependence on the changeable commitments of others. As a consequence, the base conditions for the security dilemma will always exist between sovereign states under anarchy, even if it lies wholly dormant for most states most of the time, thanks to overlying factors. Interstate friendship does not render deterioration to a security dilemma impossible, and neither does interstate animosity preclude stable and durable cooperation.88 So while identity—which in any case is “sticky” and slow to change—certainly matters to security relations, it is unlikely to trump some combination of power and informational variables.89 Of course, if international relations were transformed by the emergence of a single world-state, the system would no longer be anarchic and the units-formerly-known-asstates would not need to rely on relative power for their security, and thus such competition would end.90 That requirement, however, does not look likely to be fulfilled anytime soon. Conclusion Conflict and cooperation is not some binary “either/or” condition, but rather a spectrum. So too the security concerns borne of uncertainty over motivations are not some irreversible “on/off” switch, be that permanently severe or permanently solved. There is certainly far more peace in the world than the most pessimistic readings of realism would seem to imply,91 and ideational similarity and solidarity—as well as the power and informational variables beloved of realists—clearly have something to do with this. Interests within the parameters of continuing to survive are socially constituted, and even the route to survival itself represents an ideationally informed choice. But the need to safeguard a materially underpinned hierarchy of interests if states are to continue to exist—a necessary prerequisite to performing any kind of social role—still incentivizes them to value their position in the balance of power as a safeguard against future dangers. Of course, states can and do disregard certain incentive structures in favor of others.92 But until all states are known to have done so—a high bar indeed—the potential for security competition to re-emerge in the international system will continue to exist. And knowing that, states will continue to prize the capabilities to provide for their own security . . . and so on, creating enduring conditions for security dilemmas to one day reappear, even though they go overlain by other factors in most international relationships most of the time. Both realists and constructivists therefore have work to do, in terms of both refining their paradigmatic cores and recognizing the necessity of analytically eclectic cross-pollination to explain many of the most pressing questions of real-world international politics. Realists must do more to incorporate identity as a variable that produces systemically significant variation in behavior rather than as some adjunct bolt-on, whether that be via the post-1990s boom of neoclassical theorization or attempts at microfoundationally elaborated structural realism.93 Porter’s work on the interaction of power and habit in determining US grand strategy is a good recent example, while—as noted earlier—Snyder’s Myths of Empire remains a key benchmark.94 Constructivists, for their part, must continue to investigate the relationship between states’ potentially infinite array of socially constituted interests, their materially underpinned hierarchy of core survival requirements, and the enduring concern for relative power that the latter generates. Along the way, both sides must be circumspect in their appeals to allegedly “smoking-gun” examples. For realists to claim that structure alone explains World War II or the Cold War, for example— missing the universalist ideologies of German Nazism, Soviet communism, or US liberalism—would be a stretch indeed. Equally, constructivists’ most beloved examples—amicable US-Canadian relations along an easily passable land border, the relative underarmament of Germany and Japan, greater American fear of a few North Korean atomic bombs than hundreds of British thermonuclear warheads, the rise of European Union, and so forth—can all be readily explained with reference to balances of capability and information. “Analytic eclecticism” is easy to profess, but the most pressing contemporary questions of world politics require that theorists practice it too. For those not interested in resolving paradigm wars or “isms” debates, meanwhile, the intersection of material-structural pressures on state behavior with socially constituted foreign policy preferences provides ample scope for investigating crucial real-world questions of our time. Viewed in rationalist terms, this might involve investigating the role of social variables in informing leaders’ utility functions, and thus their preference orderings under the overall structural constraint of needing to ensure continued survival. Just how far could the United States meddle in the Middle East at the behest of domestic interests, for example, before it critically harmed its power position vis-à-vis China? Extending the previous point, has US unipolarity created unique space for a “crazy” foreign policy that disregards the balance of power—both by the United States itself and by close US allies—and will this change if or when unipolarity wanes?95 Relatedly, just how far can the likes of Germany and Japan sustain their pacifistic foreign policy orientations in the face of US relative decline or disengagement and the likely associated need for them to provide more for their own security? Changing tack, how does a small power like Sweden—say—make its trade-off between providing mobile forces for an EU Battlegroup (a cause it values), on the one hand, and maintaining large amounts of conscripts and armor on its eastern border to hedge against Russia (a threat that it cannot be rid of), on the other? Are UK efforts to rebrand as an “aid superpower” facilitated by a nuclear deterrent and the US alliance, say, providing leeway to follow an ideational foreign policy under the cover of a “good enough” military umbrella? In short, there is scope for any number of midlevel theories of foreign policy under the constraint of still recognizing that interstate balance-of-power considerations continue to structure the international system.

#### Even if it’s not perfect it’s best.

OğUzlu 20 – Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Antalya Bilim University. (Tarik, "We are now living in world of structural realism," Daily Sabah, 10-21-2020, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/we-are-now-living-in-world-of-structural-realism?gallery\_image=undefined#big, Accessed 11-3-2020, LASA-SC)

In today's emerging world order, the Cold War-like confrontation between the United States and China is not as rigid as it was between the U.S. and Russia. Neither the U.S. nor China is in any position to gather a group of committed warriors behind themselves willing to fight for unsaturated material benefits or noble ideological causes. Solid alliance structures based on common threat perceptions and unshakeable collective identities seem to have already given way to short-term pragmatic cooperation across rival camps. Compartmentalization has now become the buzzword defining frenemy-like relations between countries. Turkish-Russian relations of the last decade offer a textbook example in this regard. While the two countries are at odds with each other concerning many issues topping the geopolitical agenda of the wider Middle East, the South Caucasus and Eastern Mediterranean regions, they have simultaneously developed the ability to manage their crises lest they get out of control. All countries, irrespective of their material power capabilities, are now trying to improve their ability to resist the emerging tumultuous developments by increasingly adopting a nationalistic approach to international relations. Standing unyielding abroad while going through a restoration process at home is now the most feasible strategy that strategists recommended to national decision-makers to put into use. Speaking the language of populist nationalism and investing in material power capabilities are now common trends across the globe. What better evidence can one find than the European Union, the showcase of liberal understating of international politics, trying now to become a geopolitical power in order to survive in the world of carnivorous powers, such as the U.S., China and Russia? While we are going through a transitional process in global politics in which geopolitical cards are being reshuffled, no particular country, including the two behemoths, lays its cards on the table. Of all international relations theories, it is structural realism that defines today's world order the best. States do not trust each other. The anarchical nature of international relations impedes long-term cooperation. Trust is lacking. International organizations are mere tools used by states in order to gain an advantage at the expense of the other. Material power maximization is the key not only to mere survival but also to regional/global supremacy. States are extremely jealous of their sovereign rights to determine what is right or wrong for themselves. Conflict is the rule whereas cooperation the exemption. Concerns over cheating and relative gains prevent states from developing trust-based relations. Distribution of material power capabilities among states determine who would call the shots in global politics and who would be at the mercy of others; hard power is becoming more and more important than soft power to survive in this jungle. Self-help is the only strategy to rely on. Nationalism outbids internationalism in the competition among alternative ideologies. The nation-state is the most legitimate political community in which liberalism or democracy could survive. The most sacred identity that individuals might theoretically possess is the idea of citizenship. Peace and stability in the world can only be attained through the formation of a stable balance of power among great powers, which are the only actors that matter in international politics. Any attempt to help build a global community of humankind thriving on a universal civilization or political and economic rights is futile. Though states, middle and small powers, in particular, try to preserve their strategic autonomy, they cannot help but choose between balancing or bandwagoning in the mid- to long-term. So long as they can, many middle powers will try to avoid choosing one side at the expense of the other. Yet this will prove to be extremely difficult, as the stiff competition between Washington and Beijing turns out to become an abject enmity in the years ahead. We are fast moving away from a rule-based international order in which liberal and constructivist accounts of international relations would have more explanatory power than the time-tested structural realism.

### 2AC – Threats Good

#### Threat scenario-analysis is good.

Mahnken & Junio ’13 (Thomas; September 2013; Ph.D. and M.A. in International Affairs from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations and History from the University of Southern California, Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies; Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Studies from Johns Hopkins Univeristy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; International Studies Review, Vol. 15, Issue 3 “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” p. 374-395; RP)

This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating “world views,” setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a common tool employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study. This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and pedagogy. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable hypotheses, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an effective way to teach students to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose falsifiable hypotheses, and design new empirical research programs. Scenarios in the Discipline What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which high-consequence, low-probability events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is nuclear warfare, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many **dimensions of political science** theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between military expediency and political objectives during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may improve the study of IR. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.